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ABSTRACT
This study describes, analyzes, and evaluates the
speaking of Thurgood Marshall as Solicitor General of the
United States from 1965-1967, before general audiences and
audiences consisting of lawyers and law students.

This

period represents an important period in the speaker's life
when his services as a speaker outside the courtroom
exceeded earlier years.

Further, these were times of crises

in this nation.
The study includes chapters on Marshall's background
and other influences, development of the Negro's struggle
for equality and justice, analysis of general audiences and
audiences of lawyers and law students, occasions, and
analyses of speeches about equality and justice under law
for all Americans.

Concentrating upon five representative

speeches, an appraisal is made of the overall effectiveness
of the man and his speaking.
The study suggests that as a man whose work
symbolized and spearheaded the struggle of millions of
Americans, especially blacks, for equality and justice under
law for more than a quarter of a century, Marshall was
eminently qualified to speak on the subjects and to the
audiences he addressed.

The application of rhetorical

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

principles was evident in each speech.

Evaluation of the

speaker's logical appeals from a rhetorical point of view
indicates that effective arguments and sound reasoning
contributed significantly to his overall effectiveness.
Marshall's oratory essentially focused on themes dealing
with equal rights and justice and may be characterized
generally as rhetoric advocating reform.

Like other great

orators, Marshall came forward to address recurring crises
in American society and asserted humanitarian and
equalitarian principles to motivate others to ensure con
stitutional guarantees for all Americans.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
The Honorable Thurgood Marshall served as United
States Solicitor General from 1965-1967.

He brought to the

office of U. S. Solicitor General more than twenty years of
experience as legal defense counsel of the National Associa
tion for the Advancement of Colored People

(NAACP) and four

years on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.

As lawyer for the NAACP, he earned the title "Mr.

Civil Rights.

In 1967 he was appointed the first black

Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court.
Further, Marshall received nationwide recognition for
his legal victories before the United States Supreme Court,
which included the banning of white primaries in the South,
the exclusion of restrictive housing covenants, the outlawing
of Jim Crow restrictions in interstate travel and the historic
Brown V. Topeka Board of Education

(1954) case.

He argued

thirty-two civil rights cases before the Supreme Court and
won twenty-nine, culminating his career as NAACP Defense
Counsel with the 1954 decision on segregation in education.

^Arna Bontemps, 100 years of Negro Freedom (New
Dodd, Mead and Company, 1961), p. 249.
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Marshall commands respect as a man with incisive
knowledge of constitutional law and the ability to trans
form constitutional law into realities.

After taking his

oath as the thirty-third Solicitor General of che United
States, he remarked:

"Let me take this opportunity to

reaffirm my deep faith in this nation and to pledge that I
shall ever be mindful of my obligation to the Constitution
and to the goal of equal justice under the law.
Purpose
Essentially,

scholars have written about Marshall's

legal career and his speechmaking in the courtroom.

It

appears that his public address outside of the courtroom has
been largely ignored.

Hence this writer seeks to explore

an important facet of his speechmaking on occasions other
than those before the court.

Further, this study purports

to examine and to investigate from a rhetorical point of
view the principal line of thought or theme— equality and
justice under the law for all— utilized by Marshall in five
selected speeches delivered while he held the position of
Solicitor General of the United States.
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden explain:

In this connection,

"Instead of attempt

ing to evaluate an entire speaking career covering a lifetime
and hundreds of appearances, the critic may limit his

Ti m e , September 8, 1967, p. 16.
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investigation of a man's oratory to a period, phase, a line
of thought or even a single characteristic such as invention,
persuasive appeals, or language pat t e r n s ."^
The study is undertaken for the purpose of achieving
a better understanding of Marshall's public address during
the period from 1965-1967.

This period was selected

because it represents an important era when numerous crucial
issues related to civil rights were prevalent.

During this

period Marshall was frequently invited to address law and
professional audiences about current problems and concerns
related to inequalities and injustices to minorities in
America.

Finally, these years immediately preceded his

appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Significance of the Problem
This study centers upon addresses that dealt with
ideas which "make a difference in the run of human
affairs.

The principal significance of this study rests

in the fact that the critic attempts to forge beyond the
superficial aspects of rhetoric and to probe the basic ideas
the speaker used repeatedly to foster his line of argument.
Another important factor which contributes to the
significance of the problem focuses on speeches dealing with

^Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo W.
Braden, Speech Criticism (2d e d . ; New York:
Ronald Press
Com pany, 1970), p. 312.
"^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 398.
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elements which are characteristic of great public address.
Thonssen/ Baird and Braden note that demonstrative oratory
deals "with noble themes, universal doctrines, and expres
sions of man's higher aspirations."^

These authors also

note that "grand themes derive from momentous events,
actual or impending;

[and] great speeches translate those

themes into catalogs of proposed a c t i o n . T h e writer seeks
to examine these elements of rhetoric "for their contribu
tion to the persuasive efficacy of whole.
Rhetoricians recommend an approach to speeches of
great men "as indicating the great subjects and occasions of
our political history and the spirit and motives of the
great leaders of that h i s t o r y . C o n c e r n i n g the twentieth
century, it has been asserted that "great leaders are men
of eloquent speech and an understanding of their lives and
speeches is essential to a true conception of our political
growth and s e n t i m e n t s . M a r i e H. Nichols remarks,

"Great

speeches reveal man at the intellectual crossroads of his
public life.

They are responses to situations that m an has

^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 398.
^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 392.
^Marie Kathryn Hochmuth, e d . , A History and Criti
cism of American Public A d d r e s s , Volume III (New York :
Russell and Russell, 1955), p. 21.
^Marie Hochmuth Nichols, ^ e t o r i c and Criticism
(Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1967),
p. 52.
^Nichols, p. 57.
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had to confront rather than to flee."^^

Another significant

aspect can be found in the efforts to determine and to
evaluate Marshall's interpretation in the public speech
situation of the world around him and the methods he
employed to communicate the same to his generation.
Method
The method employed in the study of five selected
speeches by Marshall is based essentially on Aristotelian
standards.

The type of criticism is judicial since it seeks

to combine the analytic and synthetic approaches with
another crucial component of evaluating and interpreting the
results.

The judicial approach is best explained by

Thonssen, Baird, and Braden as follows:
It reconstructs a speech situation with fidelity
to the fact; it examines this situation carefully
in the light of the interaction of speaker,
audience, subject and occasion ; it interprets the
data with an eye to determining the effect of the
speech; it formulates a judgment in the light of the
philosophical-historical-literary-logical-ethical
constituents of the inquiry; and it appraises tte
entire event by assigning it comparative rank in the
total enterprise of speaking.
Related Studies
Previous studies of the oratory of Thurgood Marshall
have dealt with his legal career in general and his legal

^Nichols, p. 64.
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arguments before the Supreme Court in particular.

For

example, Jamye Coleman Williams wrote a dissertation
entitled,

"A Rhetorical Analysis of Thurgood M a rshall’s

Arguments Before the Supreme Court in the Public School
Controversy" and Randall W. Bland authored a book covering
Marshall's entire legal career.

However, there are no

studies which focus specifically on the subject matter
treated in this work.
Organization
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden make two observations
that influenced the organization of this study.

First, they

note that
rhetoric, to quote Aristotle, is the "faculty of
discovering all the possible means of persuasion in
any subject."
In other words, rhetoric is an
instrument by which a speaker can, through the apt
use of certain "lines of argument," make an adjust
ment to a situation composed of himself, his audi
ence, his subject, and the occasion.
The impact of
these four forces in a social setting gives rise to
a certain effect or outcome, the understanding of
which concerns the critic.
Consequently, to know
and to evaluate the outcome of a speech necessitates
knowing as much as can be determined about each of
the constituents of the speech situation.
So
canons of oratorical criticism cannot properly be
divorced from considerations relating to speaker,
audience, subject, and occasion.
Secondly, these authors maintain that the critic of oratory
"must delve deeply into the past if he is to understand the
The critic is reminded of the necessity of

^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 18.
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being "sensitively flexible to ideas and trends that con
tinuously shape and re-shape our patterns of thought and
culture.
In this connection. Chapter I consists of informa
tion about the problem, its importance, the method of
approach, related studies, organization of this study and
sources of the speeches.

Chapter II discusses Marshall's

background, training, experience, and other factors,
accounting for the speaker's skill.

Chapter III deals with

socio-political context of the times.

Chapters IV and V

contain rhetorical analyses of five speeches— 1) Address at
the White House Conference on Civil Rights; 2) Address at
Indianapolis Housing Conference;

3) "The Constitution and

Social Change ;" 4) Law Day Address

(University of Miami,

Florida); and 5) "Law and the Quest for Equality."

These

five speeches will be divided into two categories— those
delivered to general or lay audiences and those delivered to
audiences largely made up of members of the legal profes
sion.

The speeches will be analyzed in terms of the nature

of the occasion and audience, organization or structure, the
premises, and use of logical, emotional, and ethical appeals.
Chapter VI deals with the style and delivery and the overall
effectiveness.

Chapter VII attempts to synthesize and draw

conclusions based on the previous analyses.

14,Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 17.
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Some of the speeches studies are printed in the
Congressional R e c o r d .
journals.
of Justice.

Others are printed in law review

Several speeches were supplied by the Department
When two or more written accounts of the same

speech appear in several reliable sources in their entirety,
each text is almost identical.

It should be noted that any

difference between the texts rests largely in the format
but not in the basic content.
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CHAPTER II
MARSHALL'S BACKGROUND AND OTHER INFLUENCES
In order to analyze speeches, the critic must examine
factors in the speaker's life which contributed to his
development as a speaker.

With this in mind, the writer

focuses on pertinent facts about Marshall's background and
experiences which reflect on his speechmaking, specifically
considering Marshall's family background, education, speech
training, legal career and philosophy, and personal charac
teristics .
Family Background
Thoroughgood Marshall, the younger son of William
and Norma Marshall, was born July 2, 1908 in Baltimore,
Maryland.

He was named for his paternal grandfather,

"a

freeman of Maryland"^ and a "rough and tough sailorman.
However, as a second grader, Marshall shortened his name to
"Thurgood" because he "got tired of spelling all t h a t .

^Randall W. Bland, Private Pressure on Public Law
(Port Washington, New York:
Kennikat Press, I n c ., 1973),
p. 3.
^"The Tension of Change," T i m e , September 19, 1955,
p. 24 .
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Marshall's individualism, courageousness, and strong
convictions can probably be traced back to some of his
ancestors,

For example, he told an interviewer about his

great-grandfather who as a small boy was brought from the
Congo to Maryland by a big-game hunter:
The fellow made his objections to slavery so widely
known that the master called him in one day and
told him:
"Look, I brought you here so I guess I
can't shoot you— as you deserve.
On the other hand,
I can't, with a clear conscience, sell anyone as
vicious as you to another slaveholder.
So, I'm
going to set you free— on one condition.
Get the
hell out of this country and never come back."
Marshall added,

"And that . . .

is the only time Massuh

didn't get an argument from the old boy."'^

However, as the

record goes he did not leave the country; he settled down a
couple of miles away, raised his family, lived there until
his death, and nobody ever laid a hand on him.^
Some biographers imply that Marshall probably
inherited his concern for equal justice and human dignity.
For example, Isaac 0. B.
maternal grandfather,

[Olive Branch] Williams, his

spoke out "fearlessly against police

brutality involving a Negro at a civic mass meeting held in
Baltimore in the 1 9 7 0 's.

'Tush-Tush' Job,” New York Times Magazine, August 22, 1965,
p. 68.

Jamye Coleman williams, "A Rhetorical Analysis of
Thurgood Marshall's Arguments Before the Supreme Court in
the Public School Segregation Controversy" (PhD dissertation,
Ohio State University, 1955), p. 73.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

11
According to family legend, Williams was a sailor
who returned from his seafaring adventures with money.

He

opened up a grocery store in Baltimore and "bought a house
next to a white man who turned surley and mean" but who
changed his attitude one day when a mutual fence needed
repair and suggested that he and Williams accomplish the
task together:

"After all," said the white man,

"we belong

to the same church and are going to the same heaven."
However, remembering the slight he had received, Williams
turned down the olive branch.
snapped.^

"I'd rather go to hell," he

Also, Marshall's grandmother, on his father's

side, is remembered for strong determination and uncompro
mising defense of her rights that she demonstrated when the
utility company wanted to place a light pole in her front
yard:

"She just took her chair out to the spot and parked

herself there, day after day, until they gave up and put
it someplace else."®
Other forces that influenced Marshall can probably
be attributed to his home and his immediate family.

One

source notes "The Marshalls lived a happy, comfortable life.
Compared to the lives of Negroes in neighborhoods south and

Justice
D. 23.

Lewis H. Fenderson, Thurgood Marshall Fighter for
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969),
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east of them, it was very comfortable indeed."^

His parents

have been described as "intelligent and strongly antisegregationist"^® and they encouraged him to get the best
education possible.
His mother, a school teacher, closely supervised his
academic endeavors.
and moderation.

From her he probably learned restraint

It has been observed that "as a teacher,

she was among the aristocrats of Negro Baltimore and her
feelings about white-Negro relationships were balanced and
moderated by her sense of service and leadership among her
own people.
His father, a dining car worker and later chief
steward of a Baltimore country club, apparently taught him
to defend his beliefs verbally and physically.

For

example, his father has been described as a man with the
"tendency to disputation."

Further, Marshall's father "had

great faith in facts and devoted much of his free time to
assembling data which he used to challenge the logic of
even the most commonly accepted concepts.
for g r a n t e d . S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,

Nothing was taken

Marshall "enjoyed arguing

with his father, who had a habit of challenging the most

New York:

Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1958), p. 316.

^®Zion, p. 68.
^^"The Tension of Change," p. 26.
^^Bland, p. 4.
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innocent-sounding statements and forcing him to think
through many things he would otherwise have taken for
granted.On

the other hand, the senior Marshall told him

to fight when confronted by racial slurs.
said;

"If

permission

For example, he

anyone calls you a nigger, you not only got my
to fight him— you got my order to fight.

During an interview, Marshall pondered how his
father had influenced his choice of law as a profession:
"He never told me to become a lawyer, but he turned me
into one.

He did it by teaching me to argue, by challeng

ing my logic on every point, by making me prove every
statement I m a d e ."^^
nothing he

One biographer reports,

[William Marshall]

"There was

liked better than to attend

a trial in a courtroom when he had an afternoon off and he
seldom missed reading about law cases in the papers.
Further, it appears that William Marshall "wished that one
of his sons could be a lawyer; sometimes he told Thurgood
that . . .

he would make a good advocate.

The aforementioned facts probably

represent dominant

forces which influenced, directly or indirectly, the
development of Marshall 's dedication to the principles of
equality and justice and his speaking ability.

^^Fenderson, p. 25.
^^"The Tension of Change," p. 24.
News and World Report, June 26, 1967, p. 12.
^^Fenderson, p. 25.

^^Fenderson, p. 27.
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Education and Speech Training
Marshall attended elementary and high schools of
Baltimore.

His grades were not impressive although "he was

endowed with more than a normal supply of intellectual
curiosity.On
misconduct.

numerous occasions he was punished for

The principal repeatedly required him to spend

long hours in the basement of the school studying the Con
stitution.

Marshall recalls in one interview that by

graduation he had memorized the entire document.

Possibly,

this experience eventually blossomed into his dynamic
career as a constitutional lawyer.
In 1926, Marshall entered Lincoln University, in
Pennsylvania, which has been described as one of the half
dozen really choice colleges for Negroes; a good school,
more strict for learning than most; and staffed almost
exclusively with Princeton m e n .^^

At Lincoln, he studied

pre-dentistry but found it b o r i n g . D u r i n g his sophomore
year, Marshall began to relish "the thrill of learning
under competent instructors and— as a member of the
Forensic Society— the challenge of debate.
Marshall appears to have been developing a directtion and commitment characteristic of other Lincoln

^^Redding, p. 316.

l^Ibid.

^"^Fenderson, pp. 32-33.
^^Redding, p. 317.
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students.

Describing Lincoln men of this period, one writer

observes that "beneath the selfish ambitions projected in
their boastful dreams blazed a furious zeal for the concept
of racial equality, burned a bitter hatred of injustice,
smoldered a lava flow of race consciousness that alternately
anguished and exalted t h e m . O f

the experiences that

affected his speaking were Marshall's activities as a
debater.
As a member of the debate team, Marshall dedicated
many hours of the day "preparing his speeches— looking up
facts with which to overwhelm the opposition."
Marshall was proud of his endeavors.
father, he wrote,

Obviously,

In a letter to his

"If I were taking debate for credit, I

would be the biggest honor student they ever had around
here."

His oratorical efforts were commended by his father

with great pride.

In Baltimore, William Marshall assured

the other members of the family;

"He's learning just as

much, if not more, by having to prepare all those speeches
than he'd ever learn just to pass an exam.
Thurgood— he is thorough.
I'll bet he's darn g o o d .

You know

And good, come to think of it.
^

In keeping with his father's prediction, Marshall
distinguished himself as a speaker during formal debates

22Ibid.
^^Fenderson, p. 33.
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as well as in informal speech situations.

For example, it

is a matter of record that in formal debate he was a for
midable opponent.

On less formal occasions, he exhibited

effectiveness as a persuasive speaker:
One night . . . there was a football rally in
the auditorium.
Lincoln had lost every game but
one since the season opened, and had hoped that a
little school spirit might change the team's luck.
Thurgood jumped up on the stage and delivered a
twenty-minute speech which brought the house down
with cheers, shouts, and piercing whistles.
Later,
he claimed total credit for the tie game played by
Lincoln that weekend.
Later, during the semester, Marshall attacked
inequality and injustice by direct confrontation.

For

example, he and five other Lincoln University students suc
cessfully desegregated the local motion picture theatre when
they proceeded to sit in the section for whites and ignored
requests to take seats for Negroes in the balcony.
ing this incident, Marshall wrote his father:

Follow

"The amazing

thing was, when we were leaving we just walked out with all
those other people and they didn't even look at u s — at
least as far as I know.

I'm not sure I like being invisible,

but maybe i t 's better than being put to shame and not able
to respect y ourself.
At Lincoln, Marshall developed race consciousness
combined with a love for reading.

For example, many lengthy

"bull sessions" focused on the successes of prominent Negroes

24

,
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like Paul Roberson and the literary acclaim received by
Negro poets and writers of the late twenties.

Also Marshall

engaged in an intensive program, reading "all the books by
or about Negroes he could lay his hands on.

Sociology,

history, fiction, and poetry were pouring from the press in
unbelievable quantity.

He read Julia Peterkin and Carl Van

Vechten and was skeptical.

He read Jerome Dowd's The

American Negro and felt changed.

He read Carter Woodson's

The Negro in American History and was uplifted.

He read Du

Bois."26
According to most reports, his marriage to Vivian
Burney during his junior year at Lincoln "became a stabiliz
ing influence on his activities
academic zeal."2^

[and] inspired in him an

Evidence supports the fact that as a

senior his academic achievement was excellent, and he
became a superior debater in the Forensic Society.

Perhaps,

these facts account for his discarding the idea of a
career in dentistry and deciding to pursue law studies.
Graduating cum laude with a bachelor of arts degree
in the humanities, Marshall submitted application to the
"all white" University of Maryland Law School.

When his

application was rejected, he enrolled in the law school at
Howard University in Washington, D.C., a law school

26Redding, p. 318.

27g2and, p. 5.
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"thoroughly dedicated to the enlargement of the Negro's
civil rights.
At Howard University, he was tutored by many
scholars and renowned professors.

To understand the nature

of Marshall's law instruction, we must also appraise the
philosophy of an administration by Negroes who were begin
ning to assume direction of higher education for Negroes.
The record reveals the following:
Howard University was experiencing a regenera
tion.
Its first Negro president, Mordecai Johnson,
had set out willfully to destroy the reputation
for social glamor that, while it brought the
university a kind of prestige, had sapped its
intellectual and spiritual vitality for half a
century.
A man of vision, and tremendous drive.
Dr. Johnson was one of those Negroes who believed
that the ferment of the times, the shifting patterns
of thought and behavior, the skeptical inquiry and
rebellion of the middle class intellectual against
the old dogmas, loosening of conventions, the tohell-with-it disillusionment of the masses— in
short, the change, the doubt, the fear and chaos
that characterized the great depression— presented
an opportunity for the social reparation of the
Negro, if only the Negro would seize it. Johnson
believed that the business of education was to
incite beneficial change and to help solve the
problems that change brings.
An institution of
learning, while it protected the good and valuable
in older traditions, must at the same time encourage
that "higher individualism" that constantly makes
for new and greater v a l u e s . 29
Equally important were the teachers responsible for
Marshall's training as a law student.

Dr. Mordicai Johnson

selected for Howard University's faculty persons of similar
convictions and of "undeniable intellectual stature."

For
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example, Alain Locke,

"the spiritual father of the Negro

renaissance," taught philosophy; Franklin Frazier was in
sociology; E. E. Just taught the natural sciences; Rayford
Logan taught history; Ralph Bunche was in government and
politics; and in the law school were Charles Houston,
William Hastie, and James Nabrit.^*^
As a law student, Marshall came under the influence
of Professor William Hastie, graduate of Harvard Law School
and former editor of the Harvard R e v i e w , who "devoted his
efforts to students with the most p o tential."
reports,

R. L . Bland

"In 1930 his most promising student was Thurgood

Marshall."

Later, Marshall and his former teacher served as

legal defense counsels for the N A A C P .

It should be noted

also that Hastie became the first Negro governor of the
Virgin Islands; in 1937 he became the first Negro appointed
to a Federal Court of Appeals in Philadelphia.^^
Perhaps the most important influence on Marshall's
legal training was Dean Charles Hamilton Houston, practic
ing attorney for six years and Howard law professor for
fifteen years, who has been described as follows:
A brilliant lawyer who had been a Phi Beta Kappa
at Amherst had obtained his law degree from
Harvard. . . .
A dedicated worker and activist in
the newly mobilized civil-rights movement, the dean
was also a member of the NAACP.
Houston felt that
Negro lawyers should be social engineers, and he
attempted to make Howard the production center for
the new breed of Negro lawyer.
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Substaiitial evidence supports the fact that Dean Houston
was Marshall's mentor in law school.

Houston "taught his

protégé the strategy of using existing laws to defeat racial
discrimination" and he encouraged Marshall "to know the law
thoroughly."

Marshall recalled in an interview:

"I heard

law books were to dig in; so I dug, very d e e p ."^^
An important influence upon Marshall's speaking
should be mentioned.

At Howard, he had the opportunity to

continue speechmaking in the Moot Court held in the Howard
Law Library.

Since Hastie, Nabrit, and Houston frequently

represented the NAACP in civil rights cases,

"Howard Law

[School] had become a kind of legal laboratory, where offi
cials of the NAACP met with faculty and some of the
brighter students" to determine courtroom strategies against
racial inequalities.^^

Also, Marshall frequently observed

distinguished lawyers presenting cases to the Supreme
Court.

It has been reported that "John W. Davis . . . one

of the most brilliant lawyers of his time" became
"Marshall's hero" while he was studying law at Howard.
Additionally,

it is said that Marshall "skipped classes to

go to the Supreme Court whenever Davis was arguing a
case.Marshall's

active participation, dedication, and

diligence in Moot Court earned respect from his instructors

^^Redding, p. 320.
(1966), CXII, No. 32, A985-A986.
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and fellow students.

At the same time, he was being

observed by leaders of the NAACP.

For example, Walter White,

then chief executive of the NAACP, recalled Marshall's
vibrancy, confidence, and sagacity during these sessions:
A lanky, brash young senior law student who was
always present.
I used to wonder at his presence
and sometimes was amazed at his assertiveness in
challenging positions [taken] by Charlie [Houston]
and the other lawyers.
But I soon learned of his
great value to the case in doing everything he was
asked, from research on obscure legal opinions to
foraging for coffee and s a n d w i c h e s . 35
Marshall's formal legal training at Howard terminated
when he graduated in 1933 as valedictorian.

Perhaps of

greater importance in the making of the Marshall the a d v o 
cate is the fact that his close relationship with Houston
continued long after graduation.
Legal Career and Ideology
Following his graduation from Howard, Marshall's
commitment to the campaign for human rights and equal
justice crystalized as he began private practice in
Baltimore.
scarce.

Economic depression made clients and fees

But Marshall appeared to be a dedicated lawyer wi t h

a mission.

Saunders Redding writes:

His clients were poor in everything except frus
trated rage at the injustices of dispossessions,
evictions, police brutality, and excessive
penalties for offenses.
Marshall, who had "learned
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what rights were," threw himself into these cases
with a zeal that the prospect of large fees could
not possibly have stimulated.
He took many of
them without the slightest expectation of fees.
He
became known in Baltimore and the surrounding
county as the "little man's lawyer."
He became
known as a crusader in the war for human rights.
Of seemingly importance to Ma r s h a l l 's development as
a speaker were his experiences assisting Charles Houston
who had become special counsel of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People

(NAACP).

This posi

tion required that Marshall devote "all of his time and
intelligence to the kind of legal work he loved" and enabled
him to join "an organized, cooperative effort to attain
ends which, he felt, must no longer be compromised."

Houston

admitted to Marshall that this job "would also mean
exhausted patience, discouragement, privation, and even
physical danger."

Disregarding this fact and that he would

receive only a meager salary,
alacrity.As

"Marshall accepted with

the record goes, Marshall "worked eighteen

to twenty hours a day" and "traveled fifty thousand miles
a year.
As an NAACP attorney and later Director-Counsel
[in the 1930s, it was probably the most demanding legal
post in the c o u n t r y ] , M a r s h a l l spoke frequently to NAACP
members and other groups interested in alleviating racial

^^Redding, p. 328.

^^Redding, p. 321.
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discrimination and injustice.

However, it seems that his

acclaimed and most effective speaking took place in the
courts of many states where he defended successfully most
cases involving black Americans and other minorities or poor
people whose constitutional rights had been threatened or
denied.

"In one Southern court after another, local, state,

and federal— thirteen times in five years— he argued that
'injury results to the human personality subjecting or sub
jected to' civil inequalities."^®
It appears appropriate to discuss some instances of
Marshall's "matchless years of experience in civil law" and
proficiency in the courts which probably confirmed his
belief that the equalitarian concepts embodied in the
Declaration of Independence and that the constitutional pro
hibition of distinctions based on race and color must
become a reality.
Marshall's legal career afforded many opportunities
to attack inequalities and discrimination in many areas,
particularly in educational opportunities.

Historians note

that "the very first brief prepared by Marshall in his new
job was in a suit brought against the University of Missouri
to admit a Negro to the law scho o l ."

In this particular

case, Lloyd Gaines applied for but was denied admission to
the university "on the grounds that a state provision to
finance the graduate and professional training of Negroes

^®Redding, p. 328.

^^Redding, p. 327.
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in schools outside of the state constituted equality."
Since lower courts had upheld the state's position that to
admit a Negro to the University of Missouri was "contrary
to the constitution, laws and public policy of the State,
the case was taken to the Supreme Court.

About the argument

and the decision. Redding comments :
Marshall based his argument squarely on that
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment which forbids
the state to deny any person under its jurisdiction
equal protection of the laws.
The United States
Supreme Court was asked to decide on the appli
cability of this clause to the case at hand.
On
December 12, 1938, it ruled six to two that
"equality of education must be provided within the
borders of the state."
It was a broad decision
that not only reaffirmed an earlier opinion that
"separation (of the races) is legal only when it
provides equality between the races," but opened the
way for legal action to compel the equalization of
school funds, teachers' salaries, and school
facilities of all k i n d s . ^3
As the NAACP's defense counsel, Marshall partici
pated in more than fifty cases arguing twenty-nine of the
thirty-two cases before the Supreme Court and winning all
but three and culminating in the landmark decision of 1954—
Brown V. Topeka Board of Education.

Regarding the outcome

of this last case, it has been said:

"On Monday, May 17,

1954, the Supreme Court handed down its epochal decision.
'We cannot turn back the clock to 1868 . . . when the
(Fourteenth) Amendment was adopted or even to 1896, when
Plessy V. Ferguson was written.

...

We conclude that in

43 Redding, pp. 322-323.
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the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place.'

Further, it has been remarked

that Marshall set a unique record in the historic Brown
case since he opposed for the first time the late John Davis,
the undisputed Dean of Constitutional law and w o n . ^
Marshall's many victories against injustice have
been acknowledged by numerous sources.

For example, one

source enumerates other areas :
Thurgood Marshall stood with Authurine Lucy at
the closed doors of the University of Alabama to
give her the legal support enabling her to enter
it.
He attacked the fortress of Central High
School in Arkansas with the Little Rock Nine, those
nine brave Negro children who became the first
blacks to enter that high school.
He charged
through the South before the triumphs of the late
Martin Luther King, arguing, convincing, crusading
for first-class citizenship for black Americans,
shooting down with his fiery legal ammunition the
"colored" signs in public washrooms, classrooms,
restaurants, buses and trolley cars.
He demanded
and got an end to segregation in jails, on juries
and in other long sacred forts of lily
whiteness .46
It should be added that these victories can be largely
accredited to legal prowess but equally important is the
fact that Marshall and his staff exhibited unusual percep
tion.

For example, Loren Miller writes :

Before the Mayflower: A
History of the Negro in America~1619 - 1964 (Baltimore,
Maryland: Penguin Books, 1966), pp. 311-312.
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Judicial interpretations change as the social
climate changes.
Vast changes, far beyond the
ability of any man to foresee in 1930, were to
sweep over the United States, and the world, in the
area of race relations, in the . . . decades after
1930.
Old ideas perished, and new and revolutionary
concepts replaced them.
A n appreciable part of the
genius of the NAACP lawyers lay in their ability to
take them at their flood and translate them into
constitutional concepts palatable to Supreme Court
justices, who were . . . propelled in new direc
tions by social change and architects of that
change.
NAACP lawyers could not have won the con
stitutional victories that lay ahead of them without
their technical and legal skills, even in the con
text of the changing climate of the times.
But with
the greatest of skill and preparation, they could
not have prevailed in an unchanged climate or in a
closed society.47
Similarly, Jamye Williams comments on strategy in the Brown

Marshall and his colleagues recognized that on
their side, in addition to the law, was the neces
sity of preserving in the eyes of the world the
prestige of the United States as a democracy.
They
were also aware that world conditions— the striving
for freedom of colored peoples all over the world—
were a mitigating factor.
Not to be overlooked were
the social and economic changes in the structure of
American society— "the felt necessities of the
time."48
Another observation seems to summarize Marshall's accom
plishments during this period in his career:

"Thurgood

Marshall's contributions to the amelioration of the Negroes'
lot, and, through them, to the causes of civil rights, in

Loren Miller, The Petitioners:
The Story of the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Negro (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1966), p. 261.
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general, have been unquestionably significant.

Both as a

symbol and as a legal tactician, his work is crucial,
particularly in the 1 9 4 0 's and the 1 9 5 0 's.

Especially his

strategy in the Brown case, and its antecedent events,
looms giant.
Concerning his stature during the sixties, it has
been noted that Thurgood Marshall was the symbol of hope
of this age.

He was also the bulldozer of the Negro

revolution of the sixties.

By influencing almost single-

handedly crucial parts of the constitutional law of the
land, Marshall cleared away the legal rubble and placed
Negroes within striking distance of their goals.
Perhaps, the following represents an enlightening
comment on his legal victories as an NAACP lawyer and their
impact on society:
The opinions in these cases define the consti
tutional rights of the Negro as a citizen.
In
addition, they broaden the interpretation of
constitutional rights for all citizens and extend
civil liberties for whites as well as Negroes.
The activity of the lawyers acting for the
NAACP has added to the body of law on civil rights
for all Americans.
The association by pressing
these cases, has brought nearer to realization the
ideal embodied in the quotation engraved over the
Supreme Court in Washington, D.C.:
"Equal Justice
Under Law."
While it may be true that laws and constitu
tions do not act to right wrong and overturn estab
lished folkways overnight, it is also true that the
reaffirmation of these principles of democracy
build a body of public opinion in which rights and

^Bland, p. 116.
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privileges of citizenship may be enjoyed, and in
which the more brazen as well as the more sophis
ticated attempts at deprivation may be halted.50
In 1961 Marshall left his position with the NAACP.
He was appointed by President John F. Kennedy to a
Federal Judgeship to the Second Circuit Court of A p p e a l s .
Commenting on Marshall's career, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
remarked that "Marshall had been the leading figure in the
legal strategy of civil rights; and his elevation to the
federal judiciary therefore implied a recognition of the
merits of his cause as well as of his own qualities."51

As

a federal judge, Marshall received his share of criticism.
In response, his supporters replied that Marshall was
studying matters between tax law and admiralty law in order
to prepare himself thoroughly for his appointment to the
Office of Solicitor General of the United States.
his judgeship, one comment is worthy of mention;
wishes to be fair.
milestone cases.

Regarding
"One

Freshman judges are not assigned to
The most luminous judicial mind would be

hard put to shine in most of the cases that were assigned to
Marshall for opinions.

The best that can be said is that

Marshall dutifully did his work."

Further and perhaps sig

nificantly, the record shows that "in four years none of
Marshall's ninety-eight opinions for the majority was

^^Thurgood Marshall, "Equal Justice Under Law,"
The Crisis, 40:201, July 1, 1939.

^^Bland, p. 119.
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In
fact/ "some became law.
After four years as a federal judge, Marshall was
nominated Solicitor General of the United States.

In this

position he was the government's chief lav;yer before the
Supreme Court:

he determined the cases to be taken before

the Supreme Court; and he was the third-ranking official in
the Department of Justice.

As Solicitor General,

"He was

. . . largely responsible for making policy, deciding what
particular arguments to make, what to give up to the
opposition and sometimes even to decide when the government
came out second best.

Also, the Supreme Court relied

'heavily' upon Marshall for accurate explanation of legal
problems.
The following comment summarizes Marshall's perfor
mance as Solicitor General:

"Between 1965 and 1967

Marshall argued nineteen cases for the government before the
Supreme Court of the United States and was victorious in all
but five.

As Solicitor, the areas of constitutional law

with which Marshall was chiefly concerned were those of
civil rights and the use of listening devices on the part of
federal law enforcement o f f i c e r s . S p e c i f i c a l l y ,

Marshall

^^Bland, p. 129.
^^Zion, p. 69.
^^Fenderson, p. 116.

^^Bland, p. 133.
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prepared briefs and argued cases dealing with Negroes'
rights to participate completely in the electoral process.
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965; but in 1966
South Carolina challenged the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the Voting Rights Act.

The Solicitor

General headed the team writing the brief for South
Carolina v. Katzenbach.

Regarding his endeavors in this

case, it has been reported:
Pleading that the bill of complaint be dismissed,
Marshall in written argument contended that the
1965 Act was a proper application of the Fifteenth
Amendment.
He noted that Congress is not confined
by its express powers merely to allow the courts
the authority to strike down state laws in viola
tion of the Amendment, but that it may take positive
action as well.
This . . . is "a necessary
corollary" of the regulatory function of legisla
tion.
The Solicitor General pointed out that
neither Article I, Section 2, of the original Con
stitution nor the Seventeenth Amendment confers on
the state the absolute authority to grant or
withhold the franchise on any conditions it wished.
As far as doing so on the basis of race or color,
Marshall concluded that the Constitution expressly
forbids such action.
[Following oral argument by
the Attorney General of the United States, the
Supreme Court dismissed the bill of complaint.]^®
Marshall presented oral argument in another case
involving voters' rights.

This case— Harper v. Virginia

Board of Elections— dealt with "state imposition of poll
taxes in local elections."

According to reliable sources,

Marshall asserted that "the poll-tax requirement was a denial
of the 'equal protection of the laws' of the Fourteenth
Amendment."

Further, it has been said:

°Bland, p. 139.
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Marshall reasoned that those portions of the Con
stitution referring to "the Qualifications
requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch
of the State Legislature" do not confer on the
states the unbridled license to exclude any citizen
from the electoral process that it may choose at
any given time.
In conclusion, the Solicitor
General pointed out that both Sections 1 and 5
invest some authority in Congress to regulate state
voting qualifications and thereby prove that state
prerogatives in these motives may be subjected to
justifiable restrictions.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court responded to Marshall's argu
ment favorably.

It decided that the Virginia requirement

represented "a violation of the equal-protection clause of
the Fourteenth A m e n d m e n t ."57
Marshall successfully argued not only civil rights
cases but also cases involving labor-management relations,
internal revenue violations, corporate structures, etc.^®

It

appears that Marshall's performance impressed President
Johnson.

Nominating Marshall Associate Justice of the

Supreme Court of the United States in 1967, Johnson remarked:
"He is the best qualified by training and by valuable
service to the c ount r y ."59
The record shows that reaction to M a r s h a l l 's nomina
tion to the Supreme Court was "overwhelming and, for the
most part, f a v or abl e.
praised his ability.

Legal scholars and associates
For example. Page Keeton, Dean of

^^Editorial, "Supreme Court Justice Thurgood
Marshall," Negro History Bulletin, October, 1967, p. 4.
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University of Oklahoma Law School, said:

"Thurgood Marshall

was an outstanding trial attorney and was well qualified for
the position."

G. Theodore Mitau, Chancellor of the

Minnesota State College System, said:

"I would say he was

uniquely qualified for the a p p o i n t m e n t . H i s

appointment

was "hailed" by NAACP Executive Secretary Roy Wilkins,
Marshall's longtime associate in the fight for equality and
justice, as "a highly significant and well-merited appoint
ment."

Wilkins conti n u e d :
The appointment . . . is a tribute to Mr.
Marshall's brilliant performance as the nation's
foremost civil-rights lawyer.
It is also an indi
cation that leadership in the fight for freedom is
no bar to high public office.
The veteran civil rights attorney . . . carries
to his n ew position extraordinary experience in the
federal courts, a wealth of knowledge of federal
procedures, and a breadth of understanding rare
even among the country's most outstanding and suc
cessful lawyers.
This understanding will help to
make h im a good judge for all Americans of whatever
race or station.
He carries, also, the good wishes of his
legion of friends and admirers, including 20,000,000
Negro Americans whose aspirations for first class
citizenship he voiced so eloquently in his ple a d 
ings and victories at the bar.
Those of us who have been privileged to work
with him for more than two decades in the struggle
for human rights and dignity will miss his d edica
tion, his wise counsel, and his unflagging devotion
and courage.
Our loss is the nation's gain in
which all of us have a s h a r e . 62

°-^Bland, p. 152.
"Marshall Nomination Hailed by W ilkins," The
C risis, 62:559, November, 1961.
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Finally, another of Marshall's associates wrote :
Marshall, in the large, is as well trained and
qualified for the Court as have been most appoint
ments to that body. . . . Marshall had long and
successful experience in the handling of cases
before the Court itself and in constitutional law
generally. This put him above the rank and file of
most appointments. His qualifications, in turn,
might be rated below those of the great legal
scholars and learned judges who have in the past on
occasion been appointed— say Holmes, or Frankfurter.
Don't forget, though, that [John] Marshall, Taney,
Jackson, and Brandeis were all political lawyers
with no prior former judicial experience.
And they
turned out to be among the greatest.63
Personality and Physical Traits
Authorities in the field of rhetorical criticism
remind us that
the speaker's voice, diction, gestures and other
visual and auditory elements are highly revealing.
The audience sizes up the speaker's total impression
as tactful, sincere, friendly, pleasant, honest, or
. . . as pugnacious, indifferent, ignorant,
insincere.
These traits describe not only the
speaker's character as he impresses his listeners
and observers, but in the long run, the genuineness
of the man or w o m a n . 64
In person, Thurgood Marshall is a man of striking
appearance, physically large

("6 ft. 2 i n . , 210 lbs.")

Photographs taken in the sixties reveal Marshall as tall,
handsome and well-groomed.

National Review notes,

"He is an

63b
•^Bland, p. 153.
64„
^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 452.
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affable, out-going, and highly attractive human being. «66
On the other hand. Time Magazine in 1955 reports that "his
tense personality reflects the tensions on his job and his
time and his nation.

And, somehow, also, his personality

reflects the symmetry of the Constitution he serves and
expounds.Even

as a student, Marshall has been des

cribed as follows;
Once he began to discover himself, a fundamental
integrity fixed the abiding elements of his charac
ter in a pattern which, though still incomplete,
could scarcely be mistaken. . . .
He was not only
honest but frank to the point of insult.
He had a
natural affinity for the underdog, for arguing the
unpopular side ("just to exercise his brains"), and
for fighting against the odds.
He would one day
be satisfied with nothing less than complete dedi
cation.
Without willing it or intending it, he
would one day find composed within himself a pride
and passion of race and a shame and hatred of
racial inequality that marked him a "new Negro.
One psychologist friend characterizes Marshall as "a deli
cate balance of turmoils.
Other aspects of Marshall's appearance and person
ality seem significant.

His distinguished and commanding

presence often impressed his contemporaries.

For example,

Eric Sevaried, who heard Marshall on numerous occasions.

James J. Kilpatrick,
Rev iew, July 25, 1967, p. 804.

"The Term's End," National

^^"The Tension of Change," p. 24.

68^Redding, p. 318.
69..

The Tension of Change," p. 24.
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commented :
...

"What stayed with me, what was to be impressive

in his every expression and gesture, one was made

conscious of the presence of an American, period.
Early in his legal career, Marshall began "to take
on with certitude and passion his race's role as the
catalyst in the slow-working moral chemistry of America.
For example,

it has been reported :

Thurgood Marshall's feeling of love and awe
for the Constitution is exceeded only by his
love and awe toward his clients, the Negroes, and
especially Negroes of the South and the border
states, who, facing threats of firing or beating or
even death, continue to sign the legal petitions
and complaints that must be the starting point of
Marshall's cases from the slum and the cotton field
to the high and technical levels of the Supreme
Court.
Of these local NAACP lawyers in the South,
Marshall says:
"There isn't a threat known to men
that they do not receive.
They're never out from
under pressure.
I don't think I could take it for
a week.
The possibility of violent death for them
and their families is something they've learned to
live with like a man learns to sleep with a sore
a r m ."72
Speaking to persons attending the 1948 Annual NAACP Confer
ence in Kansas City, Missouri, June 23, 1948, Marshall seems
to project similar confidence and zeal.

At one point during

U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the
Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Thurgood Marshall
to Be Solicitor General of the United States, Hearing, 8 9th
Congress, 1st Ses s . , July 29, 1965 (Washington:
Government
Printing Office, 1965), p. 9.
^^Redding, p. 321.
"The Tension of C h a n g e ," p. 23.
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the speech Marshall said:

"But we believe that we people

in the United States have the tools to make democracy work.
We have our votes.
ment.

. . .

We have the various arms of govern

Behind all of these, we have the Constitution

of the United States to serve as a democratic frame of
reference for the efforts of all of us.
Marshall asserted:

. . .

Finally,

"We can discharge this obligation only

by dedicating our daily actions at home, in the shop, in
the office, in our churches, in our schools, and in our
social life to the fundamental American democratic princi
ples of removing every semblance of racial and religious
distinctions from every aspect of American life.
Making other occasional speeches, Marshall seems to
be remembered as a man familiar with inequality and
injustice who believed "that the equalitarian concepts
embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the consti
tutional proscription of distinctions based on race and
color should be made to apply.

For example, addressing

the Forty-fifth Annual Convention of the NAACP in Dallas,
Texas, on June 30, 1954, Marshall discussed the Supreme

Thurgood Marshall, "Restrictive Covenants and the
Segregation Picture” (Address before the thirty-ninth
annual conference of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, Kansas City, Missouri,
June 23, 1948), p. 11.
(Mimeographed.)
^'^Marshall, "Restrictive Covenants and the Segre
gation Picture," p. 13.
^^Redding, p. 327.
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Court decision of May 17 that found school segregation laws
in Kansas, Delaware, Virginia, and South Carolina unconsti
tutional .

He added :

Compulsory racial segregation is not only immoral
and illegal, it is now un-American.
What does this
mean?
It means that if the law of the land is
followed in good faith, every American can n o w move
about in his community without the threat of being
penalized by racial segregation statutes.
It means
good Americans can decide for themselves whether they
want to or do not want to associate with other
Americans.
It merely means that we are getting back
to the bedrock of democracy, the necessity for pr e 
serving and protecting the equality of m a n — the
equality of the i n d i v i d u a l . 7b
In keeping with some social utility principles and conveying
his firmest convictions, Marshall continued:
The effect of this decision [Brown] in world
politics today has been tremendous a n d b e y o n d the
expectation of anyone.
Every nation except Russia
and her satellites has commented most favorably upon
these decisions.
The decisions have been heralded
as a new hope for democracy and have been generally
accepted as such.
But these same countries are
watching most carefully to see what implementation
will come from local school boards in the several
southern states now that the law has been made
clear to them.
The movement toward implementation
of the law of the land reveals many bright spots
and many dark ones.
I, for one, do not intend to
waste my time or the NAACP 's time in debating back
and forth statements made by some politicians of the
South who have repeatedly demonstrated that solely
for political ambitions they not only put themselves
above the law of the land, but are willing to wreck
the land, if necessary, in order to get re-elected.
We have too m u c h work to do to spend our time on
people who have no faith in the American tradition.

^^Thurgood Marshall, "Address by Thurgood Marshall,
NAACP Special Counsel" (Address before the forty-fifth
annual convention of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, Dallas, Texas, June 30,
1954), p. 2.
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or who interpret that tradition selfishly in the
narrow terms of their own convenience and personal
or provincial racial bigotry.
Nor do I believe we
should waste too much time on the few Negroes in
the country who might have been so indoctrinated by
these politicians or by their long oppression, as
to actually believe that they are better off as
second-class citizens than as 100 percent Americans.
Rather, I think we should spend our time on working
with men of goodwill who have faith in our govern
ment, faith in our democracy and are willing to
work out their salvation within the framework of the
law of the land.
Fortunately for our nation, this
latter group constitutes the vast majority that has
enabled us to survive every national crisis of
d a t e . 77

Marshall's experiences in the courtroom as well as
other public speaking probably equipped him to use appro
priate bodily action to reinforce his ideas.

For example,

on numerous occasions during the fifties and sixties, he
spoke to college students, teachers' organizations, and
other groups throughout the country.

Frequently, people

addressed in Louisiana remark that he maintained good eye
contact, varied his pitch, rate, volume, and quality appro
priately, and used a variety of gestures and movements to
emphasize his ideas.
Having dedicated most of his life to the practice
and administration of justice and to acquiring a thorough
knowledge of the Constitution, it is not surprising that
Marshall was selected to attend the 1961 Kenya Constitutional
Convention in London, England.

Following this experience,

Marshall remarked that he was "going to understand our

77 Ibid.
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problems in the USA . . . better than before."

Similar

experiences confirm confidence of the nation's highest offi
cials in Marshall's dedication to democratic principles and
his competence as a communicator.

For example, he was

President John Kennedy's personal representative at the
independence ceremonies in Sierra Leone in Africa, and he
was head of the United States delegation to the Third United
Nations Congress in S t o c k h o l m . L a t e r ,

having earned the

President's respect. President Kennedy nominated him for
appointment to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

During

the hearings Senator Kenneth Keaton of New York declared
high esteem for Marshall:

"Rarely does a man, regardless of

race, earn the kind of professional and personal respect
that has come to Thurgood Marshall.

He has helped shape

some of the most important legal advances of the decade in
the field of civil rights.
Marshall was acclaimed for his forensic speaking as
Director-Counsel for the NAACP.

He argued successfully

hundreds of cases dealing with civil rights and segregation
which earned for him the label "Mr. Civil R i g h t s " a n d
Desegregation."®^

Further,

"Mr.

it is generally agreed that "the

Solicitor General of the United States," Negro History
Bulletin, January, 1966, p. 85.
®^Bland, p. 7.
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name indelibly stamped on this victory

[the United States

Supreme Court's decision in the Brown v. Topeka Board of
Education case holding segregated schools contrary to the
Fourteenth Amendment]

is Thurgood Marshall."®^

One

historian adds that "to Negroes of the rank and file he
represents what folk heroes have represented immemorially:
the ability to outwit, outscore, and eventually overcome
forces of entrenched and organized oppression.

...

He

has accomplished this without becoming pompous or thinking
himself too i m p o r t a n t . A l s o ,

for his numerous courtroom

victories he was extolled "in legal circles as a lawyer's
lawyer— an ideal person to represent the government and the
people.
Others observing Marshall in the courtroom suggest
the intelligibility and the flexibility of his voice.

For

example, it is stated that "in a calm, moving voice, he
poured out his innermost beliefs regarding segregation."
Also, his "superb control" seems o b v i o u s . O n

the other

hand, the following remark is made about Marshall's vocal
skills in a different setting:
loudest

"He is at his sincerest and

(and that is very sincere and quite loud)

in

declaring that he is only one of millions, white and Negro,

82„ The Tension of Change," p. 23.
York:

Dodd, Mead and Company, 1961), p. 249.
85.Fenderson, p. 91.
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whose courage^

sweat, skill, imagination, and common sense

made the victory p o s s i b l e . O t h e r s

have suggested

Marshall's exceptional vocal skills in the courtroom as well
as in other speaking situations.

For example, National

Review reports that in the court he was "brilliant" and
"articulate."87

Eric Sevaried comments that Marshall was

"impressive and humbling . . .

in everything

[he] said.

Time Magazine disclosed that he argued the law in "meticu
lously scholarly tones" and "he has an equally comfortable
drawling Negro dialect.
Following a personal interview, John Dorsey wrote an
article about Marshall which was printed in The Baltimore
Sun of February 20, 1966.

In part, Dorsey provides impor

tant testimony about Marshall's vocal qualities and his
ability to adjust voice to audience and situation.

For

example, Marshall's voice as Solicitor General is described
as follows:

"He represents his positions before the

Supreme Court with simple eloquence and in distinguished
tones that bear no trace of the Negro accent he puts on in
less formal situations."

The interviewer continues:

"One

„

86 The Tension of C hange," p. 23.

^^Bland, p. 117.
^^"The Supreme Court Negro Justice," T i m e , June 23,
1967, p. 18.
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of Marshall's chief assets in dealing with frightened and
doubtful plaintiffs in civil rights cases in the Deep South
was his adjustable Negro accent, which grew more and more
pronounced the farther south he went.

It made others feel

at home and confident in his presence.
Marshall's vocal variety and the unique nature of
his personality led one interviewer to make the following
observation:

"He is a big man . . . with a voice that can

be soft or raucous, manners that can be rude or gentle or
courtly, and an emotional pattern that swings him like a p e n 
dulum from serious to absurb.

His dignity can slide easily

into arrogance and his humility into self-abasement, but
not for long.

Humor— his own— brings him back to center.

Another description confirms his sense of humor but more
importantly adds other dimensions:
What he was amounted to a yeasty mixture of brash
assertiveness, a sharp and sportive sense of humor,
an instinct for people, an amused irreverence for
the "solemn finer things of life," and mercenary
ambitiousness.
At forty-five he retained his
sense of humor and his gregariousness, but all else
changed.
At forty-five he had defended in a hundred
courts of law the finest concepts of human dignity
and equality of civil rights, had wo n twelve of
fourteen cases on issues before the highest court
in the land, and was everywhere acknowledged to be
the leading civil rights lawyer of his time.52

U.S., Congressional Re c o r d , 89th C o n g . , 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No. 32, A985-A986.
^^"The Tension of Change," p. 24.
^^Redding, p. 315.
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One example of Marshall's brashness combined with
other factors which contributed to his effectiveness as a
speaker has been included in the account of an incident in
Austin, Texas.

As the record sho w s , Marshall traveled to

Dallas, Texas, to investigate a case involving the assault
of a Negro physician who had attempted to assume jury duty
in accordance with a summons he had received.

After

gathering the facts pertaining to this case, Marshall went
to Austin unannounced and secured a conference with Governor
James Allred.

What transpired is significant;

"The

governor at first seemed offended by such brashness, but he
soon got over it.
an agitator.
ity.

Marshall neither looked nor sounded like

He talked to the governor with quiet sincer

His whole, somewhat easygoing manner bespoke the

belief that a reasonable man will be moved by reason.

Wi t h 

in the hour Allred 'ordered out the Texas Rangers to defend
the right of Negroes to jury service.
Marshall's supporters and detractors commend his
alert, powerful mind and his scholarly traits.

Evidence

supports the fact that Marshall the scholar could be found
"reading, noting, thinking, remembering— late into the
night almost every night."

Also, Marshall has been des

cribed as "a sound, conscientious, imaginative legal
scholar."

Many persons remark that "what he decides to do

93'Redding, p. 323.
"The Tension of Change," p. 24.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

44
about a thousand practical legal questions will interact
powerfully with the decisions and attitudes of other men of
similar and quite different and opposite views.
Marshall's preparation for his appearances in court
was intensive and extensive.

For example, one writer

comments on the five years of endeavors and collaboration
preceding the victorious decision in the Brown v. Board of
Education case:
This included not only lower-court hearings attack
ing inequalities in the salaries of Negro teachers,
in educational opportunities, in employment, in
travel accommodations, and in the exercise of the
ballot— thus establishing precedents and erecting
a body of confirmable opinion item by item; but it
also included periodic conclaves the likes of which
had never before been convened for such purpose.
For days at a time, year after year, social
scientists, psychologists, historians, legal
experts, and educators— white and colored, and all
volunteers— met in New York to wrestle with every
aspect of the problem that Marshall and his staff
thought likely to be raised in the courts of law.
Less frequently, in the days just before an actual
hearing, the staff of NAACP lawyers . . . would
hold moot court in the Howard Law School Library,
with faculty members acting as judges.
"They're
going to try everything in the book," Marshall said,
referring to the opposition.
"Our job is to stay
ahead of them."
But even keeping up with "them" required
tremendous emotional, intellectual, and sheer
physical e n e r g y . 96
Some references to Marshall's forensic ability, made
by his associates, appear to document his persuasiveness.
For example, it has been noted:

"Normally a person who

speaks in italics, Marshall, once in the courtroom, has been

^^"The Tension of Change," p. 23.
^^Redding, pp. 327-328.
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described . . .

as a persuader who has often taken the oppo

sition off guard and, in Langston Hughes' words,

'has moved

many a judge to search his conscience and come up with
decisions he probably did not know he had in h i m . '"

After

observing Marshall's skillful courtroom tactics, Francis X.
Eeytagh, Jr., who worked under Marshall during his tenure
as Solicitor General, remarked:

He is an effective lawyer

because he has common sense and good instinct for facts.
Similarly, it has been reported that judges and lawyers were
not only impressed by "his logic, his knowledge of the con
stitutional rights, and his determined but gentlemanly
mann er" but also by his "convincing and persuasive words.
Some other comments have been made about Marsh a l l 's
presentations as Solicitor General of the United States.
One historian describes his style as follows:
In this court [the Supreme Court of the
United States], where most would talk nervously,
Marshall was completely ease.
His style was just
right for the elegance of the room. . . .
Marshall's performance here would be quiet when
compared with the explosive civil rights battles he
had fought earlier for the NAACP, but the emotional
power would be the same.
He was presenting a case involving protection,
equal rights, equal opportunity— the kind he was
familiar with— but there was no yelling, no wild
gesturing.
His argument was strong but respectful
as he asked the Supreme Court to let the government
bring federal criminal charges against persons
accused of two civil rights slayings. . . . Marshall
won the case.

^^Bland, p.
^^Fenderson, p. 100.

^^Fenderson, p. 117.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

46
Apparently, the strength of his belief in equal
justice increased over a period of time.

For example,

before becoming an NAACP lawyer and engaging in private prac
tice,

it was his custom to represent clients without charge.

It has been said that these experiences, along with many
others as a criminal lawyer, probably furnished the founda
tion for Marshall's continuing commitment to protecting the
rights of the accused.

Further, it seems to have afforded

him opportunities to develop his forensic speaking.

More

importantly, it enables one to understand other facets of
his character.

In another instance during an interview in

1955, Marshall— "the man at the vortex of the Negro issue
in the U. S."— revealed his staunch conviction regarding the
systematic remedy of the problem of inequality:

"Failure

to achieve an orderly solution of the Negro problem would
be— and this Thurgood Marshall feels deeply— much more than
defeat for the Negro.

It w ould be a failure at the very

core of the American genius— its capacity for forms strong
and shrewd enough to withstand the tensions of change.
After taking oath of office of Solicitor General in
1965, Marshall's comments reveal another dimension of his
character.

However, his comments, during the Senate Hearings

[probably in response to the opposition but for the benefit
of a ll], seem to merit attention.

Marshall said:

"The Tension of Change," p. 23.
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I know of no reason that would prevent me from doing
the best job I could and my background as an advo
cate usually on the defendant's side, and while on
the Court [shows that] I have participated in every
type of case that comes before the Federal
Courts. . . .
I'm an advocate. . . . An d personal emotions
one way or the other, once you become an advocate,
that is it. . . . I am certain that there is no
possible reason that I could have to not adequately
represent this government which is, after all, my
Government, just as it is all of our Government.101
F. X. Beytagh, Marshall's assistant from August 1966
until Marshall became Supreme Court Associate Justice,
reveals interesting facts about Marshall's personality and
insight into the nature of the man;
The office operated in a relaxed and easygoing
manner, reflecting his personality, and the
quality of the work done . . . was extremely good,
not departing in this respect from the high stand
In oral
ards set b y . . . Cox and his predecessors.
argument Marshall was very effective in cases in
which he had a distinct interest, less so in others.
...
He can be tough with those who oppose or
cross him. . . .
In fact, in m any respects he
reminded me of . . . former Chief Justice Earl
Warren.
He has a real concern for people and a
distrust of large institutions that depersonalize
life.
He is an example of a minority group member
attaining success in his chosen profession by
working within the system while trying to change,
and actually changing it. . . .102
In 1967, Marshall received the ultimate reward for
devoted service in the fight for justice and equality in
the United States and for his exceptional abilities as a
constitutional lawyer.

When he nominated Thurgood Marshall

to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the

^^^Bland, p. 130.

^^^Bland, p. 150.
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United States, President Johnson said:
earned that appointment.
is the best qualified.

"I believe he

He deserves the appointment.

...

He

I believe it is the right

thing to do, the right time to do it, the right man and the
right place."

Continuing the President asserted:

"I

believe he has already earned his place in history, but I
think it will be greatly enhanced by his service on the
Court."103
After taking oath, Marshall said, "Let m e take this
opportunity to reaffirm my deep faith in this nation and to
pledge that I shall ever be mindful of my obligation to the
Constitution and to the goal of equal justice under law."104
In response to Marshall's new status, one source comments
about Marshall's future role:
Thurgood Marshall has been dedicated to the
practice and the administration of justice and his
life's work shows that he has played not only a
leading role in past years but that a quiet and
pertinent role will be played in his new appointment
manifesting always his high standard of legal
ability, an intellectual acumen, a high code of
ethics, clear reasoning and hard w o r k — all of which
he has practiced through the years.
These charac
teristics have been demonstrated in his years as an
attorney and a judge, dedicated to the highest
American ideals of constitutionalism.
He will be
a justice who believes that the American people.

lO^Biand, p. 151.
104"^ith Another 'Liberal' on High Court," U. S .
News and World Report, September 11, 1967, p. 21.
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ultimately, will follow the law as interpreted by
the Supreme Court.105
Marshall possesses the physical attractiveness
which contemporary audiences deem essential.

Further, his

disposition is sometimes easygoing and charming and at other
times serious, sensitive, and tense.

Perhaps, more

importantly, his associates and other observers contend that
Marshall is qualified to speak about equal justice.
Marshall states his views in forcible, lucid language while
manifesting "intrinsic goodness and honesty, sound judgment,
and interest in the well-being of the audience.

. ., which

induce listeners to approve the arguments given in a
speech.Apparently,

Marshall's fondness for and famil

iarity with literature, his knowledge of the Constitution
combined with concern for people which earned his reputation
as a "strict but always human expert on the Constitution"
along with his personal and professional experiences and his
eagerness for work characterized as thorough and systematic
represent the powerful sources of his stature as a contem
porary orator.

^Editorial, "Supreme Court Justice Thurgood
Marshall," Negro History Bulletin, October, 1967, p. 5.
^^^Winston Lamont Brembeck and William S. Howell,
Persuasion: A Means of Social Control (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), pp. 244-245.
"^Fenderson, p. 118.
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CHAPTER III
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGRO'S
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
Public address functions within the framework of a
social and political milieu.

Therefore, the critic must

understand the historical trends that gave rise to the
speech.

Study of these forces enables the critic to under

stand the specific events in its relation to the whole of
which it is a p a r t .^
This chapter reviews pertinent issues and events pre
ceding and influencing Thurgood Marshall's speaking.

In

general, it seems appropriate to focus on the nature of
inequality and injustice for American Negroes and to examine
the forces which contributed to the progress made toward
equality for all in the twentieth century, especially during
the forties,

fifties, and sixties.

The response of the

three branches of the federal government— legislative, exe
cutive, and judicial— will be addressed.

Special emphasis

will be placed on the United States Supreme Court's involve
ment and the legal steps taken by the NAACP to eliminate
inequality and injustice in some of the major areas in which

Braden, Speech Criticism (2d e d.; New York: Ronald
Press Company, 1570), p. 353.
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civil rights problems occur; i.e., employment, voting, edu
cation, housing, criminal justice, etc.
The following data provide an overview of the denial
of equality and justice for Negroes which contributed sig
nificantly to the status of human rights and probably gave
rise to Marshall's speeches from 1965 to 1967.

For several

decades prior to the mid-sixties, Marshall directed the
NAACP's legal strategy to promote equal rights for all
Americans and federal government, particularly the Supreme
Court, took actions or made decisions which broadened the
constitutional significance of our national commitment to
equality.

Morroe Berger remarks that in the three decades

since 1937 the Supreme Court "has been telling the nation,
especially the South, that the Negro must be treated in
accordance with the professions of equality and justice which
underlie the basic law by which we govern o u r s e l v e s .
Accordingly, this discussion will not dwell unneces
sarily on the inequities of the past.

On the other hand,

attention will be given to events and circumstances which are
important to an understanding of the present.
The origin of the quest for equality in America dates
back to the time Thomas Jefferson wrote that "all men are
created equal."

The framers of the Declaration of Indepen

dence acknowledged "certain inalienable rights."

Morroe Berger, Equality by Statute:
The Revolution
in Civil Rights (Rev. e d . ; Garden City, N e w York:
Doubleday
and Company, Inc., 1967), p. 147.
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Scholars seem to agree that the history of the guest
for equality and justice by Negroes and other minorities in
America closely parallels the development of our country.
These conditions were influenced greatly by the economic,
scientific, and political climate of the time.
Historically,

the Negro's struggle for equality can

be traced back to events long before the Civil War to "the
peculiar institution of slavery," a most "outrageous form
of human exploitation."^

One historian remarks,

"Men

learned that they could gain practical advantages from an
unequal distribution of rights and from transgressions upon
the liberties of others.^
For almost two hundred years, the Negro brought to
America in bondage was enslaved by law.

Historical facts

provide some evidence;
During this decade [the 1 660s], various statutes
provided that Negroes were to be slaves for life,
that the child was to inherit the condition of the
mother. . . .
[Years later] statutes [were added]
to define clearly the nature of slaves as property,
to confer upon the masters the required discipli
nary power, to enact the codes by which the slaves'
movements were subjected to public control, and to
give them a peculiar position in the courts of
law. . . .
By the eighteenth century color had
become not only evidence of slavery but also a
badge of degradation.
Thus the master class, for
its own purposes, wrote chattel slavery, the caste
system, and color prejudice into American custom
and law.5

^Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution:
Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South (New York:
Alfred A.
Knopf, 1956), p. viii.
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E. Franklin Frazier suggests that the law reinforced the
status of the Negro during the seventeenth century:
The fact that Negroes were an alien race bearing
distinctive physical marks was, doubtless, the basis
for differential treatment from the beginning and
later facilitated their enslavement.
But it was not
due solely to difference in race that Negro slavery
grew and finally supplanted white servitude.
There
were powerful economic factors, such as the demand
for a cheap labor supply, that decided the fate of
the Negro.
Court decisions and statutes only gave
legal sanction to customary practices or what was
becoming an established fact.®
During the late eighteenth century, the American
revolutionaries expressed their concept of the government and
the governed in the Declaration of Independence.
be noted:

ments to the Constitution,
Rights

It should

"With the ratification of the first ten amend
in

1791, an American Bill of

became part of the law of the land. The

Bill of

Rights specifies particular rights that the federal govern
ment may not violate.

In spite of such legal guarantees,

however, many groups of Americans have felt obliged to pr o 
test on behalf of their own r i g h t s . R e g a r d i n g arguments of
this period, John Hope Franklin makes the following obser
vation:
The real point at issue was twofold:
The first was
whether slaves should be treated as
property or men.
If they were men. Gouverneur Morris had
said to

^E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro in the United States
(Rev. e d.; Toronto : McMillan Company, 1957), p. 22.
^Jack R. Fraenkel, The Struggle for Human Rights
(New York:
Random House, Inc., 1975), p. 16.
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the Constitutional Convention, then make them citi
zens and let them vote.
The view of Virginia's
George Mason and his supporters prevailed, however,
and the Constitution did nothing to indicate that
blacks were equal to others in the enjoyment of
their rights.
The second point was whether blacks who were
free should be treated as other free persons.
In
the first fifty years of the nation's history the
dominant view was that they should not be.
In the
South free Negroes were nothing less than pariahs,
while in the North they were an oppressed and under
privileged minority.
Even if men did not violate
the Constitution in maintaining slavery, they clearly
violated it in denying full citizenship rights to
free blacks.
The revolutionary dream of equality of all
peoples was deferred by necessity, as the Founding
Fathers saw it, of protecting the inviolability of
property and maintaining a stable social order.
It
was also deferred because of the pervasive view that
a man not only had to be free, but also white, in
order to enjoy equality or even to aspire to
it.8
During the nineteenth century, slavery appeared
beyond the original southern states since the Constitution
did not prohibit the same but rather left the matter of
slavery up to the discretion of the individual states.
Significantly, the Supreme Court decision in the Dred Scott
case "gave judicial sanction to the pro-slavery doctrine
that the peculiar institution could not be excluded from any
of the territories of the United States.

®John Hope Franklin, Racial Equality in America
(Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 3435.
^Stampp, p. 26.
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The Civil War, President Lincoln's Emancipation
Proclamation, and Civil War Amendments were expected to
guarantee equality for Negroes.

However, historians note

that denial of equality and justice for Negroes continued
for many years after the Emancipation Proclamation.
example, Stampp remarks, succinctly:

For

"Racist doctrines did

not die with slavery.
Unlike others who came to America seeking freedom the
Negro was brought to America to be a servant and eventually
became a slave.

Slavery existed for more than two hundred

years prior to the Civil War and the Emancipation Proclama
tion.

The Reconstruction Era has been called a "crucial

period in the Negro's struggle for equality."

Writing about

"Five Myths of the Reconstruction Era," William S.
McFeely comments :
During this twelve-year period from 1865 to 1877
some former slaves became independent farmers;
state conventions in which black men served as
active delegates drew up liberal constitutions ;
black people gained the vote; and colored politi
cians participated in the governing of the South
and the nation as judges, state legislators, con
gressmen, and senators.
The legal base for equality,
erected during Reconstruction, remained, although
much of what these men helped build upon it was
later torn down.
The Fourteenth Amendment, in
defining the rights of all citizens, brought the
word equal into the Constitution, and the Fifteenth
[Amendment] forthrightly acknowledged what divided
the nation by declaring that no man should be denied
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his vote "on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude. " H
In the opinion of many Americans, Reconstruction did
not succeed.

For example in 1901 W.E.B. DuBois,

about Reconstruction,

said,

speaking

"For this much all m e n know:

despite compromise, war,

and struggle, the Negro is not

free.McFeely

"Race can separate us; it does not

adds:

have to, but at the close of Reconstruction it did.

By

force in Mississippi and with mocking and frightened prose
from Maine, black people were forced to live in a second and
shadowed land.

America said no to the equality that black

Americans and some white Americans, as well, w anted and
worked to achieve.
The late nineteenth century represents a period of
disappointment and defeat in the Negro's quest for equal
rights.

In large part. Supreme Court actions appear to have

contributed to these circumstances.

For example, it has

been noted:
During the last three decades of the nineteenth
century, the United States Supreme Court, responding
to the temper of the times, made a series of deci
sions adverse to Negro rights— decisions that helped
reconcile North and South at the expense of the
Negro.
For instance, in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896),
the Court established the separate but equal doctrine
and two years later, in Williams v. Mi s s i s s i p p i , it

^^William S. McFeely, "The Hidden Freedman:
Five
Myths in the Reconstruction E r a ," The Black Experience in
America, eds. James C. Curtis and Lewis L. Gould (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1970), p. 69.
^^McFeely, p. 70.

l % c F e e l y , p. 86.
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approved the Mississippi plan for depriving Negroes
of the franchise.
Added to the court-approved
legislation that deprived Negroes of rights and
freedom was the widespread use of extralegal coer
cion to keep the Negro "in his place.
While the case of Plessy v. Ferguson

[a landmark constitu

tional decision of this period] pertained only to segregation
in railroad coaches, its effect extended through many areas
and gave legal sanction and impetus to Jim Crow legislation
adopted in all southern and some northern states.
It would indeed be harsh to blame Reconstruction or
the abandonment of related efforts or any single occurrence
for the legacy of racial problems confronting America at the
turn of the century and even later into the twentieth
century.

In 1944 Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish economist,

examined the status of the Negro in the United States in a
book entitled An American Dilemna.

He perceived this dilemna

as a basic conflict between the abiding faith of white
Americans in their creed of liberty and justice for all and
the positive knowledge that they were denying this demo
cratic heritage to the N e g r o . W r i t i n g The Negro in
American L i f e , Rayford Logan comments about how American

Leonard Broom and Norval D. Glenn, Transformation
of the Negro American (New York:
Harper and Row,
Publishers, 1965), p. 6.
^^Lerone Bennett, Before the Mayflower:
A History
of the Negro in America 1619-1964 (Rev. éd.; Chicago:
Johnson Publishing Company, Inc., 1964), pp. 232-233.
Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1944), pp. 88-89.
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ideals and government at the beginning of the twentieth
century detained equal rights for Negroes;

"Both major par

ties had decided that American principles of justice, liberty
and democracy did not have to be applied alike to white men
and to Negroes.

The United States had emerged as a 'world

power, ' but at home it was faithless to its own basic prin
ciples as far as nine million black citizens were con
cerned.

In general, by 1900 the white supremacy doctrine

of the South did not meet any significant disapproval and the
political and economic life of the American Negro was
adversely affected by the conditions that persisted.

For

instance, Benjamin Quarels describes the years following
Reconstruction as "the decades of disappointment."
adds:

Quarles

"Increasingly there had been a merging of the southern

and the national image of the Negro.

. . .

The idea that

certain races were naturally inferior became more tenaciously
held than ever.

The belief that the Anglo-Saxons were

superior to other races waxed in the 1890 *s . C o n t i n u i n g
Quarels notes that "politically . . . the experiences of
Reconstruction led the Negro to look to the national govern
ment rather than to the states for protection."

Thought:
The Nadir 1877-1901
Inc., 1954), p. 96.
America

(New York:

In

The Dial Press,

Benjamin Quarels, The Negro in the Making of
(New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1964), p. 148.
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particular, Negroes residing in the South were denied the
right to take part in politics by "local self-government."^^
Role of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People
The early years of the twentieth century represented
an era of rigorous struggle for the working class and par
ticularly for Negroes.

During this period, it seems that

monopoly capital was pursuing its ruthless course, seizing
the natural wealth of the country, rapidly expanding the
industrial system, reaping unprecedented profits, and sub
mitting the workers of the field and factory to ever
sharper exploitation.

Accordingly, Negroes seemed to have

"suffered the most in these years of deprivation, oppres
sion, and struggle."

For instance, one source reports;

The Negro people suffered from the most acute forms
of exploitation and terror.
They were shamelessly
robbed as sharecroppers; they were stripped of the
right to vote; they were systematically insulted
by Jim Crow; they were barred from industry, and
when they did get jobs they had to work for half of
what a white man got in the North for similar work;
they were crowded into filthy ghettos ; they were
thrown into jails and onto the medieval chain gangs
by the thousands for the most trivial offenses, real
or imaginary.
And over their whole life hung the
constant menace of sudden, brutal death from their
20
oppressors
There was evidence of widespread savagery during these
years at the hands of ordinary white persons.

But more

Quarels, p. 149.
^°William Z. Foster, The Negro People in American
History (New York:
International Publishers, 1954),
pp. 419-420.
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significantly, documentation exists that persons in charge
of law enforcement endorsed or participated in these bru
talities.

For example, it has been reported :

Between 1900 and 1914 there were recorded no less
than 1079 Negroes brutally murdered by armed mobs.
They were hanged, burned, shot, slashed to pieces
and dragged to death behind automobiles.
No feroc
ity was too terrible. . . . Men, women, and
children met this terrible fate, usually upon the
slightest pretext.
Of course, no lynchers were ever
punished for their terrible deeds.
The lynchings
were usually carried out with the full knowledge and
consent, and sometimes with the actual participation,
of the local authorities.
Further, it is revealed that a greater number of Negroes
were murdered by individual southerners than by lynchings
and pogroms; i.e., "armed white men, sure of immunity from
prosecution, shoot down unarmed Negroes for even the
slightest offense to their tender white supremacist sus
ceptibilities ."
Also, at the turn of the century the Negro resided
in an American society that "casually and unquestioningly
accepted the concept of Negro inferiority."

Other charac

teristics of the American society at this time include :
A white society that could so totally and cavalierly
reject the rights of nine million black citizens
was able to employ forceful repression at will.
Negroes were victimized in the race riots of 1898 in
Wilmington, North Carolina, of 1900 in New York
City, and of 1906 in Atlanta.
These brutalities
were repeated in the Springfield, Illinois, race riot
of 1908, the East St. Louis, Illinois, riot of 1917,

■•■Foster, pp. 420-421.
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and the wanton destruction of Negro life and pro
perty in two dozen cities in 1 9 1 9 . 2 2
Historians agree that these so-called "race riots" were "in
actuality . . . deliberately planned, organized attacks
against the Negro people by armed white thugs in the service
of the planter-monopolist

[group].

In short, the status of equal rights for American
Negroes reached its lowest and most depressed point in the
early years of the twentieth century.
torian,

According to one his

"The last decade of the nineteenth century and the

opening of the twentieth century marked the nadir of the
Negro's status in American society."24
These dramatic and violent conditions coupled with
indifference and insensitivity on the part of local,

state,

and federal governments probably served as sufficient moti
vation for Negroes to conclude that they must determine new
methods to solve the problems of inequality and injustice.
In all likelihood, these circumstances led to the assembly of
Negroes in 1905 for the Niagara Conference
the NAACP].

[a forerunner of

The purpose of Niagara Conference or Movement

was "to organize for determined and aggressive action in

The
Black Experience in A m e r i c a , eds. James C. Curtis and Lewis
L. Gould (Austin:
University of Texas, 1970), pp. 146147.
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in order to secure full citizenship."^^

Significantly, it

has been observed:
In face of such repression and brutality the American
Negro was almost defendless.
Stripped of his
political and civil rights, he had no ready means
to effect redress; confronted with segregated,
inferior educational facilities at all levels and
with discriminatory employment, he lacked much of
the broad knowledge and financial resources neces
sary to mobilize an effective attack upon racial
injustices.
What he desperately needed was a
national organization sufficiently powerful to call
into play the most concerned and alert interests
within the black and white communities and marshall
these talents and resources to achieve r e f o r m . 26
Accordingly,

the National Association for the

Advancement of Colored People

(NAACP) was organized in 1809

with the following original purpose:

"To uplift the Negro

men and women of this country by securing for them the
complete enjoyment of their rights as citizens, justice in
the courts, and equal opportunity in every economic.
The
NAACP's Annual Report of 1912 announced the organization's
"programmatic objectives that included an assault upon
lynching, disfranchisement, educational inequality, dis
crimination in public accommodations, and racial employment
inequities.

John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom:
A
A History of Negro Americans (3d ed. ; New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1967), p. 445.

R. L. Jack, History of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (Boston: Meador Publishing Company, 1943), p. 7.
^^Zangrando, p. 149.
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At this moment in the history of the nation, the
NAACP seems to have assumed leadership in the struggle for
equality and justice.

Commenting on the role and the stra

tegy of the NAACP, one source noted;
From the outset, the NAACP sought to effect change
by educating the public and its politicians to the
need for and wisdom of reform, by lobbying for
corrective legislation, by securing favorable court
decisions, and by shaping a nationwide organization
through which the black man, with interested white
persons, could work for fundamental reforms.
In
so doing, the NAACP became and remained the major
voice of the Negro protest movement down to the late

1950*s .29

In the 1930s the NAACP was able to accelerate and
enhance the effectiveness of its legal drive to secure
equal rights for American Negroes.

Some of the significant

factors contributing to the new thrust is explained, in
part, by Loren Miller:
The National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People has reached the age of majority.
The NAACP was 21 years old in 1930, under the able
and clever leadership of Walter W h i t e , a master
salesman of equality cast in the mold of Madison
Avenue.
The urban Negro middle class was solidly
enlisted under its banner and its influence had
reached down into the ranks of the more privileged
workmen.
Negro newspapers, now widely read,
rallied their readers behind the NAACP program, and
the organization had branches in every important
city and town in the nation.
In 1930, the NAACP made a historic decision,
hardly noticed at the time.
It decided to launch
a "large scale, widespread, dramatic campaign to
give the Southern Negro his constitutional
rights, his political and civil equality . ._. and
to give the Negroes equal rights in the public
schools, in the voting booths, on the railroads
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and on juries in every state where they are at
present denied them, and the right to own and
occupy real property."
There was nothing new in
those objectives.
What was new and very important
was the decision to use the courts to achieve the
objectives and to put major emphasis on planned and
orderly litigation.30
Another pertinent factor was the receipt of a sizable amount
of money received from Charles Garland who had rejected an
inheritance of more than a million dollars.

These funds

enabled the NAACP to plan a coordinated legal campaign and
to employ a special counsel.

It has been noted by one

The NAACP hired Charles Hamilton Houston, a
brilliant, tough-minded young graduate of Amherst
and Harvard University.
Houston had a vision.
Negro lawyers, he felt, should be "social
engineers. " As vice dean of the Howard University
Law School he had attempted to make Howard the
"West Point of Negro leadership." He had
encouraged brilliant teachers like William Henry
Hastie and promising students like Thurgood
Marshall.
Now, as a special counsel of the NAACP,
he planned a hedge-hopping campaign.
Starting
with the "soft underbelly" of Jim Crow— graduate
schools— he planned to take.case after case to
the Supreme Court.
And so it began.
The first case— filed on
March 15, 1933, against the University of North
Carolina— was lost on a technicality.
In 1935,
however, Thurgood Marshall persuaded the Maryland
Court of Appeals to order the state university to
admit Donald M u r r a y . The next year— on December 8,
in Montgomery C o u n t y , Maryland— the NAACP began ^its
long and generally successful campaign to equalize
teachers' salaries.

^°Loren Miller, The Petitioners;
The Story of the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Negro (New York;
The World Publishers Company, 1966), p. 258.
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Throughout the thirties, NAACP lawyers—
Marshall, Houston, Hastie and others— leapfrogged
across the country, arguing the subtleties of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
They won a great many cases,
but they didn't get rid of Jim Crow.
After losing
a case, a state would simply set up an inferior law
or journalism school at the Negro state college.
One day in 1945, Houston's successor and protégé,
Thurgood Marshall, decided that the time had come to
"go for the whole hog."32
It is probably meaningful at this point to mention
that the determination of the NAACP to utilize the courts
proficiently in its intensified crusade for equality was
not a fanciful one.

Noting the necessity of this plan.

Miller remarks:
The program was national in scope and purpose, and
Congress was so thoroughly dominated by southern
Democrats through the seniority system for
committee chairmanships in both houses and the
filibuster privilege in the Senate that there was
no hope for passage of civil rights legislation.
A democratic chief executive could, or would,
undertake only a minimum of racial reforms, in the
light of the political necessity of keeping
southern Democrats pacified and willing partici
pants in the delicately balanced South-LaborNegro political alliance upon which his power
rested.
Republican presidents were so beguiled
with the hope of breaking the Solid South that
they, too, were unwilling to favor the Negro's
demands.
There was no place to go except to the
courts.33
It is generally believed that "the Court by process of
interpretation could restore the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments to their pristine glory and thus strike
off the shackles of second-class citizenship."^'^

^^Bennett, p. 303.

^^Miller, p. 259.

^"^Miller, p. 260.
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Some of the early legal victories of the NAACP
addressed inequities in voting, housing, and criminal
justice.

To combat voting problems, for example, in Guinn

V. United States

(1915), an NAACP lawyer argued that the

"Grandfather Clause" in state constitutions violated the
Fifteenth Amendment.

Subsequently, the Supreme Court

"declared the grandfather clauses in the Maryland and
Oklahoma constitutions to be repugnant to the Fifteenth
Amendment and therefore null and v o i d . A n o t h e r

example

dealt with the denial of the right of a Negro resident of
El Paso, Texas, to participate in a Democratic Party elec
tion.

In Nixon v. Herndon, NAACP lawyers failed to win

favorable decisions in lower courts but won appeal to the
Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court ruled that the "white

primary" law was invalid and violated the "equal protection"
clause of the Fourteenth Amend m e n t .^ ^
Similarly, the NAACP experienced success in litiga
tion regarding racial discrimination in housing.
case of Buchanan v. Waverly

In the

(1917), the Supreme Court

declared unconstitutional the Louisville, Kentucky, ordi
nance "because it interfered with the rights of an owner to
dispose of his property."

Also, the NAACP addressed the

matter of protecting people accused of crime.

What has been

^^Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 447.
^^Randall W. Bland, Private Pressure on Public L a w ;
The Legal Career of Justice Thurgood Marshall (Port
Washington, New York:
Kennikat Press, 1973), p. 15.
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described as "a notorious example of injustice emanating from
mob action" took place in Elaine, Arkansas.
V. Dempsey

This case Moore

(1923) was taken to the Supreme Court by the

NAACP legal staff.

Following arg u m e n t s , including one that

defendant did not receive a fair trial because Negroes were
excluded from juries, the Supreme Court ordered a new trial.
In fact, speaking for the majority. Justice Holmes stated
that the previous trial had been "held in a hostile atmos
phere of fear and hate, was inherently unfair and resulted
in a denial of due process of law as protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
It seems desirable that the remaining discussion of
the N A A C P 's legal campaign should point out cases litigated,
in general, emphasizing those argued by Thurgood Marshall.
Marshall, an Assistant Special Counsel of the
NAACP and later as Special Counsel and Director-Counsel of
the NAACP legal staff, participated actively in the NAACP's
campaign to gain equality and justice.
suggest Marshall's involvement.

A few examples

The initial brief prepared

by Marshall as a new Assistant Special Counsel was "of
great importance to the legal arm of the NAACP because it
was employed in the first case involving education brought
before the Supreme Court by the Association."
ex r e l . Gaines v. Canada

In Missouri

(1938), the N A A C P 's lawyers relied

on Marshall's brief, basing their argument solely on section
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one of the Fourteenth Amendment which forbids a state to
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal p r o 
tection of the laws."

Randall Bland notes:

Since Missouri had no separate and equal law school
for the Negroes of its community, and having
admitted that Gaines was otherwise eligible for
admission, acceptance was requisite by the force
of the Constitution. . . .
On December 12, 1938,
the Court held that Gaines must be allowed to
attend the Law School of the state in the absence
of a comparable Negro institution.
In a 7-2 deci
sion . . . [the Court] nullified Missouri’s out-ofstate plan.38
In keeping with the plans to intensify its legal
campaign, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund was
established on October 11, 1939.
were cited in the charter:

The following purposes

"To render free legal aid to

Negroes who suffer legal injustice because of their race or
color and cannot afford to employ legal assistance; To seek
and promote educational opportunities denied to Negroes
because of their race or color; To conduct research and
publish information on educational facilities and
inequalities furnished for Negroes out of public funds and
on the status of the Negro in American life.
Parenthetically, it probably should be added that
the charter also stipulated that the F u n d ’s activities as
distinguished from those of the NAACP would not directly
exert pressure or lobby to influence legislation.

On the

other hand, evidence supports the fact that "the Fund

^^Bland, pp. 21-22.

^^Bland, p. 23.
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lawyers fully intended to use the courts as a 'forum for the
purpose of educating the public* on any form of discrimina
tion."

For example,- one source observes that, while

addressing discrimination in housing, Marshall asserted that
"the only method of counteracting this vicious practice is
by means of educating the general public, from which juries
are chosen, to the plight of the Negro."

Thus, it seems

that the Fund's activities might indirectly contribute to
improved legislative actions through the responses of "an
aroused and informed public.
In 1940, Thurgood Marshall was selected for the
newly created position of Director-Counsel,

"the top legal

officer of the Legal Defense and Educational Fund."

In

this position, he assumed the responsibility for "planning
the strategy to be used in the courts and for coordinating
the entire legal program."

He explained his duties as

Director-Counsel as follows :

"The board charges me with

the responsibility of keeping the work within the policy
adopted by the board moving along, with general supervisory
powers over the staff

[six full-time lawyers who lived in

New York but who could be assigned to places in other
states] and the other people working for u s .
Many sources comment on the effectiveness of
Marshall and his staff, which yielded significant progress

41 Bland, p. 24.
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in the NAACP's pursuit of equality.

For example, one source

reveals :
Marshall served in this capacity for twentyone years. Most major cases in the field of civil
rights were handled by the Fund during this
period, and the Director-Counsel was to a large
degree responsible for its successes and failures.
. . . Marshall argued thirty-two cases and assisted
in preparing the briefs in eleven others brought
before the Court. . . .
Of the cases he argued,
four were lost, one was dismissed for lack of a sub
stantial federal question, and twenty-seven were
substantive v i c t o r i e s . "^2
Perhaps a few of the notable cases handled by
Marshall and his staff should be included, since the out
come relieved some of the inequality and injustice plaguing
Negro Americans.

For instance, in the area of political

rights, history records the fact that as late as the 1940s
many states denied Negroes the right to serve on juries.
Gunnar Myrdal notes the following:

"In numerous cases the

exclusion of Negroes from grand and petit juries has been
challenged by NAACP lawyers, and the Association shares in
establishing precedents by which the principle is now
firmly established that the exclusion of Negroes from jury
service is a denial of equal protection of laws guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.""^^

More

specifically, in The Lonesome R o a d , Saunders Redding writes:
"But that right [of Negroes to serve on juries] had to be

42 Ibid.

^^Myrdal, pp. 828-829.
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protected time after time in state after state until at last,
in 1943, Marshall won certification of it from a Supreme
Court decision that held the exclusion of Negroes from jury
rolls in violation of the due-process clause, and therefore
unconstitutional."
In the area of securing voting rights, the Smith v.
Allwright

(1944) case provides an excellent example.

Con

cerning the Smith case Paul G. Kauper in Civil Rights and
the Constitution writes:
. V . Allwright [case] . . . must be regarded as
a very significant one, not only in terms of a
dilution of the state action restriction, but also
in terms of the effective protection of the Negro's
right to vote.
Here the Supreme Court held that
Negroes could not lawfully be excluded from parti
cipation in the Democratic primary in the State of
Texas.
In prior cases the Court had held that if
exclusion occurred as a result of state law or as a
result of grant of authority by state law to the
executive committee of the party, this was exclusion
by action of state law and was invalid under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments [e.g., Nixon v.
Herndon, 1924 and Nixon v. Condon, 1932] . On the
other hand, the Court held that the exclusion of
Negroes occurred as a result of action by the state
convention, this was a private action that was not
governed by these constitutional restrictions
[e.g., Grovey v. T o w n s e n d , 1935].
In Smith v.
Allwright, however, the Court rejected all these
distinctions and found that because of the signi
ficance of the party primary in the total election
process, a process for which the state had to
assume total responsibility, the p a r t y ’s action
could no longer be characterized as private action.
A later decision involving the so-called Jaybird
party in Texas pushed the idea still further in
finding that a party caucus preceding a primary also
was subject to the constitutional rule of
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nondiscrimination [e.g., Terry v. A d a m s , 1953].
Similar decisions elsewhere emphasize the idea that,
apart from any consideration whether the primary is
conclusive in determining the final result, the
necessary interrelationship between the primary and
the election and the integration of the primary w i t h
a public aspect that brings constitutional limita
tions into p l a y . 5
This broad concept of state action has served a most impor
tant function as part of the total movement for securing
equal rights for Negroes.
Marshall and W. J. Durham of Sherman, Texas,

"were

primarily responsible for writing the brief" and they argued
the landmark case of Smith v. Allwright before the Supreme
Court.

Among other points, the brief emphasized:

"The

Constitution and laws of the United States as construed by
the United States v. Classic prohibit interference by
respondents with peti t i o n e r 's right to vote in Texas Demo
cratic primaries."

Subsequently, the Court's decision wit h

only one dissenting vote,

"completely embraced the argument

made by the Legal Defense Lawyers."

Regarding the decision

in Smith, Justice Stanley n o t e d :
When primaries become a part of the machinery for
choosing officials, state and national, as they have
here, the same tests to deteznaine the character of
discrimination or abridgement should be applied to
the primary as are applied to the general election.
If the state requires a certain electoral proce
dure, prescribes a general election ballot made up
of party nominees so chosen and limits the choice
of the electorate in general elections for state
offices, practically speaking, to those whose names
appear on such a ballot, it endorses, adopts and

^^Paul G. Kauper, Civil Liberties and the Constitu
tion (Ann Arbor:
The University of Michigan Press, 1962),
pp. 160-161.
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enforces the discrimination against Negroes, prac
ticed by a party entrusted by Texas law with the
determination of the qualifications of participants
in the primary.
This is state action within the
meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment.46
Also, to ensure equal rights in the political processes NAACP
lawyers, including Thurgood Marshall, argued the Rice v.
Elmore case.

It probably should be mentioned that "in a

1947 class-action case, George Elmore sought injunctive
relief to enjoin Clay Rice and other election officials in
South Carolina from denying to Negro electors the right to
vote in the Democratic Primary."

Again the NAACP lawyers

were successful since the decision handed down by the
federal district court in 1948 said, in part:

"When this

country is taking the lead in maintaining the democratic
process and attempting to show to the world that the Ameri
can government and the American way of life is the fairest
and the best . . .
the Union.

. . .

it is time for South Carolina to rejoin
Racial distinctions cannot exist in the

machinery that selects the officers and lawmakers of the
United States."

Following an appeal to Fourth Circuit

Court in the Rice case, the decision of the district court
was reaffirmed,

in part, as follows:

An essential feature of our form of government is
the right of the citizen to participate in the
governmental process.
The political philosophy of
the Declaration of Independence is that governments
derive their just powers from the consent of the
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governed. . . . The disfranchised can never speak
with the same force as those who are able to vote
. . . there can be no question that such denial
amounts to a denial of the constitutional rights of
the Negro and we think it is equally clear that
those who participate in the denial are exercising
state power to that end, since the primary is used
in connection with the general election in the
selection of state officers.
Ultimately,

"Rice petitioned for a grant of certiorari from

the Supreme Court," but "the Court denied certiorari, thus
in effect upholding the prior decisions of the lower federal
courts.
The area of interstate transportation was another
area which NAACP lawyers addressed in the pursuit of equal
rights for Negroes.

Reportedly, Thurgood Marshall brought

Morgan v. Virginia before the Supreme Court in 1946, in "the
first case involving segregation in interstate transportation
presented by the NAACP before the Supreme Court of the United
States.The

Court's favorable decision probably best

confirms the effectiveness of arguments and evidence
Marshall presented.

In this connection it has been noted

that in a 7-1 decision "the Court agreed with both the
sense and the point of Marshall's argument."

Additionally,

the opinion of the Court stated:
As no state law can reach beyond its own border nor
bar transportation of passengers across its bound
aries, diverse seating requirements for races in
interstate journeys result.
As there is no federal
act dealing with the separation of races in inter
state transportation, we must decide the validity of
this Virginia statute on the challenge that it
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interferes with commerce, as a matter of balance
between the exercise of the local police power and
the need for national uniformity in the regulations
for interstate travel.
It seems clear to us that
seating arrangements for the different races in
interstate motor travel require a single, uniform
rule to promote and protect national travel.
Con
sequently, we hold the Virginia statute in contro
versy invalid.
Perhaps one of the stickiest areas that demanded the
attention of NAACP lawyers dealt with equality in the
housing for all Americans.

In the forties "the only case

planned solely by the Legal Defense and Educational Fund
was McGhee v. Sipes."

Commenting on Marshall's strategy in

the McGhee case, Randall Bland stated:
In addition to showing the social and economic
evils resulting from state enforcement of racial
contracts in this class-action case, Marshall opted
for two other tactics in this case:
First, to
demonstrate legally . . . that enforcement of
restrictive agreements by state courts was clearly
state action and, as such, violated "equal protec
tion of the laws" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment; and second, to make apparent to the
Court the widespread support for the Negro cause
by having a large number of interested groups file
amicus curiae briefs, and by focusing attention on
the problem in journals and law review studies.
Two cases— Shelley v. Kraemer and McGhee v. Sipes
(1948)— afford suitable instances.

Presenting the Shelley

case, the NAACP was aided by the Department of Justice, the
National Lawyers League Guild, the Civil Rights Department
of the Grand Lodge of Elks, among others.
"made constitutional history" accordingly:

The Supreme Court
"With three

justices not participating, a unanimous court . . . ruled

50 Bland, p. 52.
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that judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants designed
to exclude persons as inhabitants of residential areas on
the basis of race or color is state action and, as such, a
denial of equal p r o t e c t i o n . T h e

Court's decision in the

McGhee case was similar since the Court held that "the
enforcement of such a covenant by state courts was a viola
tion of 'equal protection of the laws' under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Addressing the Annual NAACP Conference on June 23,
1948, Marshall's topic was "Restrictive Covenants and the
Segregation Picture."

Referring to a 1948 Supreme Court

decision regarding discrimination in housing, he quotes from
the ruling:

"Freedom from discrimination by the States in

the enjoyment of property rights was among the basic objec
tives sought to be effectuated by the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

That such discrimination has occurred

in these cases is clear.

Because of the race or color of

these petitioners they have been denied rights or ownership
or occupancy enjoyed as a matter of course by other citizens
of different race or color."

Continuing in the same

address, Marshall evaluates the success of litigation and
the impact of the Court's decision while asserting the
necessity for preservation of this venture and the

Robert J. Harris, The Quest for Equality:
The Con
stitution, Congress, and the Supreme Court (Baton Rouge :
Louisiana State University Press, 1960), p. 116.
^^Bland, p. 57.
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accelerated of other efforts to secure equality in housing:
"This statement sums up a big victory in a long fight
against segregated housing.
segregated housing.

It did not and will not destroy

It is our job to protect the effect of

this decision and to push forward the total destruction of
not only segregation in housing, but all forms of segrega
tion in American life.
Writing about the legal career of Thurgood Marshall,
Randall Bland summarizes the endeavors of the NAACP's Legal
Defense and Educational Fund from 1945 to 1955 as follows:
During this period the legal arm of the NAACP,
under Marshall's direction, extracted from the
federal courts in general— and the Supreme Court
in particular— a number of decisions wit h great
constitutional importance, especially in the field
of education.
Although the Legal Defense Fund
made considerable gains by having nullified dis
crimination in transportation, exclusion from
primary elections, state enforcement of restrictive
covenants, and segregation of tax-supported recrea
tion facilities, its greatest victory came with the
tearing down of the wall of segregation in public
schools.
Beginning with Sipuel v. University of
Oklahoma (332 U.S. 631 (1948), and ending with
Brown V . Board of Education (349 U.S. 294 (1955),
the legal staff of the NAACP brought eighteen
education cases before the Supreme Court.
Eventually, they found the Court willing, not only
to end segregation in state colleges and upperlevel institutions, but to declare the "separate
but equal" concept unconstitutional in elementary
education as w e l l . 54

Thurgood Marshall, "Restrictive Covenants and the
Segregation Picture" (Address before the thirty-ninth
annual conference of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, Kansas City, Missouri,
June 23, 1948), p. 1.
^^Bland, p. 57.
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It seems desirable to discuss several important cases
dealing with securing equality in education which Marshall
and his staff argued successfully before the Supreme Court.
Perhaps, of significance are three cases— Brown v. Board of
Education

(1954) , Bolling v. Sharpe

Board of Education

(1954), and Brown v.

(1955)— for two reasons:

first, they

culminated a decade of litigation involving numerous cases;
and second, the Court's historic decisions represented an
era in constitutional law which seemed to pave the way for
progress toward making the goal of equality for all
Americans a reality.
Grimes remarks :

Regarding the Brown decision, Alan P.

"Not since the Dred Scott case of nearly a

century before had any Supreme Court case held such a
momentous import for the future of American N e g r o e s . H e
adds :

With the destruction of the doctrine of 'separate

but equal' in Brown v. Board of Education, a milestone was
passed in American constitutional h i s t o r y . A l s o ,

Jack

Greenberg makes the following comment concerning School
Segregation cases:
The best-known constitutional prescript of
this generation is that of Brown v. Board of
Education (1954) which, resting on the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection clause, held "that in
the field of public education the doctrine of
'separate but e q u a l ' has no place.
Separate educa
tional facilities are inherently unequal."
Less

^^Alan P. Grimes, Equality in America
Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 75.

(New York:

^^Grimes, p. 77.
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publicized but of wider legal import are the com
panion words of Bolling v. Sharpe (1954), the
District of Columbia School Segregation decision,
which involved the Fifth Amendment's due process
clause.
It said:
"Liberty under the law extends
to the full range of conduct which the individual
is free to purs u e , and it cannot be restricted
except for a proper governmental objective.
Segregation in public education is not reasonably
related to any proper governmental o b j e c t i v e . " 5 7
Reliable sources frequently assert that the Supreme
Court decisions which guaranteed equal rights for Negroes
in many aspects of American life met vigorous opposition
in some quarters.

It seems that southern states, in partic

ular, devised schemes to delay enforcement of laws related
to school desegregation.

Although opposition was not

always successful, it did seem to retard the advancement of
equality for Negroes.

Consequently, the Supreme Court in

Brown V. Board of Education

(1955) directed district courts

to "take such proceedings and enter such orders and
decrees . . .

as are necessary" to ensure that Negro

children were admitted to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed.

The

principle features of the Court's opinion provided:
All provisions of federal, state, or local
law must yield to this (holding of the School
Cases) principle.
Full implementation of these constitutional
principles may require solution of varied local
school problems.
. . . the courts will require that the
defendants make a prompt and reasonable start

^^Jack Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law
(New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 213214.
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toward compliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling.
Once such a start has been made, the courts
may find that additional time is necessary to carry
out the ruling in an effective manner.
The burden rests upon the defendants to
establish that such time is necessary in the public
interest and is consistent with good faith com
pliance at the earliest practicable date.
Continuing, the Court stated that "it should go without
saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles
cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement
with t h e m . A l t h o u g h the remedy offered by the Court
differed from that presented by the NAACP, Marshall expressed
some optimism:
The decision was a good one.
The Court has
reaffirmed its pronouncement that segregation is
unconstitutional and throughout the opinion stress
is placed upon the necessity for full compliance
at the earliest practicable date.
Delays may be
occasioned by various devices.
This would result
in any case.
We can be sure that desegregation
will take place throughout the United States—
tomorrow in some places, the day after in others
and many, many moons hence in some, but it will
come eventually to all.
We look upon the . . .
decision as a ticket which is now available to
every parent and child who need it and want to
use it.
According to most sources, turbulent years followed
the Supreme Court’s 1955 decision in the Brown case.

In

fact numerous southern states implemented "massive
resistance . . . intended to thwart the force of the Co u r t ’s
desegregation decision."

For example. Bland notes:

"These

included statutes allowing local school boards to rearrange
students among various districts in order to maintain

^Greenburg, p. 215.

^^Bland, p. 86.
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segregated facilities; repealing laws requiring compulsory
attendance, thus inviting parents to withdraw their children
from integrated schools; laws providing for state-supported
segregated private schools; acts permitting the withdrawal
of state funds from any school system that complied with
the desegregation decree; and state laws threatening the
direct closing of public schools if integration became
inevitable.
In the face of these circumstances and other
maneuvers to maintain the status quo,
1961 the NAACP

[lawyers]

"between 1956 and

. . . countered Southern resistance

with no less massive program of litigation in order to
force an end to segregated public schools."

Regarding the

sustained and widespread reluctance in the South and side
effects of litigation, it has been noted:

"As late as

1958 . . . the Southern School News reported that four
years after the School Segregation Cases in the seventeen
Southern and border states, elimination of de jure segre
gation had begun or been completed in only 764 of 2,889
school districts; none of the school districts in Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina,
and Virginia has, as yet, complied with the law.

The

litigation that ensued often brought with it racial turmoil,
rioting, and open hostility that necessitated the

Bland, p. 99.
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intervention of local and state forces and on occasion even
the federal government."®^
Importantly, the period from 1955-1960 represents
Marshall's final years with the NAACP.

Litigation by NAACP

lawyers during this period continued to address school
segregation problems in general and resistance to the Brown
decision in particular.

R. W. Bland writes:

"In the first

five years following the second Brown decision

(1955)

Marshall and his colleagues brought seven major cases before
the Supreme Court of the United States; they were Lucy v.
A d a m s , 350 U.S. 1

(1955); Florida ex r e l . Hawkins v. Board

of Control, 350 U.S. 413

(1956); Frasier v. University of

North Carolina, 355 U.S.

838

(1957); Cooper v. A a r o n , 358

U.S. 1 (1958); Faubus v. A a r o n , 361 U.S. 197

(1959); and

Bush V.

(1960).

Orleans Parish Sc h o o l s , 364 U.S. 500

Commenting on resistance to the Brown decisions,
Benjamin Quarels remarks:

"Among the resistance techniques

was that of closing public schools and replacing them with
'private'

segregated schools.

The most headlined of the

school-closing incidents came in Little Rock, Arkansas,
where the public schools remained shut during the entire
term 1957-58.

In Prince Edward County, Virginia, the

public schools closed in 1959, although private schools for
white children were operated with the support of state

®^Bland, pp. 99-100.

®^Bland, p. 100.
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fu nd s. On e

of the cases— Cooper v. Aaron— presented by

the NAACP provides another illustration:

The [Little

Rock] School Board and the Superintendent of Schools filed
a petition . . . seeking a postponement of the program for
desegregation.

Their position in essence was that because

of public hostility, which they stated had been engendered
largely by the official attitudes and actions of the Governor
and the Legislature, maintenance of a sound educational
program at Central High School, with the Negro students in
attendance, would be impossible."

Consequently,

"the

Board . . . proposed that the Negro students already admitted
to the school be withdrawn and sent to segregated schools,
and that all further steps to carry out the Board's
desegregation program be postponed for a period later sug
gested by the Board to be two and one-half years.

The

response of the Supreme Court essentially affirmed the
judgment of Court of Appeals which reversed the District
Court's decision to grant the relief requested.

Regarding

the Cooper case, it has been noted:
The constitutional rights of respondents are
not to be sacrificed or yielded to the violence
and disorder which have followed upon the actions
of the Governor and Legislature.
As this Court
said some forty-one years ago in a unanimous
opinion in a case involving another aspect of
racial segregation:
"It is urged that this

^^Quarels, p. 240.
^'^David Fellman, The Supreme Court and Education
(3d ed.; New York:
Teachers College Press, 1976), p. 149.
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proposed segregation will promote the public peace
by preventing race conflicts.
Desirable as this
is, and important as is the preservation of the
public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by
laws or ordinances which deny rights created or
protected by the Federal Constitution."
Thus law
and order are not here to be preserved by deprivina
the Negro children of their constitutional r i g h t s . 65
Further, the Court held:

"In short, the constitutional

rights of children not to be discriminated against in school
admission on the grounds of race or color declared by this
Court in the Brown case can neither be nullified openly and
directly by state legislators or state executive or judi
cial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through
evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted
'ingeniously or ingenuously.'"^^

Also, it seems pertinent

that the Court reacted emphatically to the activities of
the governor and the legislature while unanimously
reaffirming the Brown decision.

Accordingly,

it has been

No state legislator or executive or judicial
officer can war against the Constitution without
violating his undertaking to support it.
CHIEF
JUSTICE [JOHN] MARSHALL spoke for a unanimous
Court in saying that:
"If the legislatures of the
several states may, at will, annul the judgments
of the courts of the United States, and destroy
the rights acquired under those judgments, the
constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery. . .
A Governor who asserts a power to nullify a federal
court order is similarly restrained.
If he had
such power, . . . "it is manifest that the fiat
of state Governor, and not the Constitution of the
United States, would be the supreme law of the
land; that the restrictions of the Federal

Fellman, p. 152.
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Constitution upon the exercise of state power would
be but impotent phrases."
It is, of course, quite true that the
responsibility for public education is primarily
the concern of the States, but it is equally true
that such responsibilities, like all other state
activity m ust be exercised consistently with
federal constitutional requirements as they apply
to state action.
The Constitution created a
government dedicated to equal justice under law.
The Fourteenth Amendment embodied and emphasized
that ideal.
State support of segregated schools
through any arrangement, management, funds, or
property cannot be squared with the Amendment's
command that no State shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
The right of a student not to be segregated
on racial grounds in schools so maintained is
indeed so fundamental and pervasive that it is
embraced in the concept of due process of
law. . . . The basic decision in Brown . . . is
now unanimously reaffirmed.
The principles
announced in that decision and the obedience of the
States to them, according to the command of the
Constitution, are indispensable for the protection
of the freedoms guaranteed by our fundamental
charter for all of us. Our constitutional idea of
equal justice under law is thus made a living
truth.G7
The preceding examples do not pretend to include
every significant accomplishment of the NAACP legal staff.
However, they do seem to substantiate the vigorous and
victorious nature of the N A A C P 's legal efforts to fulfill
its lofty goals toward first-class citizenship for Negro
Americans.

Speaking generally about the N A A C P 's efforts

to end racial inequality. Bland noted:
Marshall and his fellow lawyers employed a line of
argument that was to be used in every other edu
cation case by the NAACP down to the Brown case
itself; that is, that the doctrine of separate

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

86
but equal was without legal foundation or social
justification:
"Classifications and distinctions
based on race or color have no legal validity in
our society.
They are contrary to our Constitution
and laws, and this Court has struck down statutes,
ordinances of official policies seeking to estab
lish such classification.
In decisions concerning
intrastate transportation and public education,
however, this court appears to have adopted a
different and antithetical constitutional doctrine
under which racial segregation is deemed permissible
when equality is afforded.
An examination of these
decisions will recall that the 'separate but e q u a l '
doctrine is at best a bare constitutional hypothesis
postulated in the absence of facts showing the cir
cumstances and consequences of racial segregation
and based upon a fallacious evaluation of the
purpose and meaning inherent in any policy or theory
of enforced racial separation."68
Role of the Congress of the United States
Prior to the mid-twentieth century the social and
political climate in America endorsed white supremacy by
legal and illegal means.

Thus the Negro, who had been

enslaved by law and emancipated by law, experienced oppres
sion, injustice and little hope of advancement toward
goals of complete equality.
Since state and local governments consistently
appear to have neglected endeavors to perpetuate equal
rights for black Americans, the responsibility for recog
nizing and remedying problems related to equal rights seemed
to rest with the federal government.

Nevertheless, during

the early years of the twentieth century, most sources
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report that little was done by the three branches of the
federal government to ensure equal rights for Negroes.

In

fact, evidence substantiates the fact that with few excep
tions, legal sanction of segregation continued for almost
thirty years into this century.

Moreover, m a n y scholars

seem to agree that for political reasons Congress has
responded least effectively and has been the least helpful
in aiding the cause of equal justice for all Americans.
Of some significance is the remark about the attitude of the
federal government for the first quarter of the twentieth
century made by one historian:

"What is now called second-

class citizenship for Negroes was accepted by presidents,
the Supreme Court,

[and] C o n g r e s s . M o r e o v e r ,

in the

prior century, Frederick Douglas had queried whether
"American justice, American liberty, American civilization,
American law, and American Christianity could be made to
include and protect alike and forever all American citi
zens in the rights which have been guaranteed to them by
the organic and fundamental laws of the l a n d . F o r
several decades into this century, many Americans felt the
question equally pertinent.
The attitude and action by Congress during this
period, along with the accompanying outcome,
cant.

seem signifi

The legislative organ of government was inactive.

^^Kauper, p. 206.

^^Logan, pp.

ix-x.

^^Logan, pp. 3-4.
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It was insensitive and indifferent to minority needs. Since
the rights of minorities are logically referable in large
measure to constitutional protections, it is not surprising
to find increasing resort to the Supreme Court for their
vindication.

Scholars contend that Congress "too often

shunted" these matters to the Court.

Also, they agree that

the net effect was to make the Supreme Court, and not
Congress, the major organ for enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment, contrary to the expectations of its framers and
the meaning of its text.
Many sources reveal that the.United States Congress
has authority and power, not only to protect and to enforce
constitutional guarantees in the area of civil rights, but
also to create "new patterns and methods for solving
integration problems."

Our American system of government

empowers Congress with viable and extensive resources to
address problems related to equality and justice.

Paul G.

Kauper acknowledges the reluctance and subsequently the
limited response by Congress to overwhelming civil rights
problems.

On the other hand, Kauper asserts the extra

ordinary potentiality for substantial legislative response
since Congress has been endowed with the most abundant
supply of powers which, if utilized fully, could yield
significant advancement in the area of civil rights.

Martin M. Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Rights (Atlanta:
Scott, Foresman and Company,
1967), p. 140.
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Kauper comments:
For over three quarters of a century Congress did
nothing in the civil rights field.
By enactment
of the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts it made
important contributions to the practical implemen
tation of the right to vote.
Important other tasks
remain to be done.
The general body of civil
rights legislation going back to the Reconstruction
period cries out for badly needed revision and
modernization.
The problems raised by resistance
to the Supreme Court's school desegregation decree
and the slow movement toward integration in a
number of the states make it clear also that
Congress should use the powers available to it both
for encouraging states to comply with the decree and
for strengthening the hand of the judiciary and the
executive department in dealing with the problem.
Moreover, Congress has a larger reservoir of sub
stantive legislative powers it may tap, if it will,
in order to enlarge the body of civil rights on the
federal level.
If Congress defaults in these tasks
or fails to exercise its powers, this failure is
attributable not to the lack of constitutional power
under our federal system but to a system of
practical politics in which sectional differences
continue to play a large p a r t .'^
In the area of voting for more than half the
twentieth century, the widespread practices of excluding
Negroes from voting continued.

Many sources remark that

"it is hardly surprising that the Negro has turned to
Washington and that Congress has responded with the Civil
Rights Act of 1957, the first such federal legislation
since 1875.
Commenting on the Civil Rights Act of 1957, in
terms of how it promoted equality in the area of voting,
Kauper notes:

pp. 205-206.

^^Harris, p. 125.
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Probably the mos t important feature of this legis
lation was the section which authorized the Attorney
General to bring suit on behalf of Negroes in order
to enjoin violation of their voting rights.
The
effect of such a proceeding is to subject registra
tion officials to the risk of a contempt proceeding
in the event that they persist in discriminatory
practices.
Giving authority to the Attorney General
to bring such a suit in order to assert the rights
of Negroes is in itself an effective step, both
because it takes the burden away from individual
Negroes or organizations representing them to bring
suits in the first instance and because it may have
the effect of relieving Negroes from the economic
burden and reprisals that would be effectuated i f
they themselves brought the suits.
In the
important Raines case (1960) the Supreme Court held
that, because of the public interest in the
enforcement of these rights. Congress could pro
perly authorize a suit like this in the name of the
United States.
According to Justice Brennan's
opinion, "there is the highest public interest in
the due observance of the constitutional guarantees,
including those that bear most directly on private
rights, and we think it perfectly competent for
Congress to authorize the United States to be the
guardian of that public interest in a suit for
injunctive r e l i e f . 7 5
In the general area of civil rights Congress has
been credited with making some contributions.

For example,

the Civil Rights Act of 1957 enacted by Congress has been
praised

for creating and enlarging the duties

of a unique

and powers

Civil Rights Commission:

The other important feature of the 1957 act
was the creation of the Civil Rights Commission,
the first of this kind in the history of the
country.
The Commission is charged with the task
of making studies and investigations if alleged
denials of civil rights including voting rights,
authorized to conduct hearings, and directed to
make reports to Congress and the President.
The
Commission was clothed with the power of subpoena.

^^Kauper, pp.

196-197.
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and during the first three years of its life it
conducted extensive hearings and in 1959 submitted
its final report which included, inter a l i a , the
recommendations that its life be extended and that
further legislation be enacted.
As might be
expected, the Commission ran into difficulty in con
ducting its hearings and its power was challenged
almost immediately, but to date its authority has
been sustained by the Court.76
According to some historians, the 1957 Civil Rights
Act enacted by Congress failed "to come to grips with the
problem of adequate supervision of the registration process
to make the voting right effective."

In response. Congress

enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1960:
After extended discussions Congress acted to create
a system under which federal district courts are
authorized to employ so-called registrars who will
assist the federal judges in policing the voting
registration system and, in effect, will take
over in a limited way the function of determining
eligibility to vote once a pattern of racial
discrimination has been established.
The federal
court now assumes a responsibility through the
use of registrars for seeing to it that qualified
Negroes are actually registered as eligible
voters despite obstructive tactics by local offi
cers.
It is too early yet to tell whether this
process will be effective or whether, as some
critics claim, this process will be mired in legal
technicalities and time-consuming processes.77
Our constitutional federal structure invests other
powers in Congress.

Evidence seems to verify the fact that

our system of government prescribes an important role for
the legislature,

in particular, to perform in discharging

^^Kauper, p. 198.

^^Kauper, p. 199.
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its responsibilities effectively.

Accordingly,

sources

suggest the general capability of Congress and explain ways
Congress could alleviate problems related to employment;
In these areas of its own legislative compe
tence and authority, the federal government has
adequate power not only to create rights but to
secure their enjoyment by providing sanctions and
remedies not only against those who acting under
authority of laws may be found to violate these
rights but against private persons as well.
Indeed, [Congress has] the power to deal with all
persons coming directly within the scope of its
legislative competence.
If Congress provides that
every employer engaged in production for commerce
shall not discriminate on the basis of race or
color in the choice or discharge of employees,
obviously Congress may choose various means to make
this policy effective.
It ma y provide criminal
sanctions against employers found guilty of violat
ing the act; it may authorize a damage action
against the employer by persons discriminated
against; it may authorize an injunctive remedy to
enjoin employers from continuing these practices;
or it may create an administrative remedy pursuant
to which an employer's practice is characterized
after a hearing by a board as an unfair labor
practice which may be corrected by an appropriate
order directed to the employer and violation of
which may be made punishable.
In other words,
when we are dealing with rights created by Con
gressional legislation in the exercise of the
independent substantive powers of Congress, we are
talking about rights which in the mo r e accurate
and strict sense may be called civil rights since
they give rise to reciprocal obligations enforce
able against private persons, as distinguished
simply from constitutional liberties that are pro
tected against government in the interest of
individual freedom.78
Also,

it has been reported that Congress has not

exhausted its resources which provide opportunities to
eliminate other equal rights problems.

In the area of

pp. 179-180.
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education, it has been said many times that the spending
power of Congress represents a very significant source of
authority to deal with civil rights, which has not been
utilized generously and proficiently.

Regarding this

authority, Kauper noted:
The current discussions apropos federal aid to edu
cation highlight the possibility of using the
federal spending power as a means of promoting state
observance of constitutional rights.
Thus it has
been proposed as a condition to federal spending
for public schools that no federal money shall go
to aid in the construction or operation of schools
that practice racial segregation.
Similarly,
nondiscriminatory provisions may be included in
federal legislation appropriating money in aid of
both public and private housing. . . . Apart from
its corrective power to enforce the Due Process and
Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amend
ment, Congress has substantial reservoirs of power
to draw upon to further a program of protecting
minorities against discrimination in transportation,
employment, education, and h o u s i n g . 79
Discussing the role of Congress in respect to
rights guaranteeing equal protection and due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment by making remedies available
through federal courts, reliable sources reveal that
Congress has authority:
The Congressional role in this respect should
not be underestimated.
We tend to forget that
Congress has made an important contribution to the
Supreme Court's paramount role in this area by
giving the Court a power to review the decisions
of the highest courts of the state dealing with
questions involving rights, privileges, and
immunities arising under the Constitution, treaties,
and laws of the United States.
If Congress were
to limit the Supreme Court's appellate
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jurisdiction as has been several times proposed in
recent years in order to deny it opportunity to
raise questions arising under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a large part
of the effective apparatus for vindication of
these protected rights would be impaired or des
troyed.
Likewise, Congress has made a valuable
contribution to enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment by making such remedial devices as the
injunction, habeas corpus, and the declaratory
judgment available in the lower federal courts as
well as by legislation subjecting state officers
and agents to criminal liability and damage actions
in cases where their actions have resulted in denial
of due process or equal protection. . . .
It is
worth noting that the development we have had in
recent years directed to the end of terminating
law-imposed segregation in public schools is
attributable entirely to the action of the federal
courts.
Congress has taken no positive steps to
aid in the more effective enforcement of this
decree.
Depending . . . upon the Court's authority
to interpret the meaning of equal protection and
. . . upon the power of the federal courts to make
their decrees effective, the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts have been carefully, slowly,
and at times with great difficulty in the face of
determined opposition, making their way in the
attempt to convert the Court's decision into an
operating rule of law throughout the country.80
Some scholars distinguish between rights that pro
tected against states under the Fourteenth Amendment and
the created rights,
some of which are created directly by the Consti
tution, either expressly or by implication, and
some of which are created by Congress.
In a case
of the protected rights Congress has a limited
function to perform in authorizing corrective
devices whereby the judiciary and the executive
can make these protected rights effective.
In the
case of the federally created rights the courts
have an important interpretative and enforcement
function, but Congress has a broad function since

pp. 173-174.
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it can create rights of this character as well as
prescribe the remedies for making them effective.
Other endeavors by the legislative branch which seem
pertinent to this study include the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the
Civil Rights Act of 1968.

Referring to the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, President Lyndon Johnson referred to it as "a
challenge to men of goodwill in every part of the country to
transforra the commands of law into customs of our land."
President Johnson praised this action by Congress.

While

acknowledging that no single legislative act could eradicate
all injustice, discrimination, hatred, and prejudice.
President Johnson insisted that the Civil Rights Act of
1964 "had gone further in doing so than any previous legis
lation in the twentieth century."

Signing the bill into

law the president, perhaps wishing to dramatize the event,
informed a nationwide television audience:
We believe that all men have certain inalien
able rights, yet many Americans do not enjoy
those rights.
We believe all men are entitled to
the blessings of liberty.
Yet millions are being
deprived of those blessings— not because of their
own failures, but because of the color of their
skin.
The reasons are deeply embedded in history
and tradition and the nature of man.
We can
understand— without rancor or hatred— how this
happened.
But it cannot continue.
Our Constitution, the foundation of our
republic, forbids it.
The principles of our

®^Kauper, p. 181.
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freedom forbid it.
Morality forbids it and the
law I will sign tonight forbids it.82
One writer points out what he considers some significant
aspects of the 1964 Act:
In the more important of its many provisions,
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorized the Attorney
General to initiate school-desegregation suits and
eliminated racial segregation in any program or
activity receiving federal assistance; however, the
most controversial portion of the Act was
Title II— or, as it is better known, the 'public
accommodations' section.
It forbade racial dis
crimination in all places of public accommodations—
hotels, motels, restaurants, service stations, places
of entertainment— engaged in interstate commerce.
Such discrimination had long been a particularly
sensitive area for American Negroes.
Finally, it seems appropriate to mention that this Act met
resistance just as the previous Acts had been challenged.
Moreover, many sources assert that resistance by white
southerners, especially in the Deep South, to the Negroes'
exercise of public accommodation rights "took on more
violent forms, including murder.
In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act.
Presumably, previous legislation contained provisions for
dealing with problems related to voting rights.

However,

the necessity for this additional legislation is hig h 
lighted as follows:

"Blacks were still systematically pre

vented from voting in much of the South.

An incredible array

James C. Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the
Johnson Administration (Jackson:
University and College
Press of Mississippi, 1973), pp. 16-17.
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of public and private obstacles still confronted blacks in
their efforts to register and v o t e . R e g a r d i n g the
inherent value of ensuring the privilege to participate in
this important political process, it has been said:
The vote merits attention because it is one
of the most w idely distributed of all political
resources, because all decisions in a democratic
form of government rest ultimately on votes, and
perhaps, because it is the major mechanism for
translating popular preferences into governmental
decisions.
Various groups, from the propertyless
to women, have sought the vote on grounds that it
is an important resource in the implementation of
their preferences and the recognition of their
interests, as well as their worth as persons.
The Negro struggle for political rights fits into
this same c o n t e x t . 85
Perhaps, an interesting corollary of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 is that Congress, though often appearing
indifferent to civil liberties, provided legal aid for
the poor and served to make the poor

[many, if not most,

of whom are Negroes] more aware of and sensitive to
exercising their legal rights.

One writer notes:

"Congress's decision in 1965 to finance legal services for
the poor on a vastly expanded

(if still inadequate)

has had particularly broad repercussions.

level

Existing cadres

of civil liberties and civil rights lawyers were augmented

®^Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson
Administration, p. 26.
^^William R. Kreech, The Impact of Negro V o t i n g :
The Role of the Vote in the Quest for Equality (Chicago;
Rand McNally, 1968), p. 3.
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by a vigorous and idealistic group of young men and women
representing the p o o r ."86
It has been reported that the constitutionality of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was challenged almost imme
diately.

The South Carolina v. Katzenbach case provides an

example:

"The state of South Carolina filed suit before the

United States Supreme Court on September 25, 1965, to
enjoin Attorney General Katzenbach from enforcing the act on
the grounds that the law had unconstitutionally invaded the
states' rights to establish voter qualifications."

It seems

that the state of South Carolina failed to accomplish its
goal since the Supreme Court,

in this case, "unanimously

upheld the constitutionality of the entire Voting Rights Act
of 1965 on the grounds that it was within the power of
Congress to take affirmative measures to implement the
Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Scholars report repeatedly that in early 196"
numerous civil rights bills "languished in Congress."

Sig

nificantly, in 1966 one civil rights bill considered by
Congress contained an open housing provision.

It seems that

open housing or fair housing proved an insurmountable
obstacle.

One writer noted the key factors contributing to

What They Are— What They Should Be
Books, 1970), pp. xix-xx.

(New York:

Pantheon

Administration, p. 35.
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the bill's demise:

"The sad, ever outrageous, but inescap

able fact seems to be that the white is not yet acclimated
to the notion of having a Negro for a neighbor.

So the

bill . . . became the first civil rights measure to be killed
by Congress in nine years."

Among others. President Johnson

issued an emotional plea calling for fair housing.

The

president reminded Congress that "in the war, the Negro
American has given this nation his best— but this nation has
not given him equal justice."
Johnson asserted,

Specifically, President

"The bullets at the battle front do not

discriminate— but landlords at home do."

Other difficulties

and factors that threatened the civil rights bill have been
documented.® ®
In late 1967, Congress was once more obligated to
confront the civil rights bill.

It seemed obvious that

passage of such legislature would be difficult, if not impos
sible.

For example, it has been reported:

"By late August

the House-passed civil rights bill was sent to the Senate
Judiciary Committee.

Senator Eastland announced that he

planned to kill it by adding the 'open' housing provision to
it.

The Mississippi senator predicted that his action would

halt further efforts to pass civil rights laws aimed at the
South."

Further, it appears that for numerous reasons

Congress was not coerced by President Johnson or former civil
rights advocates among its membership to pass the bill as it

®®Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson
Administration, pp. 37-43.
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had been in 1966.

For example, it has been disclosed:

Despite the rhetoric the administration has
not pressured as much for civil rights legisla
tion in 1967 as it had in 1966. Being fully aware
of the changed complexion of the House and the
growing backlash, the president seemed to place a
higher priority on support for other matters,
especially the undeclared war in Vietnam.
Even
some of the traditional support of northern
moderates and liberals warned:
"The open bussing
and equal employment bills affected the Northern
homeowner and labor unionist, whose interests had
not been touched by the civil rights movement.
Northern members of Congress from both parties,
many of whom had supported civil rights legislation
previously, were keenly aware of the sensitive
nature of those issues."
The coalition of
northern Republicans and Democrats so crucial to
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 seemed to have
faded a w a y . 89
Concluding this discussion on the civil rights bill
that Congress failed to pass over a two-year period,

it

seems desirable to note that in 1968 sufficient votes were
mobilized to result in enactment of a Civil Rights Act.
Beginning the drive toward eventual passage of the Act,
President Johnson,

in his annual message to Congress on

January 17, 1968, asserted:

"I shall urge Congress to act

on several other pending civil rights measures— fair jury
trials, protection of federal rights, enforcement of equal
employment opportunity, and fair housing."
in this scenario,

Another feature

some writers claim, can be explained in

terms of vigorous efforts of Clarence Mitchell of the NAACP
and other members of the 1966 Leadership Conference.

For

Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson
Administration, pp. 46-47.
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example, one source notes that these leaders "decided to
make the civil rights bill passed by the House in 1967 and
still pending in the Senate, the vehicle for open housing
legislation in 1968."

Also, Senator Everett Dirksen who had

played an important role in previous years with civil rights
bills had a change of heart which contributed to the even
tual success of the bill.

Significantly, the senator nego

tiated a compromise with Ramsey Clark and other civil rights
advocates to modify the coverage of the housing section of
the bill.

Dirksen then introduced an amendment which

included eighty percent of the nation's housing.
Congress passed this Act on April 10, 1968.
Aspects of the Act include:
The new law which would go into effect fully
in 1970 prohibited discrimination in the sale of
rental of about 80 percent of all housing.
Most
housing built with federal assistance, such as
public housing and urban renewal projects, was
covered immediately on enactment of the bill.
Coverage was to be extended on January 1, 1969, to
all multiple-unit dwellings except for owneroccupied dwellings with no more than four u n i t s .
Also covered on that date were single-family
houses, owned by private individuals.
Privately
owned single-family houses sold or rented by real
estate agents or brokers were covered as of
January 1, 1970.
Private owners selling or
renting their house without the services of a
real estate agent or broker were exempt.
The pro
hibition against discrimination also applied to
financing and brokerage services.
The secretary
of Housing and Urban Development was to administer
this title.

90;Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson
Administration, pp. 47-50.
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The bill also provided criminal penalties for
injuring or interfering wit h a person who was
exercising specific rights which included:
to
serve on a jury, to vote, to work, to participate
in government or government-aided programs, to
enjoy public accommodations, and to attend school
or college.
In addition, the measure provided
similar protection to civil rights workers who urged
or helped others to exercise the rights mentioned
a bove.^ 1
Also, some significant responses to the Act have
been observed.

One writer refers to President Johnson's

remarks upon signing the bill into law.

President Johnson

said:
Now with this bill, the voice of justice speaks
again.
It proclaims that fair housing for all— all
human beings who live in this country— is now a
part of the American w ay of life.
This afternoon,
as we gather here . . ., I think we can all take
some heart that democracy's work is being done.
In the Civil Rights Act of 1968 America does move
forward and the bell of freedom rings a little
louder.52
On the other hand, an article in Christian Century noted:
"The fact that Washington could sigh with relief when such
a minor bit of legislation stumbles through is an indica
tion that the white power structure is still not prepared
to do anything about the great injustices that perpetuate
poverty.Another

source reveals some strengths and

weaknesses of the Act.

First, the Act disregards zoning

Administration, pp. 54-55.
Administration, p. 55.
^^"Racism Arrested?" Christian C e n t u r y , April 24,
1968, p. 507.
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laws and building codes.
Development

Second, Housing and Urban

(HUD) lacked enforcement authority.

The only

other action available was to bypass HUD and proceed
directly to a federal district court.
article notes:

Continuing the

"If the procedural and substantive difficul

ties do not vitiate Title VIII, it ma y eventually provide
an escape valve for Negro frustration.
best serve only as a temporary sedative.

Otherwise, it can
To at least a

certain extent, however, exodus from the ghetto is now a
practical possibility."^^
Perhaps, summarizing the impact of efforts by the
United States Congress during the mid-twentieth century,
one black historian remarks :
Few developments have affected the movement
for racial equality more than the assumption of
some responsibility by the government.
Within a
decade after the Truman Committee on Civil Rights
had completed its task. Congress has created the
United States Commission on Civil Rights.
The
significance of the Commission lay not so much in
the exercise of its quite limited powers or the
success of its quite modest program as in its
symbolizing a remarkable and historic reversal of
congressional policy on matters affecting race.
And having taken this first, halting step.
Congress, responding to pressures from the outside
as well as from within, took additional steps.
It extended the life of the Commission on Civil
Rights and enlarged its powers.
A few years later
in 1964, it enacted into law the most far-reaching
civil rights bill ever passed by that body,
authorizing agents of the government to protect
citizens against discrimination in voting.

^■*"The Federal Fair Housing Requirements : Title
VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act," Duke Law Journal,
1969:762-771.
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education, and the use of public accommodations.
In the following year it passed the Voting Rights
Act, which led to a dramatic increase in the number
of black voters and ultimately of black elected
public officials.
Now that the barrier was
breached there would be other legislation in the
area, but none as far-reaching or significant as the
acts of 1964 and 1965.95
The preceding discussion suggests that for several
decades Congress did respond, somewhat reluctantly, to the
need to eliminate racial inequality in some major areas.
Nevertheless, it seems obvious that these actions did not
substantially change the status of millions of Negro
Americans in their pursuit of equality and justice or firstclass citizenship.

Hence, the struggle continues and

problems remain unsolved.

On the other hand, the informa

tion presented essentially documents specific resources
Congress utilized to address equal rights problems in some
areas; i.e., voting, employment, education, fair housing,
etc.

At the same time, our system of government affords a

wider range of resources for use by Congress which the
legislature failed to use fully to accomplish greater gains
in the crucial area of civil rights.

Also, the inter

relationships of the three branches could have functioned
in a manner to yield more substantive advancement toward
equality for all Americans.

^^Franklin, Racial Equality in America, pp. 101-
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Role of the United States Supreme Court
This section addresses the nature and scope of the
leadership assumed by the judicial branch of our federal
government, particularly in the area of civil rights.
Specifically, it seems appropriate to concentrate on the
Supreme Court's actions during the twentieth century, which
assisted the Negro's efforts to secure equal rights and
justice.

It should be remembered that prior to 1900 actions

by the Court were diametrically opposed to fostering racial
equality.

For instance, one writer notes:

The United States Supreme Court had chipped in with
the 1896 "separate but equal" decision in Plessy
V. Ferguson, holding in essence that Chief Justice
Taney was correct when he noted in the famous Dred
Scott cases that under the Constitution, "The
unhappy black race were separated from the white
by indelible marks."
The 1896 Court said that the
law was "powerless to eradicate racial instincts
or to abolish distinctions based on physical dif
ferences," and held that the states— and the Federal
Government, for that matter— were constitutionally
justified in classifying citizens on the basis of
race and forbidding their use of state facilities,
private accommodations, and public utilities on the
basis of that classification.
It added that where
Negroes were excluded from state facilities or
private utilities, they must be furnished separate
and equal accommodations for their own use, a hedge
that was construed to mean that a one-room Negro
school in a church basement was equal to a graded
eight-room school for whites and that Jim Crow
seats in half of a baggage car were equal to
Pullman accommodations.96
As the twentieth century began, the Supreme Court
was content to obstruct rather than promote the ideals of

^^Robert L. Carter et a l ., Equality
Random House, Inc., 1965), pp. 11-12.

(New York:
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equality and justice.

For example, one writer observes:

By 1900 the elaborate apparatus for the
enforcement of equal rights in the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
and subsequent legislation of 1870, 1871, and 1875
was largely a failure, and continued in a somewhat
less degree to be so in 1959. . . . Indifferent and
inactive Presidents and disinterested or timid
Attorneys General did little to enforce the amend
ments and the remnants of the statutes and the
Supreme Court, as we have seen, imposed very con
siderable obstacles by invalidating key provisions
of federal statutes and construing others and the
amendments strictly.97
Further, for several decades into the twentieth
century, it was evident that the Court did not feel compelled
to move expeditiously in addressing the inequalities and
injustices American Negroes experienced.

For instance, it

has been noted:
The long period of legal inactivity which existed
for almost thirty years following the close of the
nineteenth century ended with but few encouraging
signs.
Moreover, those few cases were scattered
over a period of years and had little effect upon
the total problem of discrimination.
Rather than
representing any sustained efforts, they were only
occasional victories and often easily circumvented.
Perhaps, it should be mentioned that these cases involved
discrimination in the voting process and housing.

For

instance, in 1915, the Court declared use of the "grandfather
clause" unconstitutional and in Warley v. Buchanan

(1917)

the court "held as unconstitutional a municipal ordinance
forbidding Negroes to occupy houses on blocks where a
majority of the populace was white."

The latter decision
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according to some legal scholars, "furnished the initial
breakthrough in the housing area.
Moreover,

it has been reported that in the mid-1920s

the Supreme Court acquired additional resources to attack
discrimination :
In 1925, the passage of a statute pertaining
to the Supreme C o u r t 's jurisdiction was to give
rise to the possibility of increased Supreme Court
review of "due process" in the state courts.
The
true significance of this statute has been largely
hidden and ignored.
This statute permitted the
Supreme Court to review cases through certiorari
rather than being limited to cases on appeal.
Hence,
it made it possible for the Court to select the
cases where it felt review was necessary and also
to prevent the overcrowding and congestion of the
docket.
At the same time, it allowed the Court to
proceed at its own pace. While it has been
questioned as to what extent this reform legisla
tion has been responsible for greater Supreme
Court activity, this little noted development might
properly be viewed as a prelude of what was to
co m e .9 9
Significantly, one source refers to the Court's activity
in the area of school segregation during the same period :
In the first three decades of the new century,
the Court's course in reference to school segrega
tion had been weak and inconclusive.
It had not
faced the problem squarely, but its evasions
bolstered the widely held lay and legal belief that
such segregation squared with the requirements of
the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend
ment.
States were encouraged to pursue separate
school policies and practices.
The ruling
[rejecting Negro students] in the Berea College
[Kentucky] case was indefensible.
It put the great

of the Civil Rights Movement
versity Press, 1965), p. 15.

(Detroit:

Legal Aspects
Wayne State Uni

^^King and Quick, p. 16.
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seal of Supreme Court approval on racist legisla
tion that was patently prescribed even under the
most restrictive interpretation of the amendment
and, in so doing, institutionalized racial segre
gation and the color-caste system.
The Court's
Negro wards fared ill at its h a n d s . 100
Since by the 1930s, it became apparent that the
Court was adopting a more meaningful role in the advancement
of racial equality, perhaps some of the factors contributing
to this change of attitude should be mentioned.
remarked :

It has been

"In p a r t , the changed outlook of the Supreme

Court reflects

'cultural drift' toward more egalitarian

values in the United States.

Although the rulings of the

Court are not necessarily a direct reflection of prevailing
views among the populace, changes in the philosophy of the
Court occur in the context of more or less in harmony with
broader cultural and social trends.

Parenthetically,

it should be remembered that the nation was at a crisis in
the early 1930s.

According to most historians, the crisis

had been touched off with the stock market crash in the
fall of 1929 and probably intensified the Negro's problem,
particularly in terms of the unprecedented unemployment.
For instance, millions of people, especially Negroes, were
out of work.
During the third decade of the twentieth century,
the Court's involvement in securing equal rights was signi
ficant in the area of employment.

100Miller,
^,
p. 216.

Commenting on the Court's

^*^^Broom and Glenn, p. 56.
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response to persistent discrimination in employment, Loren
Miller notes :
There were well-defined limits to effective
judicial action against discrimination in employ
ment, but the Court responded to every invitation
extended to it from the 1930's onward to exert its
power to strike down discriminatory labor practices.
It administered the final death blow to state
statutes which had the effect of fostering peonage;
it blazed a new trail in its holdings that railway
labor unions could not discriminate against Negro
workmen where they were placed in a position to do
so by federal statutes; it narrowed the doctrine
that private organizations were free to discriminate
under any and all circumstances, with the labor case
rulings that where the union accepted statutory
benefits, it was restrained from the exercise of
racial discrimination in much the same manner as a
legislature; it recognized the right of Negroes to
picket against discrimination in employment and
placed that right on a par with picketing rights of
unions, despite an unnecessary limitation of that
power in the Hughes case; it validated state fairemployment statutes and refused to limit their
power to act to purely intrastate employers.
Except in the case of peonage statutes, these actions
were significant departures from the restrictive
constitutional view taken in earlier c a s e s .102
Another source praises the Court's exemplary leadership and
predicts the far-reaching effect;
[The Court] overturned or ignored its own strangling
precedents and even assumed an amazing leadership in
the area of civil rights.
By the sheer weight of
its own example, it inspired something of a similar
zeal on the part of the executive branch of the
government and ultimately helped create a climate
of public opinion in which Congress was induced to
act by passing the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960,
and 1964, and 1965.
The Court's equalitarian
decisions beginning in the mid-1930's gave increasing
freedom and opportunities to civil rights organiza
tions to press it as well as the executive and
legislative branches of government for ever widening
reforms.103

•^Miller, pp. 14-15.
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Historians generally agree that numerous factors
contributed to the Court's change of attitude:
The great depression and the measures taken to
ameliorate it were levelers of a kind, and the war
against Nazi Germany and its racist dogmas, with
preachments of equality by American leaders, was a
great equalizer.
Beyond these forces, however, was
the rise of the Negro race economically and politi
cally to the extent that more Negroes were ready to
challenge discriminations which in other times were
accepted with indifference or resignation.
Finally,
by 1935 powerful groups, well supported by numbers
and money, had arisen to work for the cause of
Negroes in the civil rights vineyard, so that cases
presented in the 1930's and afterwards were, for the
most part, based on adequately prepared records in
the trial court and were always marked by the most
competent presentation of issues in appellate pro
ceedings. 104
Perhaps, at this point we should take a look at the
socio-political climate in America during the forties.
Among the numerous observations made about this period in
our nation's history, the following seems important for the
purpose of this study:
Racial discrimination burdened the consciences of
some white Americans, but not enough.
Most never
thought twice about the fact that in one-third of
the states their fellow citizens with dark skins
were excluded from most decent schools and restau
rants and public p a r k s , were confined to the rear of
buses and to separate railroad cars and could not
vote in the meaningful elections, the primaries;
that. North and South, they were largely limited to
menial employment; that they were forced to serve
in segregated units of the armed forces of the
United States; that, eighty years after the Civil
War, they could not sit down at a drugstore lunch
counter or see a movie in downtown Washington, D.C.,
the capital of the country.105

^^^Harris, pp. 109-110.
^Anthony Lewis, P_____________________
Random House, 1953), p. 3.
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Beginning in the early forties and continuing for
two decades, the Court became favorably disposed toward cases
brought before it by persons aggrieved over racial discrimi
nation.

For example, John Hope Franklin comments:

"In

cases involving education, housing, transportation, civil
rights, and voting, the federal judiciary handed down a
series of landmark decisions during the last three decades
that greatly encouraged Negro Americans and all Americans
who sought racial equality.

Another appropriate comment

on the Court's leadership includes the following:
As the Supreme Court broke with old precedents
and either overruled them directly or indirectly to
find a path back toward the goal of the color-blind
state envisioned by the framers of the Civil War
Amendments, it acted as a catalytic agent to loose
other great equalitarian forces.
It refurbished
the concept of the Constitution as the fountainhead
of equality when it appealed to that document for
justification of the decisions it rendered.
More
and more often U.S. Attorneys General, who had been
worse than laggered in enforcement of old Civil
Rights statutes, appeared as a friend of the
court— often at the invitation of the justices—
to throw the weight of the executive branch of the
government behind racial reforms.
The Court's con
stant reiteration of the sentiments that its civil
rights decisions were required responses to the
constitutional guarantees stimulated and helped
create a climate of public opinion that demanded
extension and intensification of the very reforms it
had initiated.107
The Supreme Court received criticism when it assumed
leadership of social reform.

Critics seem to view the

Court's leadership as a departure from its traditional

106.'Franklin, Racial Equality in Am e r i c a , p. 103.

„

107
"^Miller, pp. 431-432.
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judiciary role— that of declaring and interpreting the law
as enacted by the legislature and as enforced by the execu
tive branch of democratic government.
to disregard the two facts:

Such criticism seems

(1) the impact of the doctrine

of judicial supremacy on our institutions is immense and

(2)

our Supreme Court, as the final repository of state power,
plays a primary role in American government.
Those who criticize the Court's current efforts to
promote equal rights did not criticize the Court when its
leadership resulted in the weakening and emasculating the
Civil War Amendments.

In other words, the Court was

commended highly for its leadership then and condemned now
for its leadership.
Relentless and formidable leadership in the area
of civil rights became apparent during the mid-twentieth
century.

Several cases illustrate the Court's unprecedented

endeavors.

For example, in Shelly v. Kraemer

(1948) the

Court held that enforcement of restrictive covenants was
unconstitutional and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Apparently, noting the most important aspect of this deci
sion, one source points out:

"By increasing the scope of

the state action concept, the Court furnished a general
judicial technique that later was to prove invaluable

[since

subsequently this technique was used in numerous cases to
overcome the separate but equal doctrine]."

Another case—

^°®Miller, p. 432.
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Sweatt V . Painter

(1950)— provides a second example.

In the

Sweatt case, the Court reversed a decision of the Texas
Supreme Court which held that a new "basement" law school
for Negroes was equal to the University of Texas Law School.
One incident of great importance, according to legal
scholars,

"occurred in the Court's analysis of 'separate but

equal'" and the indication that the presence of intangible
factors may make separate facilities inherently "unequal.
The McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents case

(1950)

represents a third example of the praiseworthy leadership
in the area of equal educational opportunities.

In the

McLaurin case a Negro graduate student at the University of
Oklahoma was required by state law to sit in a segregated
area of the classroom, cafeteria and library.

Declaring

this differential treatment "constitutionally impermis
sible" the Court asserted that such "restrictions impair
and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions
and exchange views with other students, and, in general,
to learn his profession."

Also, the Terry v. Adams case

(1953) which was discussed in a previous section addressed
discrimination in the area of voting rights.

In T e r r y , the

Court held that white primaries in Texas were unconstitu
tional since they excluded Negroes.
Henderson v. United States

Another example is

(1950), a case which involved

discrimination in the dining car of a passenger train.
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Specifically,

"a Negro was denied the right to sit in the

portion of the dining car reserved by the railroad for whites
only."

The Court's decision held that this was a violation

of an Interstate Commerce Act.
said:

In addition, the Court

"We need not multiply instances in which these rules

sanction unreasonable discrimination.

The curtains, parti

tions and sign emphasize the artificiality of a difference
in treatment which serves only to call attention to a racial
classification of passengers holding identical tickets and
using the same public dining facility.
Of special importance is the renown Brown v. Board
of Education case

(1954 and 1955).

According to most

authorities, the Court's decision in the Brown cases not
only has historical significance for affording equal educa
tion for all American children but also for initiating
numerous reforms.

Many sources verify the Court's initia

tive and confirm its effectiveness in promoting social
reform.

For example, one writer comments:
The desegregation decision. Brown v. Board of Edu
cation . . . ushered in a series of profound
reforms.
States and federal criminal procedures
were modified to protect defendants, including
juveniles.
Jurisdiction was assumed over the
apportionment of state and federal legislative
bodies. . . . There developed an aggressiveness
in protecting the rights of the Negro. . . . These
results were accompanied by significant growth in
the jurisdiction of the federal courts and by

King and Quick, pp. 21-22.
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development of legal doctrine that together provide
a solid basis for further change.Ill
One source acknowledges the importance of the Brown decision
in upholding the constitutional prohibitions against racial
discrimination in public education.

But more importantly,

it claims that the Court's actions probably gave impetus to
review of other inequalities in ranerican life.

Accordingly,

Supreme Court decisions of the sixties influenced constitu
tional law dealing with the political processes of govern
ment.

For example, in several cases— Gray v. Sanders

Wesberry v. Sanders

(1964); and Reynolds v. Sims

(1963);

(1964)—

the Court made it patently clear that both election and
representation in the legislature must afford voters per
capita equality with regard to economic interest or place of
residence within the political u n i t .

The Court decision

in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections

(1966) invalidated

state laws making the payment of poll tax a prerequisite to
voting: "The Supreme Court of the United States . . .
struck down the Virginia requirements as a violation of the
equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.

...

In

overruling an earlier decision in Breedlove v. Suttles,
Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority of the Court,
noted in part:

'Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not

the People's Rights (Woodbury, New York:
tional Series, Inc., 1973), p. 463.

Barron's Educa
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germaine to one's ability to participate intelligently in
the electoral process.

. . .

The requirement of fee paying

,«113
causes an invidious discrimination.'
In other cases. Court decisions, regarding the
administration of criminal justice, reflected an increasing
influence of egalitarianism.

In 1966, one writer notes

optimistically that "no period of our history since the
adoption of the Bill of Rights can equal the last decade in
the scope, rapidity, and intensity of the changes in the
law of criminal procedure."

He adds that "many of the

changes are the result of decisions by the United States
Supreme Court.
Regarding the sit-in cases of the sixties, it has
been observed:
The historian will be struck with the fact
that in every case in which it granted review— as
it did in most cases— the Supreme Court upset con
victions upheld by state courts of last resort in
the great sit-in controversy.
Time and again, the
Court put its own construction on the facts and
came to conclusions opposed to those of the state
courts.
Federal supremacy was asserted with
vengeance, and no ingenious interpretation of state
laws governing breach of the peace, unlawful
assembly, or tresspass was availing against what
seemed the obvious determination of the Supreme
Court to protect sit-in defendants against the wrath
of the states.
These decisions had significance
beyond protection of individual rights : they left
the students and their sympathizers free to pursue
their massive assault on discrimination in places
of public accommodation, to keep the controversy

Dorsen, p. 433.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

open, and to marshall public sentiment for congres
sional action.115
Perhaps, the following comment on the Supreme
Court's leadership characterizes the nature, scope, and
potential summarily:
The sum of the whole matter is that the Supreme
Court has been bold, aggressive, and creative in
resuscitating civil rights and in restoring them to
the place assigned them in the constitutional
firmament by the Civil War Amendments.
It has had
to break old shackles and depart from old prece
dents of its own making.
It has rarely hesitated.
Where it could have taken refuge in those old p re
cedents, it has resisted the temptation to do so
and has remained undaunted by the shock waves of
criticism and abuse.
It has been tried and found
worthy of the past moments of its own greatness.
In its great decisions in the white primary cases,
the confessions cases, the race-restrictive
covenant cases, the school cases, the sit-in cases,
the Supreme Court has moved at an ever accelerating
pace toward making the Negro more and more a free
man and less and less a freedman. H G
Role of Presidents of the United States
Regarding the role of president or the executive
branch of the federal government in general,

it seems

desirable to mention duties that authorities consider para-

An important role of the executive department is
to see to it that the independence and integrity
of the federal courts are observed and that judi
cial orders are carried out.
Another important
function is to see that the basic conditions of
peace and order are maintained, and those, in turn,
may involve the protection of important constitu
tional rights. . . . Moreover, some remedies that
Congress may provide for vindication of certain

^^^Miller, pp.

402-403.

^^^Miller, pp. 432-433.
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rights depend for their effectiveness upon the
aggressiveness, the initiative, and the energy of
the executive as it operates through the Justice
Department or otherwise in the prosecution of these
remedies.117
Until the mid-twentieth century, presidents failed
to utilize their resources and authority to remedy persistent
racial problems.

In fact, Gunnar Myrdal wrote in 1944;

The Negro problem is not only America's greatest
failure but also America's incomparably great
opportunity for the future.
If America should
follow its own deepest convictions, its well-being
at home would be increased directly.
At the same
time America's prestige and power abroad would rise
immensely.
The century-old dream of American
patriots, that Americans should give to the entire
world its own freedom and its own faith, would come
true.
America can demonstrate that justice,
equality, and cooperation are possible between
white and colored people. . . . America is free to
choose whether the Negro shall remain her liability
or become her opportunity.J-iw
Perhaps, Myrdal's comments stemmed in part from the fact
that for the first three decades of the twentieth century
the plight of Negroes to secure first-class citizenship
had been disregarded by the federal government, in general,
and the executive branch in particular.

When there was

response from the executive branch, during the decades
following the 1930s, pursuit was limited or inadequate.
Commenting on the Franklin Roosevelt administration, one
writer observes;
There was scarcely any concern about blacks
in the twentieth century until the Franklin

^■^^Kauper, p. 181.
^Myrdal, pp. 1021-1022.
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Roosevelt administration.
Even then, blacks bene
fited for the most part only because most of them
were among the poor who were helped by the New Deal
programs.
The emphasis was on economic and social
class rather than color of skin, but societal
institutions, including the "breadlines," remained
segregated.
The federal government made no concerted
effort to lift the barriers that surrounded blacks
at every turn.
During World War II, as the result
of a threatened march on Washington by black leaders.
President Roosevelt issued an executive order
banning discrimination in employment in defense
industries and established a Fair Employment Prac
tices Committee (FEPC) to deal with government con
tract employment.
During the administration of President Harry
Truman the pace toward accomplishing equality and justice
did not seem to accelerate greatly.

Some of the achieve

ments of President Truman include creating a Fair Employment
Practices Board

(FEPB) in the Civil Service Commission,

since Congress had discontinued the FEPC; initiating
desegregation of our nation’s armed forces; and recommend
ing a civil rights program.

Truman's proposal of a civil

rights program was considered significant at that partic
ular time by some people.
noted;

On the other hand, it has been

"President Truman, a master at making promises

which he had no intention of fulfilling, appointed a
committee, in December, 1946, to work out a civil rights
program.

The resulting document attacked lynching and Jim

Crow in its manifold forms.

Truman, however, obviously

had no intention of making a fight for this program, and

^^^Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson
Administration, p. 3.
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after it ran into strong Congressional opposition, he let
it gather dust on the shelf.
The accomplishments of the Eisenhower administra
tion in the area of civil rights seem to be meager.

Some

historians have pointed out Eisenhower's abhorrence of the
use of executive power to deal with what he considered
basically local problems.

However, it has been observed

that President Eisenhower continued his predecessor's
attempts to desegregate the military.

Eisenhower also

established committees to deal with racial discrimination
against Negroes in both government and contract employment.
He, also, promoted desegregation in Washington, B.C.
Eisenhower's lack of commitment to school desegregation was
evident in that Eisenhower seemed to disassociate himself
from the Brown cases.

Sources indicate that he never

publicly committed himself to desegregation of public
schools.

Nevertheless,

it has been observed that he

reluctantly set an important precedent by sending in
federal troops and federalizing the Arkansas National Guard
to enforce a federal court order for school desegregation
in Little Rock.

Identifying Eisenhower's own role as

ambigious, historians record the fact that it was during
Eisenhower's administration that Congress passed the Civil

^^^Foster, p. 530.
^Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson
Administration, p. 4.
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During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations,
presidents probably responded m ost aggressively to foster
rights to which Negroes were entitled.

Hence, this section

will deal in some depth with the efforts of these two
presidents to utilize the power and the influence of the
presidency to effectuate significant advancement in the area
of civil rights.
Some of President Kennedy's responses to racial
injustice and discriminatory practices in America should be
discussed.

His contributions to the Negro's struggle for

equal rights and justice have been documented many times.
Evidence supports his involvement in the areas of housing,
employment, and education.

In addition, it should be

mentioned that President Kennedy appointed numerous Negroes
to federal positions and sought to reduce discriminatory
practices in the armed forces.
Our system of government provides substantial
opportunity for the president to effectuate significant
change in civil rights and to promote reform.

Outstanding,

perhaps, is the president's authority emanating from the
prestige of his office and originating within the province
of his executive power.

For example, the president can

issue executive and administrative orders and make speeches
to influence public opinion.

Also, the president can

utilize his personal influence to convince governmental
officials to enforce pertinent policies and offer proposals
to Congress.

As commander-in-chief, the president has
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the power to make changes in the armed forces and to call
on the military to enforce court orders.

Perhaps, most

importantly, the president can exercise his own authority
in the area of federal funding.

Other powers of the presi

dent include his ability to encourage or threaten litigation
in the courts and to make federal appointments.
During the Kennedy administration, many sources
acknowledge that Attorney General Robert Kennedy served as
the chief strategist and leader of civil rights efforts
within the federal government.

Interestingly, the nature

and scope of Robert Kennedy's responsibilities and
authority have been summarized.

"The president's brother,

Robert Kennedy, who was attorney general

. . ., gave

overall direction to the administration's civil rights
policies.

Major questions of policy and execution to cope

with large-scale problems were dealt wi t h by him and his
staff."^23
To reduce discrimination in housing. President
Kennedy issued an executive order called "Equal Opportunity
in Housing."

Regarding this particular executive order, it

has been explained:

"Under its terms the president directed

James C. Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy
Administration (Hattiesburg, Mississippi:
University and
College Press of Mississippi, 1971), pp. 17-18.
^Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis
tration, p. 21.
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federal agencies to take every proper and legal action to
prevent discrimination in

(1) the sale or leasing of housing

which was owned or operated by the federal government;

(2)

housing which was constructed or sold through loans which
were made, insured, or guaranteed by the federal government;
and

(3) housing which was made available through slum

clearance or urban renewal programs.
In the area of employment, discrimination persisted.
Discrimination in federal employment caused great concern.
For example, one source notes:

"Between June 1961 and June

1962, the federal employment of Negroes increased by only
11,000, while the total number of federal employees increased
by more than 62,000.

Further, it has been mentioned:

"According to a Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity
report in 1964, Negroes had increased since 1961 from 12.9
to 13.2 percent of all federal employees, and in the Plans
for Progress companies the increase was from 5.1 to 5.7.
By the end of 1963, Negroes were still concentrated in the
least skilled and poorest paying jobs in both public and
private categories.
President Kennedy assumed the responsibility for
addressing discrimination in employment.

Among other things.

Ha r v e y , Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis
tration, p. 29.
^^^Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 627.
^Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis
tration, pp. 48-49.
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in 1961, the president made the following announcement :
I am today issuing an Executive Order combining
the President's Committee on Government Contracts
and the President's Committee on Government Employ
ment Policy into a single President's Committee on
Equal Employment Opportunity.
Through this vastly strengthened machinery, I
intend to ensure that Americans of all colors and
beliefs will have equal access to employment within
the government, and with those who do business with
the government.
This order provides for centralization of
responsibility for those policies under the VicePresident.
It requires the Secretary of Labor—
with all resources of the Department of Labor at
his command— to supervise the implementation of
equal employment policies.
And it grants, in
specific terms, sanctions sweeping enough to
ensure compliance.^27
Also, during the Kennedy administration efforts were made
to obtain cooperation and assistance from companies not
holding government contracts in providing for equal job
opportunities.

In June of 1963, President Kennedy issued

another executive order which was designed to reduce job
discrimination.

For example, it has been reported:

"President Kennedy issued Executive Order 11114 in which
he extended the authority of the Committee on Equal
Employment Opportunity to cover any federally assisted con
struction project, whether by loan, grant, contract,
guaranty, or insurance; and he empowered the committee to
withhold federal funds from any project in which discrimi
nation against workers was practiced."

Despite these

efforts which were considered praiseworthy at the time.

^Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis
tration , p. 48.
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authorities pointed out, in 1965, that the President's
attempt to deal with job discrimination under his 1961
Executive Order had little impact."1^8
Perhaps, it should be pointed o ut that the year 1963
marked the one hundredth year of Negro emancipation and one
year of Negro revolution.

Many sources contend that

Americans experienced the most serious domestic crisis since
the Civil War and that there were only limited signs of
progress in the area of civil rights.

For example, Lerone

Bennett notes:
In scores of cities. North and South, there
were riots and near-riots and small wars were fought
in Cambridge (Maryland), Danville (Virginia),
Savannah, and Birmingham.
There were . . . more
than ten thousand racial demonstrations (sit-ins,
lie-ins, sleep-ins, pray-ins, stall-ins) in this
year, and more than five thousand American Negroes
were arrested for political activities.
The whole
army of resistance and rebellion reached a pitch
in the Red Summer of 1964, one of the most
turbulent summers in American race relations.
. . . Negro ghettos were spreading like hot lava
across the concrete crags of every metropolitan
area; Negro unemployment was at a 1930 depression
level; and Negro schools, the Supreme Court to the
contrary notwithstanding, were separate and trans
parently unequal.
In the North, there was gentle
evasion of the spirit and letter of the Constitu
tion; and in the South, there w as open defiance.
As the year of decision opened, federal troops were
maintaining an uneasy vigil at the University of
Mississippi.
And police officers and black rebels
at the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC) were fighting grim guerrilla actions in the
wilds of the Black Belt counties of southwest
Georgia and central Mississippi.1^9

^Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis
tration, p. 48.
^^^Bennett, p. 328.
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Another writer makes the following remark:

"The fulfillment

of the Negro revolution plainly demanded much more than the
achievement of the Negroes*

legal rights.

In April 1963 the

unemployment rate for non-whites was 12.1 percent, for
whites 4.8 percent.

Poverty afflicted half the non-white

population, less than one-fifth of the white population.
Three out of five non-white families lived in deteriorating
or dilapidated buildings or without plumbing.

The racial

and social problems were inextricably intermingled."

Arthur

Schlesinger comments on the prevalence of revolutions in
American history and implies their propensity to effect
social reform:
Every great period of social change in
American history has been set off by the demand of
some excluded but aggressive group for larger
participation in the national democracy:
in the
age of Jackson by the frontier farmer, the city
worker, the small entrepreneur; in the progressive
era, by the bankrupt farmers of the middle border
and the by-passed old upper classes of the cities ;
in the New Deal by labor in mass-production
industries, the unemployed and the intellectuals.
The uprising of the Negroes now contained the
potentiality of ushering in a n e w era which would
not only win Negroes their rights but renew the
democratic commitment of the national community.
It
also contained the potentiality, if the anger
the Negroes exceeded the will of the government to
redress their grievances and the capacity of their
own leadership to retain their confidence, of
rending and destroying the fabric of American
society. . . .
A generation ago Roosevelt had
absorbed the energy and hope of the labor revolution
into the New Deal.
So in 1963 Kennedy moved to
incorporate the Negro revolution into the democratic
coalition and thereby help it serve the future of
American freedom.130

A Thousand Days:
John F .
Kennedy in the White House (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1965), pp. 975-977.
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It seems that President Kennedy urged Congress to respond
effectively to civil rights problems.
"The President declared that . . .

One source notes :

he was going to ask

Congress to act on the proposition that race had no place in
American life or law.

He pointed out that already the judi

ciary and the executive branches of government had made that
commitment and that it was time for Congress to act."
Accordingly, the president's message to Congress in 1963
stressed that Negroes'

drive for justice had not remained

stationary nor would it do so until full equality had been
achieved.
dent said:

Urging passage of Civil Rights Bills, the p r e s i 
"The growing and understandable dissatisfaction

of Negro citizens with the present pace of desegregation and
their increased determination to secure for themselves the
equality of opportunity and treatment to which they are
rightfully entitled, have underscored what should have
already been clear:

the necessity of the Congress enacting

this year— not only the measures already proposed— but also
additional legislation providing legal remedies for the
denial of certain individual rights.
During the Kennedy administration, there were
efforts to eliminate discrimination in public schools.
instance,

For

in the fall of 1962 the Justice Department filed

an unprecedented law suit in the federal district court in
Richmond, Virginia, to end racial discrimination in the

tration, pp. 56-58.
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Prince George County Public S c h o o l s . The widespread
significance of this action has been indicated:

"This

marked the first time that the federal government had ini
tiated a school desegregation suit.

It was an important

case for private groups, because they foresaw that the
financial burden of instituting and prosecuting civil rights
cases might be shifted to the federal government in those
parts of the South which benefited from impacted area
aid."

Also in the fall of 1962, there existed evidence to

verify the president's leadership.

Of tremendous impor

tance, perhaps, is evidence not only of President Kennedy's
responsive and exemplary leadership but also the effective
ness of cooperation between branches of our government to
secure equal rights for Negroes.

For example, actions

were taken to ensure James Meredith's admission into the
University of Mississippi in compliance with a federal
court order.

Accordingly,

it has been noted:

In order to carry out the court order, it was
necessary for the Justice Department to dispatch
541 United States marshals, and the president
alerted several thousand federal troops and
federalized the Mississippi National Guard. Federal
troops were retained in Oxford for the rest of the
year to maintain order and to protect Meredith,
as he completed requirements for a degree.
The president's commitment to equal rights in edu
cation was again demonstrated in 1963 when Governor George

^^^King and Quick, p. 263.
^Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis
tration, pp. 40-41.
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Wallace refused to allow two Negroes, Vivian Malone and
James Hood, to register at the University of Alabama.

He

signed an executive order to federalize the Alabama National
Guard to ensure their registration.

Further, Kennedy

appeared on television and explained to the nation the
necessity for the use of federal troops.

Delivering an

address praised by many people as the Second Emancipation
Proclamation and by others as the Kennedy Manifesto, the
president asserted:

"We are confronted with a moral issue.

It is as old as the scriptures and as clear as the
American Constitution.

The heart of the question is whether

all Americans are to be offered equal rights and equal
opportunities, whether we are going to treat our fellow
citizens as we want to be treated.
Kennedy was willing to indicate to all Americans
that his administration would choose individuals for impor
tant governmental appointments on the basis of their merit
and without regard to other considerations.

Of some

importance is the fact that Kennedy appointed Negroes to
numerous positions.

One writer remarks:

Kennedy showed little hesitation in appointing
Negroes to important federal positions.
As judges
he appointed Thurgood Marshall to the Circuit Court
in New York, Wade McCree to the District for
Eastern Michigan, James Parsons to the District
Court of Northern Illinois, and Marjorie Lawson,
Joseph Waddy, and Spottswood Robinson to the bench

'^Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis
tration, pp. 41-42.
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in the District of Columbia.
Robert Weaver became
the head of the Housing and Home Finance Agency
. . . .
The President also appointed George L. P.
Weaver to be Assistant Secretary of Labor, Carl
Rowan as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and
later Ambassador to Finland, and Clifton R. Wharton
and Mercer Cook to be Ambassadors to Norway and
Niger, respectively.
He appointed two Negroes,
Merle McCurdy and Cecil F. Poole, as United States
Attorneys, several others to presidential committees
working in the civil rights field and to other
boards and commissions, including John R. Duncan to
the Board of Commissioners of the District of
Columbia.135
The preceding information does not pretend to
include all endeavors of the Kennedy Administration to
ensure equal rights for Negro Americans.

However, it pre

sents some evidence of President Kennedy's active involvement
in the area of civil rights.

Particularly in education the

President demonstrated the leadership and coordination of
federal resources which yielded benefits.

One writer

evaluates achievements of the Kennedy Administration:
In appraising the Kennedy record on desegregation
in education, one salient feature stands out:
the President and his administration spokesmen
have created a new mood which at the moment is
primarily qualitative, but which will eventually
have its quantitative effect on the Negro com
munity.
Following an era in which the federal exe
cutive had maintained a posture of an impartial
agent of law enforcement and a neutral arbiter
between Negro claims on the one hand and white
supremacy on the other, the Kennedy Administration
has resolutely moved the presidency into a position
of support for the embattled judiciary on the side
of Negro rights.136

l^^Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 626-627.
^Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis
tration, p. 42.
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John Hope Franklin notes:
The young President had no ambitious plans for
new legislation to elevate the Negro in American
life.
Instead, he looked toward expanded executive
action, especially in those areas where federal
authority was most complete and undisputed.
He
hoped, moreover, to use the prestige of his office
to exercise the "moral leadership" to which he had
referred during the campaign.
He encouraged the
Department of Justice, headed by his brother Robert,
to carry forward its efforts to secure the right to
vote through negotiation and litigation.137
In another source there exists evidence that the office of
the president was transformed during the Kennedy adminis
tration.

This transformation was apparently most signifi

cant in the area of civil rights.

For example, it has been

observed:
President Kennedy changed the image of the
presidency from a position of seeming neutrality on
civil rights as under the Eisenhower to one of
positive actions on behalf of the frustrated
blacks.
In his executive actions. President
Kennedy relied heavily on precedents established
during previous administrations. . . .
In fact,
one might say that Kennedy returned the presidency
to the attempt at leadership of the civil rights
movement as under Truman.
John F. Kennedy was, of
course, more successful, though much remained to
be done at the time of his death.1^°
Perhaps it should be added that despite some advancement
of Negro rights, much remained to be accomplished.
it has been noted:

Further,

"The president's leadership role had

been vital in obtaining a meaningful bill which had a
chance of passage in the House.

This goal of enacting a

1^'^Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 626.
Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis
tration , p. 71.
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civil rights bill was unfulfilled because of his death on
November 22, 1963.

But a new president, Lyndon Johnson,

made it plain in an address to Congress a few days later
that he meant to see the bill passed into law.

His own

leadership played a m ajor role in fulfilling that part of
John F. Kennedy's program by July 1964, when the most farreaching civil rights bill in American history became law.
A significant step had been taken toward making the Negro
a first-class citizen of the United States.
In the 1960s direct action occupied center stage
in the Negro's quest for equality.

At the same time

Negroes were reminded by leaders that the ballot and the
courts were still valuable instruments for achieving pro
gress.

In 1964, Roy Wilkins, executive secretary of the

NAACP considered by m any the most consistently powerful
civil rights organization,

insisted that the flexible use

of a variety of tactics would be essential if the civil
rights movement were to accomplish its goals.
asserted:

Wilkins

"We cannot have meaningful change in human rela

tions, especially if these involve the revision of laws
and uprooting of tradition, without confrontation, tension
and occasional s t r i f e . C o n t i n u i n g ,

Wilkins said :

^^^Harvey, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Adminis
tration, p. 63.
^^^Frances L. Broderick and August Meier, e d s .,
Negro Protest Thought in the Twentieth Century (New York :
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), p. 397.
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The plain lesson is that we must use every
method, every technique, every tool available.
We
need to devise new tools.
Our attack must be
across the board and must be leveled at all forms
and degrees of second class citizenship.
Where one
weapon is sufficient, let it be employed.
Where a
combination is required, let it be used. Where
variations in timing and methods will be effective,
by all means let us employ them.
But let none of
us, in the North or in the South, "activists" or
not, fall into the trap, at this crucial stage, of
attempting to solve all problems everywhere by a
single method.
If Negro citizens today need to re-examine
their positions, white people are under no less
obligation to review theirs.
Despite the bitter
enders, the question of the day is not whether
racial inequality and its principal tool, segrega
tion, shall survive.
The question is only on the
means and the pace of eliminating it.
Diehard
opposition will but delay matters; it cannot win.
. . . American Negro citizens are a unit insisting
that the Constitution of the United States
guarantees protection of their citizenship rights
against the abridgements and denials of any
racist doctrine or practice, in Atlanta or in
Spokane.141
In 1964, Negroes expected to move at an accelerated pace
toward the practical realization of first-class citizenship.
President Lyndon Johnson seemed reluctant to use
the power of his office to press Congress toward passage
of the Voting Rights Act.

However, on March 15, 1965, he

addressed the matter of voting as a basic right, and
reminded Congress that "every device of which human
ingenuity is capable has been used to deny this right.

^Broderick and Meier, p. 400.
^Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson
Administration, p. 31.
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He concluded his speech by outlining proposals which he
planned to submit to remedy the existing problems.
On August 6, 1965, signing the Voting Rights Act
into law, Johnson asserted that the act would "strike away
the last major shackle" of the b l a c k ’s "ancient bonds."
Generally speaking, this act suspended literacy tests and
gave the attorney general the power to appoint federal
examiners to supervise voter registration where tests or
similar qualifying devices existed.
Johnson was praised for bringing more blacks into
prominent federal positions than any previous president.
Noting that the urban Negro's suffering was greatest in the
area of unemployment, one source suggests that "President
Johnson attempted to set a pattern for fair employment by
continuing to appoint Negroes to high government posts.
Johnson's appointments included the following:

Thurgood

Marshall, Solicitor General and Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court; Robert Weaver, Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development; Hobart Taylor, Board of Directors of the
Export-Import Bank; Clifford Alexander, Chairman of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Theodore Berry,
Assistant Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity
(OEO); and Ruby Martin, Director of the Office of Civil

^Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson
Administration, p. 34.
^^^Franklin, From Slavery to F r eedom, p. 641.
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Rights; and Carl Rowan, Director of the United States Infor
mation Agency

(USIA) .

As ambassadors, he appointed James

Nabrit, Jr., to the United Nations, Patricia Harris to
Luxenbourg, Clinton E. Knox to Dahomey, Franklin Williams
to Ghana, and Merle Cook to Gambia.
In the area of employment, Johnson used the power
of the presidency to promote reform.

For example, in

1965, he issued an executive order which transferred the
responsibility for widening equal employment opportunities
within the federal government from the President's Committee
on Equal Employment Opportunity to the Civil Service
Commission.

Revealing some activities of the commission,

James C. Harvey observed:
The commission almost immediately undertook efforts
to recruit and train personnel and to police
various efforts at equal employment opportunity
within the federal government.
A number of
governmental agencies took independent action in
that direction too.
In 1966 the commission
established a new program called MUST (Maximum
Utilization of Skills and Training) to assist other
federal agencies to recruit and train workers who
did not or could not ente the civil service
through regular testing procedures.
The commission
in 1966 for the first time made intensive efforts
to recruit personnel at black colleges.
Final l y , _
it made attempts to revise entrance examinations in
order to eliminate "cultural bias.
One study of black employment in the federal government.

^ ^ H a r v e y , Black Civil Rights During the Johnson
Administration, pp. 64-65.
Administration, p.

69.
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completed in 1969, reflects progress during the Johnson
Administration.

In part, the study indicates that more

Negroes were employed but black employees were still largely
employed in the lowest paid and the most menial positions.
In 1965, President Johnson issued an executive
order citing the need for coordination of all parts of the
federal government involved in the elimination of discri
mination and the promotion of equal opportunity.

Writing

The Presidency and Black Civil Rights, Allan Wolk summarizes
President Johnson's endeavors :
Lyndon Johnson's Council on Equal Opportunity
was the first fullfledged official unit of
coordination which had specific powers and respon
sibilities stated in an executive order.
It,
however, was created reluctantly by a president
who always had reservations as to its need.
Its
short existence was an indication that the adminis
tration preferred decentralized civil rights
implementation, with White House control vested in
the trusted Justice Department.
This was further
reflected in the delegation of Title VI coordina
tion responsibilities to Attorney General Nicholas
Katzenbach, who did not view his new duties as
calling for czar-like action.
Katzenbach, rather,
saw the Justice Department as a moderating force
which kept civil rights enforcement advancing at a
steady and even speed.
Thus, the Attorney General,
as coordinator, did not engage in the pushing type
of operation that was desired by civil rights
groups, but rather assumed a more passive coordina
tion role, one in which he used his power to keep
the various departments working in tandem, and in
which he tried to prevent political embarrassment
for the President.148

^^^Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson
Administration, p. 76.
^^^Allan Wolk, The Presidency and Black Civil Rights
(Madison, New Jersey:
Farleigh Dickinson University Press,
1971), pp. 204-205.
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On the other hand, it has been mentioned that President
Johnson missed an opportunity to exercise essentially strong
presidential leadership when he dismantled the vehicle for
a centralized coordination of civil rights efforts.
it has been contended:

Further,

"If he had retained that instrumen

tality and given it his full support there would have been
much greater progress than there was in implementing civil
rights.
Finally, it seems safe to conclude that the Negro's
struggle for equality made some progress during the Johnson
presidency but not enough.

Although President Johnson

utilized some of his power and authority to ensure the pas
sage of three civil rights bills, many political scientists
seem to agree that Johnson gave little attention to their
enforcement.

Frequently,

it has been observed that without

persistent pressure and support from the executive branch,
the bureaucracy was often unable or unwilling to fulfill
the objective of legislation.

Commenting specifically on

the achievements of the Johnson administration, one writer

In evaluating the overall accomplishments of
the Johnson administration in terms of civil
rights coordination, appointment of blacks to
significant positions in the federal government,
black employment with the federal bureaucracy, and
blacks in the armed services, one must m a k e some

^ Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson
Administration, p. 225.
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positive and some negative statements.
As far as
coordination of civil rights activities is con
cerned, the Johnson administration seemed to have
set up the strongest mechanism in 1965, but it was
abandoned within a few months. After that, efforts
to coordinate were at best uneven and too much
dependent upon voluntarism.
Quite a number of
blacks were appointed to important posts . . . but
all too often they were of the "revolving doo r "
type and had little or no real power. More blacks
were hired to work in the bureaucracy than ever
before, but they still held very few of the higher
positions; there was still too much tokenism above
the lower levels.
Strides were made in desegregat
ing the armed forces, but here too, blacks tended
to be top heavy in the lower ranks and to be too
heavily involved in the combat units. . . . Black
servicemen still found much prejudice off base.150
The preceding brief history of the Negro's struggle
for equality in America appears to reflect the pattern of
social and political forces operating during most of the
twentieth century.

This information provides comprehensive

views of events and issues which Thurgood Marshall felt
compelled to address from 1965-1967.
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden assert:

In this connection,
"Distinguished

oratory and social crisis are closely related.

. . .

The

stress of events associated with man's quest for freedom
in civil and political life, the upsurges of patriotic
fervor occasioned by man's desire to preserve his rights or
to extend the influence of his power— these and other
manifestations of the human will have always dominated the

^^^Harvey, Black Civil Rights During the Johnson
Administration, pp. 89-90.
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scene during those periods most productive in public
address.
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CHAPTER IV
THURGOOD M A R S H A L L ’S SPEECHES TO
GENERAL AUDIENCES
This Study analyzes five of Thurgood Marshall's
speeches delivered between 1965 and 1967 while Marshall
served as Solicitor General of the United States.

These

speeches were selected because they deal with the theme of
equality and justice for all Americans.

Also they appear

to be typical of the comprehensive discussions developed by
Marshall on the -subject equality and justice.

During this

period Marshall not only directed the course of litigation
for the United States, particularly cases pertaining to
civil rights; but, being called upon to make speeches at
universities and public conferences, occupied more of the
public limelight than at any other stage of his career.^
five speeches may be divided into two categories:
delivered to general or lay audiences and
sented to law students and lawyers.
includes two speeches delivered

The

(1) those

(2) those pre

The first category

1) at the White House Con

ference on Civil Rights on June 1, 1966 and

2) at the

Greater Indianapolis Housing Conference on June 15, 1966.
The second category includes three speeches:

(Port Washington, New York:

Kennikat Press, 1973), p. 143.
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"The Constitution and Social Change" to the Federal
Bar Association on September 16, 1965;
"Human Rights— Civil Rights:
From Theory to Prac
tice" to the University of Miami School of Law on
April 27, 1966;
"Law and the Quest for Equality" to the University
of Washington School of Law on March 8, 1967.
This chapter analyzes Marshall's two speeches to
general audiences in terms of the following:
sion and the audience;

(1) the occa

(2) preparation, integrity of his

basic ideas, and major premises;

(3) the organization,

identifying purpose, proposition and structure ; (4) logical
appeals;

(5) evidence and support;

appeals; and

(6) the emotional

(7) ethical appeal or ethos.
The Speech of June 1, 1966

Occasion and Audience
Thurgood Marshall,

Solicitor General of the United

States, delivered an address on the struggle for equality to
about 2,500 men and women representing many facets of
American life.

The occasion was a "White House Conference

to Fulfill These Rights" in Washington, D.C.

Marshall

spoke during a banquet session held on the evening of the
first day of the conference.
June 1, 1966, reported :

The Washington

(D.C.) Post on

"The conference was called a year

ago by President Johnson to focus on developing new means
and methods to help the American Negro fulfill the rights
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which, after the long time of injustice, he is finally about
to secure."^
Some significant events preceded this conference.
President Johnson called a planning session which was held
November 17-18, 1965.

About two hundred scholars and

"practitioners in the areas of civil rights, labor, business,
education, religion, and social welfare met for intensive
working sessions."

This group developed a comprehensive set

of recommendations "reflecting a variety of viewpoints and
experience."

In February, 1966, President Johnson appointed

a thirty-member council under the chairmanship of Ben W.
Heineman, Chairman of Chicago and North Western Railway
Company, that included Martin L. King, Jr., Vernon Jordan,
Roy Wilkins, and other members of groups active in the
civil rights movement, along with representatives from
numerous major corporations.

This council set the policies

and supervised the detailed planning of the conference.
White House staff and numerous consultants reviewed and
refined the Council's recommendations and made preparation
for the Conference.^
The White House Conference, held June 1-2, 1966,
assembled, according to Heineman, "to pool knowledge.

"Civil Rights
Talks Begin Here Today," Washington P o s t , June 1, 1966.
^Council's Report and Recommendations to the White
House Conference (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1966), p. 2.
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energy, and resources in this common cause" and represented
"a significant milestone in this n a tion’s drive to remove
all remaining barriers which prevent Negro Americans from
full and free participation in our society."

He added that

the one hundred recommendations prepared by the planning
council were to serve as "our blueprint for realistic and
attainable action."**

The Conference directed its attention

to four critical areas— economic security and welfare,
housing, education, and administration of justice.

The major

goal of the Conference was to determine "immediate, practi
cal steps to enlist in this cause the great mass of
uncommitted and uninvolved A m e r i c a n s . V i c e President
Hubert Humphrey addressed the conferees the morning of the
first day, and Marshall spoke that evening at a banquet
held in the Sheraton Hotel of Washington, D.C.
President Johnson, having called for this White
House Conference, established the theme— "To Fulfill These
Rights," and asserted that the object "would be to help the
Negro American move beyond opportunity to achievement," and
invited the 2,500 men and women in the interracial audience
to attend this two-day conference.

Prior to Marshall's

Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To
Fulfill These Rights" (Washington:
Government Printing
Office, 1966), p. i.
^Report of the White House Conference "To Fulfill
These Rights" (Washington:
Government Printing Office,
1966), p. 5.
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speech. President Johnson addressed the assembly and said:
"Now you are here tonight from every region of this great
land, from every walk of life, to play your part in this
momentous undertaking and in this great adventure."^

Presi

dent Johnson, who had appointed Marshall Solicitor General of
the United States and had invited Marshall to address the
conference, introduced him to the audience.

Accordingly,

Johnson remarked that for five years he had worked to attain
equal employment in federal jobs and referred to the rare
nature of his introduction:
And I am tonight going to give a good example of it
[equal employment provided Negr o e s ] . I have a very
unusual pleasure and pride to introduce to you a
great soldier.
I might say that the President of
the United States does not often have the opportunity
to introduce another speaker.
But I am glad that tonight I do have that oppor
tunity.
I am going to introduce to you one who 12
years ago established in the field of civil rights a
beachhead from which we shall never retreat.
Since that day, he has already occupied two
great offices— as distinguished Justice of the Court
of Appeals, and now as the great Solicitor General
of the United States of America.
When he accepted
this call and left his lifetime job to take a tem
porary one in this administration, not knowing how
long it would be but realizing that it offered an
opportunity to serve his country, he had argued
already 33 major cases before the Supreme Court.
But he was really in the kindergarten class
then, because before he finishes his term he will
probably have argued more cases before the Supreme
Court than any other American.
And let no man ever
say that he is not a qualified lawyer and judge.

^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To
Fulfill These Rights," p. 1.
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I am proud that he serves my administration.
I am very proud that his is the voice of the
people of all of the United States before the
highest and greatest court of this land.
Nothing, I think, could be really more appro
priate than that this man should speak to the first
great national conference that has ever been called
to really consider the rights and the opportunities
of Negro Americans.
Now I consider it m y high honor and my very
great privilege to present to you the man who has
been in the forefront and will continue to be in
the forefront of all battles for the things that are
good for our country— Thurgood Marshall, the
Solicitor General.7
Obviously, in his introduction President Johnson established
the virtues of Marshall as a man and his authority on the
topic to be discussed.
President Johnson's introduction accomplished the
following:

(1) for the listeners who were unfamiliar with

the speaker, it provided essential infoimiation about
Marshall's background and professional experiences;

(2)

many conferees were familiar with Marshall's personal expe
riences, as a black American, which he shared with inter
viewers for national publications, reported during frequent
meetings with NAACP members, and discussed in less formal
situations.

Obviously, they were cognizant of his profes

sional experiences which demonstrated his outstanding
leadership in the N A A C P 's legal strategy, struggle, and
victories in the field of civil rights; culminating in the
landmark decision Brown v. Board of Education which

^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To
Fulfill These Rights," pp. 9-10.
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eliminated the "separate but equal" theory of racial
equality.

For these hearers, Johnson's introduction probably

confirmed their preconceived image of Marshall;

(3) Johnson

presented information about the speaker that indicated the
president's close relationship with and esteem for the
speaker.

He related instances which stressed the appro

priateness and value of Marshall's information and ideas for
this particular audience.

The President revealed Marshall's

eminent qualifications as an authority in the area of civil
rights and his competence to provide essential leadership and
direction for the conference and the conferees.

Therefore,

it may be concluded that for the entire audience Johnson's
introduction sharpened interest and established a favorable
relationship between speaker and listeners.
Preparation, Integrity of Ideas
and Major Premises
This section examines significant aspects of
Marshall's preparation, his capacity for formulation of
ideas, and his ability to determine major premises.
Preparation.

Information about Marshall's activ

ities as legal defense counsel for the NAACP and comments
by persons who observed him in other speech situations
during the 1950s and the 1960s provide important information
about his preparation.

For example, one biographer comments

on Marshall's briefs for court cases:

"Apparently Marshall

had come to believe that the success of litigation depends

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

147
greatly upon the amount of preparatory work done before the
case is brought to court.

Marshall spent countless weeks

and months in research, evaluating precedents, consulting
with witnesses, and writing and rewriting briefs.
Colleagues remark that Marshall's cases and speeches were
prepared with habitual thoroughness.

Substantial evidence

supports the fact that Marshall believed in being wellprepared when he argued a case or delivered a speech.
As legal counsel for the NAACP, Marshall frequently
addressed local chapters and other groups throughout the
country.

Most of his speeches dealt with the struggle for

equality and justice.

Also, Marshall was acclaimed as a

successful lawyer who devoted most of his career to the
legal struggle for civil rights.^

These factors obviously

enabled him to be thoroughly familiar with his subject and
with speechmaking.
Integrity of i deas.

The critic must assess the

speaker's capacity for formulation of ideas.

Accordingly,

it seems essential to review briefly pertinent factors in
the life of this black American which influenced the ideas
about the struggle for equal rights he composed and

Bland, p. 8.
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on the Judi
ciary, Nomination of Thurgood Marshall to Be Solicitor
General of the United S t ates, Hearing, 89th Congress, 1st
Sess., July 29, 1965 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1965), p. 8.
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delivered.

Also, Marshall's ideas are evaluated in terms of

traditional rhetorical requirements.
Forces emanating from his home, schools, and legal
career appear to have contributed to the development of
certain skills and concepts.
in this study.

Evidence was presented earlier

Significantly, Marshall's devotion to

reading and respect for research which started at Lincoln
University have been maintained throughout his adult life.
Entering the private practice of law in 1933 he demonstrated
skill as a trial lav/yer and zest for equality and justice.
As NAACP lawyer for more than two decades, Marshall parti
cipated in the struggle for human rights and dignity.

For

"his wise counsel and his unflagging devotion and courage
as NAACP lawyer, Marshall's legal skills and dedication to
the cause of civil rights were praised.

Marshall served as

legal counsel for the NAACP arguing numerous cases involving
civil rights, including fifty-one cases before the Supreme
Court

[and lost only eight].

In this connection, one

source reports:
While Brown v. Board of Education was perhaps
the most famous case presented to the Court during
Marshall's 23 years with the NAACP and the one
with the most far-reaching consequences, under his
legal guidance the NAACP won several other
important victories including the banning of the
"white primary" in the South, the exclusion of
restrictive covenants in housing and outlawing of
Jim Crow restrictions in interstate travel.
Many

"Marshall's Nomination Hailed by Wilkins," The
Crisis, 62:559, November, 1961.
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of today's gains in civil rights might well have been
impossible had it not been for the dedication and
brilliant legal groundwork which he laid. . . . H
When Marshall was appointed to federal judgeship, NAACP
Executive Secretary Jloy Wilkins asserted;

"The veteran

civil-rights attorney . . . carries to his new position extra
ordinary experience in the federal courts, a wealth of
knowledge of federal procedures, a breadth of understanding
rare even among the country's most outstanding and successful
l a w y e r s . B i o g r a p h e r s comment that Marshall demonstrates
legal ability, intellectual acumen, high code of ethic,
clear reasoning, and hard work dedicated to the highest
American ideals of the Constitution.^^
Marshall's personal and professional experiences
afforded him frequent encounters with violations of civil
rights and racial prejudice, discrimination, and injustice.
Presumably, these factors contributed to his ability to
formulate egalitarian ideas,

identifying crucial problems

related to inequality and injustice and proposing solutions.
In this speech, Marshall seems to meet Dewey's
requirements for appraising a speaker's ideas and reflective

Thurgood Marshall . . . Uncle Sam's Lawyer," The
Crisis, 66:435, August-September, 1965.
"Marshall's Nominatio
Crisis, 62:559, November, 1961.
^^Editorial, "Supreme Court Justice Thurgood
Marshall," Negro History B u l letin, October, 1967, p. 5.
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t h i n k i n g . M a r s h a l l ' s capacities can be measured as
follows:

(1) He recognized the problem of translating the

promise of equality into reality for millions of Negro
Americans as the most important problem at the moment and one
that would seriously disturb the status quo.

Commenting on

the depth of the problem of racial prejudice and discrimi
nation in America, Marshall implies or states that the prac
tices and policies which have denied Negroes equality and
justice for centuries represent an unwillingness to change.
(2)

He analyzed the nature and bearing of the problem upon

the social setting.

Marshall reviews the historical back

ground of the struggle for racial equality in this country
and discusses recent dramatic accomplishments "to place the
present in proper p r o s p e c t i v e . M a r s h a l l notes that
recent progress in the area of civil rights has encountered
various types of resistance but that tactics of delay and
evasion could only postpone, not defeat, the victory won.
He seems to imply the need to address the tremendous social
challenge of conflict in the country.

(3) Marshall suggests

ideas relevant to a solution of the difficulty.

Here, he

acknowledges that recent progress in the area of civil
rights represents no more than a firm base from which to

Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo W.
Braden, Speech Criticism (2d ed.; New York:
Ronald Press
Company, 1970), p. 395.
^^Major Addresses at the White House Conference
"To Fulfill These Rights," p. 39.
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launch the final attack on the causes of racial inequality
and injustice.

Marshall notes the role of the federal

government in translating the constitutional promise of
equality for every American.

On the other hand, he advocates

passage of more laws and stronger laws which must be
vigorously enforced.

Also, he recommends restudying and

renewing the drive toward ending the gap between theory and
practice in the area of civil rights.

(4) He demonstrated

acuteness in examining, through reasoning, the implications
of his suggestions.

Marshall seems to deal with matters

which lie at the center of the issues.
facts to reveal the problem.

He uses historical

He relates specific instances

which can be considered typical to prove certain assertions.
It seems that Marshall preferred to rest his important
propositions on historical narrative and examples.
speech was arranged in a chronological order.

This

Marshall's

purpose for examining the past was expressed directly:
"History . . . tells us how deeply rooted habits of prejudice
are, dominating the minds of men and all our institutions
for three centuries; and it cautions us to continue to move
forward lest we fall b a c k . F r e q u e n t l y ,

narratives of

the past and present dramatize values and tendencies which
the listeners are already anxious to discover.

Audience

response to this device generally earns praise for the

^^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To
Fulfill These R i ghts," p. 40.
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speaker's invention and insight.

Marshall's arguments

focused chiefly upon the social, moral, and political forces
which allowed him to present a body of data and incidents
correlated and synthesized to make his conclusions about
their importance appear unquestionable to the listeners.
(5) Dewey's final requirement is the verification of the
speaker's judgment following acceptance of the most feasible
solution.

It is probably unnecessary for Marshall to meet

this requirement since some rhetoricians assert:
In general, those who wait upon ceremonial
speakers are drawn from their habitual haunts by a
sense of duty, a personal involvement in the occa
sion, a lively curiosity, or — perhaps most often— by
a desire to hear a preachment upon the significance
of the occasion.
And the ceremonial speaker . . .
is usually at liberty to view the celebrated event
in its most symmetrical cosmic attitude.
Listener
and speaker are intent upon contemplating together
the relation of the occasion to the received values
honored by all parties.
The celebrants may differ
with those outside their bethel, but differences
among themselves are usually excluded by tacit
agreement.17
Assuming that the listeners did not add incompatible views
to Marshall's message nor disregarded the information he
chose to include, it is likely that they accepted his view
of the case.

Subsequent activities and plans by the con

ferees may, in part, constitute acceptance of the solution
proposed by Marshall.

For example, the conferees' report

which was submitted to President Johnson admitted that a

^^Carroll C. Arnold, "George William Curtis," A
History and Criticism of American Public A d d ress, ed. Marie
Kathryn Hochmuth (New York: Russell and Russell, 1955),
p. 153.
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broad and vigorous attack on the roots of the problem must
be mounted if the nation is to meet the goal— equality as a
fact and as a result not just equality as a right and a
theory.

It should be noted that observers report the

following:

"There was no complacency as they addressed them

selves to their task.

These meetings were charged with an

atmosphere of urgency.

Their conviction that despite the

tremendous gains which had been made in creating a legal
framework for equality, the ugly racial crisis facing the
nation was quickening in m o m e n t u m . T h e

conferees'

report also disclosed:
In order to achieve a common focus on specific
action efforts, it was necessary to select a
manageable number of areas of concentration . . . in
which the results can be far-reaching.
The resulting conclusion was that the Conference
should direct its primary attention to four critical
areas— economic security and welfare, education,
housing, and administration of justice.
It was also
decided that there should be developed in each of
these areas a limited number of specific proposals
for local action to which the conferees could then
commit their efforts in their own communities to
actions which will achieve early important effects.
The Council's Report is designed to serve
these purposes.
It seeks to summarize, succinctly
but thoroughly, the chief problems in each subject
area that deny Negroes their full share of parti
cipation in the life of the nation.
It defines the
broad goals that must be attained if we are to
realize "not just equality as a right and a theory,
but equality as a fact and a result." It details
ma]or actions that need to be taken by various ele
ments of our society— by government at all levels;
by private groups, such as business, labor, reli
gious and voluntary organizations; and, in some

These Rights"
1966), p. 2.

(Washington:

"To Fulfill
Government Printing Office,
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instances, by private citizens, themselves, acting
individually.
Finally, the Council proposes several specific
local activities in each area on which Conference
participants and other public-spirited citizens
may concentrate their efforts.
As the Report clearly indicates, there is no
intention to slight the importance of governmental
action, whether Federal, state, or local.
The need
for additional legislation, administrative changes,
and executive leadership at all three levels of
government has been extensively treated; the pro
posals in this category and the Conference reactions
to them will be transmitted to the President and
will be made available to state and local public
officials.
But the Conference would fail in its main pur
pose if it did no more than that.
Governmental
action, however forceful and creative, cannot succeed
unless it is accompanied by a mobilization of effort
by private citizens and the organizations and insti
tutions through which they express their will.
Indeed, the role of government itself is in large
part determined by the presence or absence of such
citizen efforts.
That is why the major emphasis of this Confer
ence must be on immediate, practical steps to enlist
in this cause the great mass of uncommitted,
uninvolved Americans.
That is why we must not end these discussions
without a common resolve to return to our communi
ties and undertake those specific actions for which
our varied interests and positions best fit u s .
Major premises.

Authorities in the field of rhetoric

advise that the prospective aspect of logical analysis is
furthered by determining the premises from which the speaker
argued.

Substantial evidence discussed earlier supports the

fact that personal and professional experiences afforded
Marshall frequent encounters with violations of civil rights.

Report of the White House Conference "To Fulfill
These Rights," p. 5.
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As a lawyer he acquired knowledge of court law, experience
as the nation's foremost advocate of civil rights and a
profound, almost religious, respect for the efficacy of the
law.

Biographers acclaim Marshall's ability to outwit, out-

score, and eventually overcome forces of entrenched and
organized oppression.

His faith in the Constitution as a

"living d o c u m e n t " w a s confirmed in his arguments before
the Supreme Court which received an unprecedented number of
favorable decisions in the struggle for equality and justice.
It can be assumed that these circumstances and experiences
were the sources from which Marshall drew premises pre
sented to his listeners.
Analysis of Marshall's speech of June 1, 1966,
appears to indicate the underlying assumption that every
American must be guaranteed equality and justice.

The

speaker seems to support his position by presenting con
tentions with the following major premises:
(1) For centuries, Negro Americans have been denied
equality and justice guaranteed white Ameri
cans.
(2) During the first three decades of the twentieth
century, efforts ensure equality and justice
were limited and/or ineffective.

^ ü . S . , Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary,
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall of New York to Be an Asso
ciate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
Hearing, 90th Congress, 1st Sess., July 13, 14, 18, 19,
and 24, 1967 (Washington:
Government Printing Office,
1967), p. 49.
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(3) During recent decades of the twentieth century
the struggle for equality and justice has made
significant progress.
(4) In the future, passage, implementation and
enforcement of laws are essential to secure
equality and justice for every American.
Organization
Disposition embraces the following matters :
emergence of a central theme or proposition,

(1) the

(2) the order

in which the parts of the discourse are developed and the
proportioning of materials, and

(3) the general method of

arrangement adopted for the speech.
Thematic em e r g e n c e .

It seems suitable to preface

the presentation of the theme of Marshall's speech to the
White House Conference with a discussion of the purpose of
his address.

First, the fact that President Johnson invited

the speaker he had appointed the first black Solicitor
General of the United States who served as the people's
advocate authorized to conduct and argue cases for the
government before the Supreme Court, combined wit h his
success as a people's advocate while serving as NAACP lawyer
and continuing as Solicitor, Marshall represented a symbol
of civil rights.

Undoubtedly, President Johnson invited

Marshall to speak for two reasons:

to inspire and to inform.

In this speech Marshall implied that his purpose was to
inform; but in reality,
exposition to persuade.

it appears that the speaker used
The information presented to support

his thesis was clearly persuasive.
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Marshall's theme seems to emerge in his opening
statements of the speech:

the present mission and future

actions of those attending the White House Conference "To
Fulfill These Rights" can benefit from reviewing the history
of the struggle for racial equality in America.

How

closely Marshall follows this theme will be revealed in the
section dealing with the structure of this speech.
Rhetorical proportioning and order in disposition.
In this speech, Marshall followed the traditional tripartite
division of introduction, body and conclusion.

In terms of

word distribution, the introduction consisted of approxi
mately 26G words.

This relatively short introduction seems

somewhat typical for Marshall.

The body of this speech

contained about 2,740 words and the conclusion consists of
almost 140 words.
In the introduction presumably Marshall attempted
to enlist the interest and attention of the listeners.
Certainly, Marshall indicated the purpose and revealed the
direction his speech was going to take.
Marshall began his speech as follows :

For example,
"My immediate task

in this conference 'To Fulfill These Rights'
the present in the proper prospective.

is to place

In order to do this

I have been requested to review the historical background
of the struggle for racial equality in this country."

He

established his thesis at the end of the third paragraph
when he remarked:

"History tells us how deeply rooted
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habits of prejudice are, dominating the minds of men and
all our institutions for three centuries; and it cautions
us to continue to move forward lest we fall back."

Since

the preceding passages referred to the occasion, explained
the purpose of the speech, stated the plan of treatment, and
expressed the central idea, it can be assumed that they were
effective in enlisting the interest and the attention of
the audience.
Often understanding the speaker's invention is aided
by knowledge of the organizational pattern evident in a
speech.

Therefore, the following outline of the body of

Marshall's speech to the White House Conference contributes
to the analysis of the speaker's invention.
Central Idea ; Those of us who know the struggle
is far from over history tells how deeply rooted
habits of prejudice are, dominating the minds of
men and all our institutions for three centuries;
and it cautions us to continue to move forward lest
we fall back.
I.

During the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nine
teenth centuries, history reveals significant
factors about the struggle for and denial of
equality and justice for some Americans.
A.

During the seventeenth century Americans
faced experiences that helped them define
certain rights.

B.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth cen
turies, some Americans struggled to elimi
nate frequent abuses of slaves and denials
of free Negroes' rights perpetrated by
individuals, states, and branches of the
federal government.

^^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To
Fulfill These Rights," pp. 39-40.
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During the first three decades of the twentieth
century, history discloses additional dis
franchising laws, expansion of enforced segre
gation, and very limited efforts by any govern
ment, federal, state, or local, to improve
prevailing conditions; but the Negro began to
protest and organize to alleviate these circum
stances.
A.

Nothing was done by any government,
state, or local, although there was
occasional pious declaration by the
or another high federal official to
prevailing conditions.

federal,
an
President
improve

B.

Disenfranchising laws were multiplied,
enforced segregation— once confined to a few
activities and a few states— now reached
farther and deeper, including the federal
government which officially adopted a policy
segregating government offices and the
military services.

C.

The few Supreme Court decisions [the first
NAACP victories] in support of Negro rights
were long bearing fruit, easily circumvented
and did not change the Negro's status sig
nificantly.

D.

Efforts of the NAACP and the Urban League
to curtail legal and extralegal instances
of inequality and injustice represent the
only significant measures to remedy the
prevailing conditions.

During the next two decades [1929-1948], the
status quo did not change significantly but
from 1948 to 1966 history reveals meaningful
signs of progress in the struggle for equality.
A.

From 1929 to 1948, history records the
Great Depression combined with the New Deal;
the federal government's thrust for fair
housing; the establishment of a somewhat
ineffective Civil Rights Section in the
Department of Justice and a Fair Employment
Practices Commission combined with the per
sistence and intensification of segregation
by law and by policy within federal agencies
which did not change the status quo signi
ficantly and did not benefit the Negro's
struggle for equality dramatically.
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B.

IV.

During the period from 1948 to 1966, efforts
of the three branches of the federal govern
ment, which revoked its discriminatory
policies, reversed its stand on the insur
ability of homes in mixed neighborhoods,
declared unconstitutional judicial enforcement
of racially restrictive covenants and
"separate but equal" schools, outlawed
segregation in railroad dining cars and in
State graduate school, declared illegal
discrimination by places of public accommoda
tion, passed the Civil Rights Acts of 1957,
1960, and 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of
1965, and undertook as never before to
enforce and implement the court decisions
and new laws, represent actions to translate
and to fulfill the constitutional promise of
equality and significant contributions to the
Negro's struggle for equality.

The history of the struggle for Negro rights
reveals some lessons for the future.
A.

Law is important in determining the condition
of the Negro, whether enslavement, emancipa
tion, disfranchisement, or equality.

B.

Law— whether embodied in acts of Congress or
judicial decisions— is, in some measure, a
response to national opinion, and, of
course, non-legal, even illegal events, can
significantly affect the development of law;
hence this history demonstrates the impor
tance of getting rid of hostile laws and
seeking security in new friendly laws.

C.

Provided there is the determination to
enforce it, law can not only provide concrete
benefits but can change the hearts of some
men since history makes it clear that the
hearts of men do not change of themselves.

D.

Evasion, intimidation, violence may sometimes
defeat the best laws but they, too, can be
legislated against.

E.

The Negro will more readily acquiesce in his
lot unless he has a legally recognized claim
to a better life.
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Conclusion;
I do not suggest a complacent reliance
on the self-executing force of existing laws.
On
the contrary, I advocate more laws and stronger laws.
And the passage of such laws requires untiring
efforts.
. . . we must use the present tools— not as an end,
but rather as additional incentive to restudy and
renew our drive toward ending the gap between theory
and practice.
Moreover, laws have only limited effect if they
are not vigorously enforced.
What I do say is that
I have faith in the efficacy of law.
Perhaps that
is because I am a lawyer and not a missionary.
But
I think history— which proves so many things—
proves me right.
In the body of this speech, Marshall presented four
main contentions.

Three explained historical events related

to the

Neg r o ’s struggle for equality and justice.

fourth

contention affords directions for the future of

struggle for racial equality.

The
the

The copies of the speech

printed in reliable sources include the fourth contention as
part of the conclusion.

However, upon close examination it

appears to represent part of the body of the speech.
The conclusion of this speech may be considered
brief.

On the other hand, it contains an appeal for a ccep

tance and action.

Marshall's concluding statements were

probably effective in winning listeners to his point of view.
Method of arrangement.

Marshall followed a

chronological order of development.

Undoubtedly, the pattern

made the message easy to follow and enabled the audience to
understand what was being communicated without any difficulty.
Further, Marshall used internal summaries, transitions and
signposts which usually achieve cohesive organization.
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Logical Appeals
According to Aristotle, logical materials are the
most important ingredient in a speech.

Thonssen, Baird and

Braden maintain that the object of analysis of logical con
tent is the following;

"To determine how fully a given

speech enforces an idea; how closely that enforcement con
forms to the general rules of argumentative development; and
how nearly the totality of the reasoning approaches a measure
of truth adequate for purposes of action.
The rhetorical critic's duty is to examine and to
determine the effectiveness of the speaker's arguments and
the support offered to substantiate the speaker's position.
This section focuses on Marshall's logical appeals.
Marshall's main ideas in the first speech can be
summarized as follows:
(1) Deeply rooted habits of prejudice dominated
the minds of men and all our institutions for
three centuries ;
(2) During the last two decades, legal actions,
court decisions, executive orders, legislative
acts, and concerted efforts of organized groups
helped reduce racial prejudice, discrimination,
and injustice;
(3) In the future, we must have more laws, stronger
laws, and vigorous enforcement of laws which
require that we take affirmative action toward
ending the gap between theory and practice.
A study of logical proof should examine the speaker's
reasoning and evidence.

The validity of his reasoning can
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be determined by constructing syllogisms from his main
points and testing them according to the rules of logic.
Three hypothetical syllogisms can be constructed
from Marshall’s main points to illustrate concisely what
he was trying to prove.
The first hypothetical syllogism can be stated as
follows ;
(Major Premise)

(Minor Premise)
(Conclusion)

If racial prejudice and discrimi
nation prevailed for three cen
turies, all Americans did not
enjoy equality and justice.
Racial prejudice and discrimina
tion did prevail for three
centuries.
Therefore, all Americans did not
enjoy equality and justice.

The syllogism is valid because the antecedent in
the major premise is affirmed by the minor premise and
because the conclusion affirms the consequent.
The major premise can be considered an historic
fact.

It was probably accepted readily by the audience.

However, the speaker probably thought that the minor
premise needed proof.
dence.

He presented an abundance of evi

Marshall frequently employed specific instances and

authoritative testimony to support his contentions.

The

nature of the illustrative examples and the source of the
expert testimony differed from speech to speech.

In his

White House Conference speech, Marshall included details of
historical events during three centuries that illustrated
the prevalence of inequality.

He mentioned slavery in the
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South, lynchings, coerced confessions, frequent acts of
violence by white mobs in the North, the "enactment of
highly imaginative segregation statutes . . .

to degrade an

entire race of people," the legitimization of segregation
by the Supreme Court when it invalidated the Civil Rights
Acts of 1870, 1871, and 1875.

The speaker acknowledged his

indebtedness to the well-known historian, John Hope
Franklin, for the historical data prior to 1900.
The second main idea can be formulated as a valid
hypothetical syllogism.
(Major Premise)

(Minor Premise)
(Conclusion)

If recent laws and doctrine reduce
discrimination and inequality, they
should be promoted and enforced
vigorously.
Recent laws and doctrine do reduce
discrimination and inequality.
Therefore, they should be promoted
and enforced vigorously.

Marshall probably felt the need to prove the minor premise
of this syllogism.

In some speeches, Marshall argued largely

from specific instances of historic events— the federal
government stopped discrimination in hiring; the Supreme
Court outlawed segregation; passage of the Civil Rights Acts
of 1957, 19 60, and 1964; passage of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965; and the enforcement of court decisions by the
president in Little Rock and Oxford, Mississippi.

He m en

tioned his personal experiences and victories in arguing many
civil rights cases and the important Brown v. Board of
Education case.

He added:

"Perhaps most important, the

Executive Branch has undertaken as never before to enforce
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and implement the court decisions and the new laws.

Little

Rock and Oxford, Mississippi are the most dramatic examples.
But, there are countless other daily occasions when the
President, the Attorney General, and the Civil Rights Divi
sion of the Department of Justice act to 'execute* the law
of the land.
In each speech, Marshall offered evidence that could
be documented and testimony from competent authorities.

It

is highly probable that the audience could accept his state-

The third main idea can be formulated as a valid syl
logism also:
(Major Premise)
(Minor Premise)
(Conclusion)

If equality for all Americans is
to become a reality, we must take
affirmative action.
Equality for all Americans must
become a reality.
Therefore, we must take affirmative

Marshall sought to prove the minor premise of this syllo
gism briefly by citing personal experiences and expert
testimony.
In each hypothetical syllogism, the minor premise
affirms the antecedent and the conclusion affirms the conse
quent.

Therefore, the syllogistic reasoning is valid.

The

speaker employed evidence that met traditional requirements.
The evidence can be considered sufficient.

It is probable

^^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To
Fulfill These Rights," p. 52.
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that the audience accepted his conclusions and was convinced
by his logic and persuasion.
Close examination of this speech reveals other facts
about the evidence or forms of support utilized by the
speaker.

For example, frequently Marshall seems to employ

argument from circumstantial details.

Brembeck and Howell

define circumstantial detail argument as that in which
numerous items not intimately related to each other by cause
to effect relationships combine to form a pattern.

Further,

this argumentative form, derived from courtroom proceedings,
is one of the most useful forms of reasoned d i s c o u r s e . T h e
following excerpt from the speech illustrates M a r s h a l l 's
use of circumstantial details:
In 1867 some Negroes got the vote, but not all.
Some got a few rights, but not all.
And whenever
they secured some of their rights, it took extra
ordinary courage— even gallantry— to exercise them.
For they had little or no protection, either at the
local level or from the federal government.
Schools
were segregated, even where Negroes had some poli
tical power.
(They never had much.)
People
laughed when Negroes sat down in a restaurant to have
a cup of coffee or when they tried to get accommoda
tions in a hotel.
The Civil Rights Act of 1875,
before Congress for five years before it was finally
passed, was not effectively enforced anywhere.
When
the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in
1883, few Americans took notice of it; for the Act
was already a dead letter in Atlanta, San Francisco,
Chicago, Washington, and New York.
Responsible
citizens boasted of this fact.
The Fourteenth Amendment, never an effective
shield for human r i g h t s , became the mechanism by

^ W i n s t o n Lament Brembeck and William Smiley Howell,
Persuasion:
A Means of Social Control (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, I n c ., 1952), p. 202.
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which corporate businesses took on human traits and
enjoyed protection that few black human beings ever
enjoyed.
One southern state after another amended
its constitution to disfranchise as many Negroes as
possible without disfranchising, as one leader put
it, a single white man. And no strong voice was
raised against this blasphemy of American democratic
practices.
After citing these details the speaker concluded that during
this period "there was no time to consider the basic human
rights, no interest in securing to all Americans equality
and justice.

The effectiveness of this method can be

measured in terms of the "cumulative effect of the list.
Another illustration of the speaker's use of circum
stantials detail emerges to support his contention that the
goal of racial equality and justice will be fulfilled in
terms of the American constitutional system:
What is striking to me is the importance of
law in determining the condition of the Negro.
He
was effectively enslaved, not by brute force, but
by a law which declared him chattel of his master,
who was given a legal right to recapture him, even
in free territory.
He was emancipated by law, and
then disfranchised and segregated by law. And
finally, he is winning equality by lav7.27
Marshall used facts and opinions to support his con
tention that from 1948 to 1966 progress was made toward
securing equality and justice.

In part, he said:

^^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To
Fulfill These Rights," pp. 44-45.
^^Brembeck and Howell, p. 202.
^^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To
Fulfill These Rights," pp. 52-53.
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The real march forward for the American Negro
begins in 1948, first by very small steps, later by
much bigger ones.
In that year, the Executive Branch of the
federal government officially revoked its discrimi
natory policies and began a slow effort to undo what
it had done.
The desegregation of the armed forces
was undertaken.
Discrimination in government hiring
was ordered stopped.
And FHA reversed its stand on
the insurability of homes in mixed neighborhoods.
So, also, in 1948— urged to do so by the first
amicus curiae brief ever filed by the United States
in private civil rights litigation— the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional judicial enforcement of
racially restrictive covenants.28
Rhetorical logic requires the use of evidence.
Examples of the speaker's use of circumstantial details and
facts and opinions to support his contentions have been
presented.

Assuming that the speaker's supporting materials

approach completeness, the conclusion drawn is more accept
able.

From these details the speaker draws conclusions

which the audience can probably accept.

Providing facts and

opinions which approach completeness as supporting material
probably enabled the audience to reach the same conclusion
as the speaker reached.
Emotional Appeals
A study of emotional proof should examine how the
speaker utilized appeals to the primary and secondary needs
of the audience, how the speaker employed emotive and connative language, whether the emotional appeals were adjuncts

^^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To
Fulfill These Rights," pp. 50-51.
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to reason, and whether the emotional proof moved the audi
ence to agree or to act.
Marshall employed major emotional appeals in the
speeches studied:

(1) appeals to individual freedom;

appeals to sense of justice and fair play; and

(2)

(3) appeals

to social responsibility.
Addressing the White House Conference "To Fulfill
These Rights," it seems that Marshall appealed to the
listener's respect for individual freedom w hen he said:
The existence of slavery in the colonies at a
time that they were fighting for their independence
proved to be a serious embarrassment.
It was
scarcely possible to limit the great principles of
freedom, stated so eloquently by Jefferson, to only
white people of the emerging United States.
It was
an iniquitous scheme, Mrs. John Adams said, to
fight for what they were daily robbing and plunder
ing from those who had as good a right to freedom as
the patriots had.
In Massachusetts, Negroes
insisted that they had "in common with all other men
a natural and inalienable right to that freedom
which the great parent of the universe hath
bestowed equally on all mankind and which they had
never forfeited by any compact or agreement."30
Marshall frequently appealed to the h e a r e r s ' sense
of justice and fair play.

For example, he contends:

Once the colonies gained their independence and
became the United States of America, hardly a year
passed that did not witness some new abuses of
Negro slaves and some denial of rights even to those
who had gained their freedom. . . .
One might have thought that the Civil War in
which scores of thousands of white Americans gave

Major Addresses at the VThite House Conference "To
Fulfill These Rights," pp. 40-41.
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their lives and in which 186,000 Negroes fought
would have settled once and for all the question of
equal rights.
But this was not the case.
Even the
most elementary rights were denied the freed men at
the end of the Civil War.
It mattered not how many
sacrifices Negroes had made to save the Union, how
many were men of education and property, how loyal
they were to the finest traditions of American
democracy, they had few rights that anyone was bound
to respect. . . .31
The following passage seems to illustrate the
speaker's appeal to social responsibility:
Just as the Supreme Court decisions on the
"White Primary," "Restrictive Covenants," and social
segregation provided the impetus for stepped-up
protests of Negroes, we must use the present tools
not as an end, but, rather as additional incentive
to restudy and renew our drive toward ending the
gap between theory and practice.32
Marshall's appeal to sense of justice and fair play
can be perceived in the following excerpt from this speech:
"One Southern state after another amended its constitution
to disfranchise as many Negroes as possible without dis
franchising . . .

a single white man.

And no strong voice

was raised against this blasphemy of American democratic
practices."

Continuing Marshall said:

When the 145 Negroes assembled . . . in 1880
to organize the Afro-American League . . . they knew
that they had few if any friends. . . . One thing
they knew, however, and it was that they had become
the custodians of America's ideals, the conservators
of America's professions of equal rights.
They
could well have been proud of their own role as they
pledged themselves "to protect against taxation; to

^^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To
Fulfill These Rights," pp. 41-44.
32
Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To
Fulfill These Rights," p. 54.
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secure a more equitable distribution of school
funds; to insist upon a fair and impartial trial by
judge and jury; to resist by all legal and reason
able means mob and lynch law; and to insist upon
the arrest and punishment of all such offenders
against our legal r i g h t s . ^ 3
Obviously, M a r s h a l l ’s speeches contained some p athe
tic proof.

In this speech as well as others, the emotional

appeals presumably serve as adjuncts to reason.

Most

importantly, the effectiveness of the speaker's emotional
proof was probably because of relationship established
between noble and lofty sentiments and the interests of the
audience.
Ethical Appeals
Aristotle defines the role of ethos in persuasive
speaking as follows;
The character (ethos) of the speaker is a
cause of persuasion when the speech is so uttered
as to make him worthy of belief; for as a rule we
trust men of probity more, and more quickly about
things in general, while on points outside the
realm of exact knowledge, where opinion is divided,
we trust them absolutely.
This trust, however,
should be created by the speech itself, and not
left to depend upon an antecedent impression that
the speaker is this or that kind of man.
It is not
true, as some writers on the art maintain, that the
probity of the speaker contributes nothing to his
persuasiveness; on the contrary, we might almost
affirm that his character (ethos) is the most
potent of all the means to persuasion 34

^^Major Addresses of the White House Conference "To
Fulfill These Rights ," p. 45.
^^Brembeck and Howell, p. 245.
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Further, Aristotle suggests three constituents of ethical
proof:

character, sagacity, and goodwill.
To determine Thurgood Marshall's ethical appeals,

two questions should be posed.

First, what reputation did

the speaker bring with him to the speaking situation?
Second, what did the speaker do during the speech to enhance
the audience's impression of his character, sagacity, and
goodwill?
Several events appear to have increased materially
the force of Marshall's ethical appeal.

First, as chief

counsel for the NAACP Marshall has been described as the
"champion of Negro rights" for twenty-six years who argued
thirty-two cases before the Supreme Court which resulted in
twenty-nine victories,

"including the 1954 school integra

tion decision, perhaps the most famous Supreme Court deci
sion of modern times."

Secondly, after the 1954 decision

"Marshall became internationally recognized in the legal
profession."

Thirdly, in 1960 Marshall "was invited to

Britain as special advisor to the fourteen African members
of the Kenya Constitutional Conference and helped to draft a
constitution of Kenya writing into the documents safeguards
for Kenya's white minority."

Fourthly, in 1962 President

Kennedy appointed Marshall to a federal judgeship which
seemed to represent "that point of security and prestige
toward which he had been working all his life."

However, in
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1965, Marshall was appointed the first black Solicitor
General of the United States and "went back to a familiar
occupation— arguing before the Supreme Court.
Undoubtedly, the fact that the then President Lyndon
B. Johnson introduced Thurgood Marshall when he addressed
the White House Conference on June 1, 1966, made a favorable
impression.

It should be remembered that President Johnson

had called for this White House Conference and established
the theme— "To Fulfill These Rights."

The president

asserted the object of the conference "would be to help the
Negro American move beyond opportunity to achievement."
President Johnson had invited the 2,500 men and women in the
audience to attend this conference.

During his remarks to

the assembly on June 1, 1966, he said:

Now you are here

tonight from every region of this great land, from every
walk of life, to play your part in this momentous under
taking and in this great a d v e n t u r e . A l s o ,

it is

generally considered a rarity for the president to introduce
a speaker.

In this connection, Johnson remarks that for

five years he had "worked diligently to attain equal
employment in federal jobs" and refers to his appointment of
Marshall as Solicitor General as an example.

Noting the

rare nature of his introduction and Marshall's reputation,
Johnson said:

3 % . S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Bess.
(1966), CXII, No. 32, A985-A986.
Fulfill These Rights," p. 1.
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I have a very unusual pleasure and pride to intro
duce to you a great soldier. . . .
I am going to
introduce to you one who 12 years ago established
in the field of civil rights a beachhead from which
we shall never retreat. . . .
I am proud that he
serves my administration . . . [and] that he is the
voice of the people of all the United States before
the highest and greatest court of this land. . . .
I consider it my high honor and very great privilege
to present . . . the man who has been in the fore
front and will continue to be in the forefront of
battles for things that are good for our country.38
Presumably; most people attending the White House
Conference were familiar with Marshall's concern and advocacy
for minorities and those in the lower economic strata, his
advocacy of freedom of expression, and his advocacy for the
disfranchised as an NAACP lawyer and throughout his legal
career.

Marshall's highly publicized legal endeavors com

bined with frequent expression of his conviction that Negro
Americans must be afforded equality and justice indicate
that Marshall was not only the champion of the inarticulate
masses but also that he believed intensely in the causes for
which he spoke.
interviewer:

In February 1966, Marshall remarked to one

"What is important is that the Negro keep

impressing three things on the American conscience.
the Negro has had a bad shake all these years.
is entitled to a better shake.

One, that

Two, that he

And three, that he has not

^^Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To
Fulfill These Rights," pp. 8-9.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No. 3, A986.
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combined with Marshall's message which embraces similar con
victions probably convinces the audience the speaker is
virtuous.
The Speech of June 1 5 ^ 1966
Occasion and Audience
United States Representative Andrew Jacobs, Jr
(D-Ind.) identifies the occasion, its sponsorship, and prin
cipal speaker when he requested permission to insert
Marshall's address in the Congressional Record

(June 21, 1966) :

Mr. Speaker, a housing conference was held
June 14 and 15, 1966, in Indianapolis under the
sponsorship of the President's Committee on Equal
Opportunity in Housing and the Major's Commission
on Human Rights.
Principal speaker at the conference was the
Honorable Thurgood Marshall, Solicitor General of
the United States.^®
In Chapter Three, it was mentioned that during this
period several civil rights bills were being debated in
Congress with little hope of being voted upon favorably.
Specifically, fair housing was considered "the major stumbl
ing block."

In this connection, it has been noted:

A number of civil rights leaders realized that
strong opposition was likely to develop in Congress
against "open" housing, and urged the president
[Johnson] to extend the coverage under the executive
order issued by President Kennedy in 1962. . . .
Such organizations as the Americans for Democratic
Action and the National Committee Against Discrimi
nation in Housing communicated to the president

^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966) CXII, No. 101, A3319.
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their concern that federal funds and credit were
perpetuating an even increasing the amount of
racially segregated housing.
Although Johnson rejected the suggestion of the civil rights
leaders "allegedly on the grounds that it might raise
serious constitutional questions," it was reported that on
April 28, 1966, the president urged action from Congress.
Regarding housing, the president requested passage of legis
lation as follows:

"To declare national policy against

racial discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, and
to create remedies against that discrimination in every part
of America.
According to the Indianapolis Recorder, Congressman
Jacobs opened the two-day conference, held at the Severin
Hotel, with a speech revealing his intention to introduce
before Congress a new housing bill which would prohibit the
acquisition of land or construction of public works until
"adequate and comparable replacement homes and churches are
available to the d i s p l a c e d . A l s o

in attendance were Paul

R. Oakes, Republican nominee for Congress for the Eleventh
District of Indiana, Mayor John J. Barton and Dr. Cleo W.
Blackburn.Reportedly,

Mayor Barton was the first to

Johnson Administration (Jackson, Mississippi:
University
and College Press of Mississippi, 1973), pp. 36-37.
42» Housing Expert Urges Whites to Help Others,"
Indianapolis Recorder, June 18, 1966.
Speaker at Housing C onference,"
Developer Will Be Spei
Indianapolis S t a r , June 16, 1966
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initiate substantial measures to ensure adequate housing for
44
Dr. Blackburn, executive director of the Board for

all.

income housing project in Indianapolis in 1966— was con
sidered a pioneer in housing p r o g r a m s h a v i n g developed
programs not only in Indianapolis but throughout the eastern

reports that "Thurgood Marshall, Solicitor General of the
United States, spoke at a noon luncheon attended by more
than 450 p e r s o n s . I n d i a n a p o l i s newspapers also identi
fied the "interracial a u d i e n c e " a s

representatives of

government, including social service agencies, business,
and religious organizations assembled to discuss "critical
local housing problems and plans for more decent low-income
housing.
Earlier in this study, Marshall's commitment and
success as an advocate of equality and justice for all
Americans throughout his legal career were documented

^^Based on conversation between Nellie Gustason
and the author, October 17, 1978.

45^Indianapolis Recorder, June 18, 1966.
46
'Based on conversation between T. C. Vaughn,
Director of the Greater Indianapolis Housing Commission, and
the author, September 29, 1978.

Indianapolis Sta r , June 14, 1966.

^^Indianapolis Star, June 14, 1966.
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substantially.

Regarding the matter of discrimination in

housing, several facts seem pertinent.

At this point, it

seems pertinent to mention M arshall’s involvement in the
area of fair housing.
As Director-Counsel of the NAACP, Marshall partici
pated in a vigorous legal attack against restrictive
covenants from 1945 until he left this position.

Also,

Marshall suggested that the NAACP create a staff position
devoted to the area of housing.
Prior to Marshall's address before the "Greater
Indianapolis Housing Conference of Adequate Housing for All,"
his endeavors to eliminate discrimination in housing had
been widely publicized and generally applauded.

For

example, in one interview Marshall said:
What we must have, and will have eventually, is
total integration, of schools, housing, the power
structure, everything. . . . Not until you have
young people growing up together on an equal basis
from the start are you going to have real accept
ance.
It is too late to do that for most of the
present generation of children but we can try to
do it for the next.
Take for example, the cooperative apartment
house we live in in New York.
There were whites,
Negroes, Catholics, Jews, Orientals, every group—
all living side by side and there was never an
incident.
Now those children have a pretty good
chance of growing up without p r e j u d i c e . 52

Clement E. V o se, Caucasians Only:
The Supreme
Court, the NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant Cases
(Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1959), p. 64.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No. 32, A986.
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As Solicitor General of the United States, Marshall
continued to argue cases dealing with civil rights in
general and racial or housing discrimination in particular.
For example, Reitman v. Mulkey case challenged the validity
of provision in the California constitution, prohibiting the
state or any of its subdivisions or agencies from enacting
"open or fair housing statutes."

When the case reached the

Supreme Court of the United States, Solicitor General
Marshall presented the government's position.

Marshall

argued that the amendment had made the state a guilty partner
in a discriminatory act since it freed the citizens of
California from the restraints of not only the Unruh Act
which prohibited racial discrimination in all places of
business accommodation, but also of other statutes which had
been enacted to end racial discrimination in housing.

The

Supreme Court of the United States agreed after hearing
the governmen--s p o s i t i o n . T h e man the audience came to
hear had been highly praised as "a man whose work has
symbolized and spearheaded the struggle of millions of
Americans for equality before the l a w . W i t h

the preced

ing in mind, one can understand why Marshall was selected
as the person to address the Indianapolis Housing Conference.

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary,
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Hearing, 90th Congress,
1st Sess., July 13, 14, 18, 19, and 24, 1967 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 2.
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Basic Ideas and Major Premises
This section focuses on pertinent factors that con
tributed to Marshall 's storehouse of knowledge regarding
housing problems and enabled him to determine certain major
premises.
Integrity of ideas.

The numerous forces which

influenced Marshall’s ideas about racial inequality and
injustice, in general, have been discussed earlier.

At this

point, it seems appropriate to mention some of M arshall’s
previous experiences related to housing problems which he
brought to the speech situation in Indianapolis.
In this connection, during the 1940s and 1950s
Marshall was actively involved in struggle against restric
tive covenants which have been described as "the most clear
For
example, in 1945, the NAACP called a national conference on
the matter of housing and launched a vigorous attack against
restrictive covenants in the courts.

During the conference,

as Director-Counsel, Marshall discussed legal strat .-^ies:
"The objective, explained Marshall, was to develop causes
by which the constitutionality of the enforcement of racial
contracts could be successfully challenged before the
Supreme Court of the United States.

. . .

Every aspect of

the techniques of attacking restrictive covenants was

(New York:

Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 279.
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discussed."

Following the conference, it has been reported

that Marshall announced that the NAACP and its lawyers would
place special emphasis on the fight against restrictive
covenants.

Also, Marshall declared the N A A C P 's commitment

to a propoganda crusade against "the evils of segregation
and racial restrictive covenants" and suggested the creation
of a staff position devoted to the area of housing.
In 1947, eighteen Negro leaders including Marshall
held a second conference on housing and decided to use
sociological and economic support in the fight against
restrictive covenants when the next case was argued before
the Supreme Court.

Commenting on the inevitable decision of

NAACP lawyers to rely on sociological and economic material
as a principal point in litigation involving such cases,
it has been noted:

"Marshall . . . [was] impressed w ith the

growing number of articles and other publications showing
the disastrous sociological and economic effects of not
only racially segregated housing but racial segregation per
se.

Since Marshall was already making use of social

theories in two cases involving higher education . . ., he
was predisposed to the doctrine.
Of some importance is Marshall's participation in
cases involving discrimination and segregation in housing.
For example, in McGhee v. Sipes it has been reported:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

182
The question presented to the Supreme Court of
the United States by Marshall and [Loren] Miller,
both in brief and in oral argument, was predicated
on the facts involved in the case;
"Does the
enforcement by state courts of an agreement restrict
ing the disposition of land by prohibiting its use
and occupancy by members of unpopular minority
groups, where neither the willing seller nor the
willing purchaser was a party to the agreement
imposing the restriction, violate the Fourteenth
Amendment and treaty obligations under the United
Nations Charter?"58
Specific information about the nature of the brief for the
McGhee case reveals the following:
The authors [Marshall and Miller] of the
brief . . . devoted thirty-eight pages to a discus
sion of the damaging effects on unpopular minorities
because of these agreements.
Using data extracted
from the Bureau of Census figures and Special Census,
Race, Sex by Census Trace, they analyzed the problems
of overcrowding and of deteriorated dwellings.
They
cited such findings as revealed in Britton, "New
Light on the Relations of Housing to Health," in the
American Journal of Public Health (1942); Hyde and
Chisholm, "Relations of Mental Disorders to Race
and Nationality," in New England Journal of Medicine
(1944); Cooper, "The Frustration of Being a Member
of a Minority Group," in Mental Hygiene 29 (1945);
and Farris and Dunham, Mental Disorders in Urban
Areas:
An Ecological Study of Schizophrenia and
Other Psychoses (1939).
In this way Marshall and
Miller attempted to link the unsanitary conditions
of the ghetto with ill health.
Moreover, they con
tended, the perpetuation of slum areas amounted to
greater costs for the whole community in prejudice,
hostility, and racial tension.
The Negro lawyers
pointed to an argument presented in Gunnar M y r d a l 's
An American D i l e m m a , a recent study of American
race relations conducted by a Swedish sociologist,
"that in many northern states . . . there is partial
segregation aided by the gerrymandering of school
districts."
Referring to an article by Robert
Wea v e r , the advocates . . . concluded that the
inevitable result of such redistricting: "As
Negroes are relegated . . . to physically
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undesirable areas . . . they are associated with
blight . . . are all believed to be undesirable, and
their perpetual and universal banishment to the
ghetto is defended on the basis of racial charac
teristics. "59
Marshall included similar ideas in his June 15, 1966
speech.

For instance, he supports his contention that the

perpetuation of ghetto costs greatly.

In part, he said;

"It imposes a social and moral cost beyond measure; it
assesses a financial cost of physical maintenance and social
and public service which must be calculated not in the
millions but in the billions.
Marshall's conclusion in McGhee v. Sipes contained
ideas which he reiterated before the Indianapolis Housing
Conference in 1966:
This case is not a matter of enforcing an isolated
private agreement.
It is a test as to whether we
will have a united nation or a nation divided into
areas and ghettos solely on racial or religious
lines.
To strike down the walls of these state
court imposed ghettos will simply allow a flexible
way of life to develop in which each individual
will be able to live, work, and raise his family
as a free American.61
Addressing the thirty-ninth Annual NAACP Conference
in Kansas City, Missouri, June

23, 1948, Marshall's topic

was "Restrictive Covenants and the Segregation Picture."

^^Bland, p. 56.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.
^^Bland, p. 57.
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He quoted, in part, the Supreme Court's unanimous decision
in McGhee case;
Freedom from discrimination by the States in
the enjoyment of property rights was among the
basic objectives sought to be effectuated by the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
That such
discrimination has occurred in these cases is clear.
Because of the race or color of these petitioners
they have been denied rights of ownership or
occupancy enjoyed as a matter of course by other
citizens of different race or color.
Marshall continued as follows:
This statement sums up a big victory in a long
fight against segregated housing.
It did not and
will not of itself destroy segregated housing.
It
is our job to protect the effect of this decision
and to push forward toward the total destruction of
not only segregation in housing but all forms of
segregation in American life.
Thirty years ago we
won another victory in the Supreme Court which
declared unconstitutional a city ordinance in
Louisville which required racial segregation in
housing.
Ever since that time we have been battling
various devices by which white supremacists have
sought to evade that decision. Restrictive covenants
were the final, most workable and most prevalent
device which formed the cornerstone of the ghetto
for the Negro and the Jew, the Mexican and the
Oriental.
Indeed, for every minority to whom some
Americans would deny democracy.62
Discussing the nature and scope of racial segregation,
Marshall comments on the housing problem:

"A shortage of

adequate housing, and I mean unsegreqated housing, for all
American citizens raises a crucial problem.

. . .

Racial

segregation is inextricably tied up with every single problem
that you can name.

No economic, political or social reforms

Thurgood Marshall, "Restrictive Covenants and the
Segregation Picture" (Address before the thirty-ninth
annual conference of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, Kansas City, Missouri, June,
1948), p. 1.
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directed at any one of these problems can be effective so
long as segregation exists."

Regarding the solution for the

problem of segregation, Marshall asserts:
There is no single easy solution to this problem.
It will not be solved solely by any court decision
. . . by any act of Congress . . . by the act of
any State Legislature . . . by any resolutions by
this or any single organization, public or private.
This problem will only be solved by all of
these actions plus a climate of opinion throughout
this country in favor of full citizenship for every
American regardless of race, creed or color.
It
will not be solved until the day comes when prefixes
to the word "American" are removed by court decision,
by statute and from the thinking of all American

citizens.

In 1953, NAACP lawyers participated in another
restrictive covenant case— Barrows v. J ackson.
assisted in the preparation of the brief.

Marshall

Although Miller

argued this case before the Supreme Court of the United
States, it should be added that the argumentation repeated
much of that contributed by Marshall and Miller in the
McGhee case.

The NAACP lawyers received another favorable

decision from the Supreme Court.

Further, it has been noted:

The Restrictive Covenant Cases proved to the legal
arm of the NAACP that utilization of multigroup
support through amici curiae briefs and other forms
of group pressure on concerned federal agencies was
an invaluable asset.
Essential to the success of
this strategy was the fact that for the first time
in a private suit the federal government had sub
mitted a brief friendly to the Negro cause.
In the 1960s, Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall
argued many civil rights cases before the Supreme Court.

In
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particular, he argued cases involving racial discrimination
in housing.

For example, in the Reitman v. Mulkey case

Marshall, as amicus c u r i a e , presented the government's p o s i 
tion, which, in part, held that the amendment to the
California constitution which prohibited the state or any
of its agencies to enact open or fair housing statutes made
the state a guilty partner in a discriminatory act since it
freed citizens of California from statutes which had been
enacted to end racial discrimination in housing.

Subse

quently, the Supreme Court agreed with Marshall that
California Supreme Court's decision that the amendment v i o 
lated the equal-protection clause must be upheld.
Reliable sources agree that the intensive prep a r a 
tion and exceptional strategy contributed to the legal
victories of Marshall and his associates in the restrictive
covenant cases.

For example,

legal career. Bland writes :
legal staff]

in a book about Marshall's
"The success of the

[NAACP

in the Restrictive Covenant Cases supported

its long-practiced strategy of lengthy, legal preparations,
exposing arguments before moot courts of interested law
schools . . . and soliciting the finest professional
talent."

Also, commenting on the activities of Marshall

and his staff in the development of these cases, Clement
E. V o se remarks:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

187
Analysis of the Negro victory in the Restrictive
Covenant Cases forces the conclusion that this
result was an outgrowth of complex group activity
which preceded it.
Groups with antagonistic
interests appeared before the Supreme Court, just
as they do in Congress and other institutions that
mold public policy.
Because of organization the
lawyers for the Negroes were better prepared to do
battle through the courts. Without this . . . they
would not have freed themselves from the limiting
effects of racial covenants, notwithstanding the
presence of favorable social theories, political
circumstances, and the Supreme Court justices.67
Major premises.

After discussing the factors which

contributed to the shaping of Marshall's basic philosophy
and concepts, it seems desirable to examine the major
premises presented in Indianapolis.

The factors discussed

in the previous section probably enabled Marshall to select
appropriate premises for his speech of June 15, 1966.

Upon

close examination of this speech, the following premises
appear to emerge :
(1) The impact of urban housing problems extends
beyond the immediate residents.
(2) Ensuring adequate housing for all Americans
requires community and national commitment and
program.
(3) To remove conditions which require certain
people to live in the ghetto involuntarily, we
must attain certain prerequisites in terms of
program and policy and their implementation.
In this speech Marshall's premises focus on housing
as a specific area of racial discrimination.

On the other

hand, they seem consistent with arguments dealing with
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racial segregation and discrimination in other areas.
Further, these contentions were most likely acceptable to
most of his listeners in principle if not in practice.

It

seems that these contentions support M arshall’s position
and could lead to the desired responses from his many, if
not all, of his hearers.
Marshall's years of experience as a trial lawyer
and public speaker, his thorough knowledge of racial
segregation and discrimination, and his acclaimed reputa
tion for unparalleled skill in determining legal strategy
to solve problems related to racial segregation and dis
crimination apparently qualify him as a well-known and
highly respected authority on the subject discussed with
his audience.

These factors, among others, enabled

Marshall to know the significance of various ideas and
their probable effects on the audience.

Further, he seems

to know the audience's present state of mind, its knowledge
of the subject, and its awareness of opposing ideas.
Possessing a broad understanding of the aforementioned
matters, presumably Marshall can select the best possible
strategic ideas.
Organization
Disposition will be examined in terms of the
speaker's purpose, the emergence of a central theme or
proposition, and the general method of arrangement adopted
for the speech.
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The speaker's purpose.

Marshall's purpose before

the Grea-cer Indianapolis Housing Conference appears to be
twofold:

(1) to increase the hearers' knowledge or to

inform the members of the audience assembled to confront
housing problems "head-on" and

(2) to convince the listeners

to adopt a specific attitude toward his proposition and to
take action on it.

The speaker seems to indicate his pur

pose and to provide a preview of his discussion in the
following passage:

"While this conference cannot produce an

absolute unanimity of view,

it can define with some preci

sion the true and real nature of the area's housing situa
tion, and, hopefully, point the way toward a community-wide
attack on the problems that do e x i s t . M a r s h a l l ' s purpose
can be considered audience-oriented.
The emergence of a proposition.

In this address,

Marshall seems to imply the following proposition:

Persis

tent segregation and discrimination in the area of housing
violate the rights of many Americans and perpetuate a divided
society.
Structure of the speech.

The introduction, body, and

conclusion of this speech are discernible as the major divi
sions of this speech.

The length of the introduction

presented in Indianapolis is similar to that presented about

U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

190
two weeks earlier in Washington, D.C.
sists of approximately 265 words.

The introduction con

Perhaps, more importantly,

the content of this introduction probably enlisted favorable
attention, promoted friendliness and respect, indicated the
speaker's knowledge of the various attitudes of his hearers,
and established common ground while indicating purpose and
previewing the direction his discussion will take.

For

example, Marshall said:
I am grateful to all of you here today, not
simply for the courtesy of your invitation to parti
cipate in this conference but, far more important,
for your willingness to confront the housing
problems of the Greater Indianapolis community headon.
I suspect that there are here, as in other
areas through the country, varying and divergent
assessments about housing— its adequacy, its ready
accessibility by all, its character and its quality.
There are those, I am sure, who see no real
need for concern about the situation, who believe
that things, in total, are not too bad at all.
Then, at the opposite end of the spectrum,
there are those who are convinced we face a crisis
in housing, that it constitutes one of the most
serious shortcomings of our economy and our society.
And finally, there is that sizeable middle
group who haven't given the matter much attention
or thought, those who are relatively satisfied and
at ease with their own lot and find it difficult to
involve themselves in problems that m ay affect
others but which don't, they feel certain, have any
broader or more pressing impact.
While this conference cannot produce an
absolute unanimity of view, it can define with some
precision the true and real nature of the area's
housing situation, and, hopefully, point the way
toward a community-wide attack on the problems that
do exist.69
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This introduction fulfills rhetorical requirements
in terms of gaining attention, securing goodwill, and
preparing the audience to understand the discussion which
follows.

Also,

it probably paves the way for acceptance of

the speaker's implied position that widespread urban
housing problems must he solved.

Marshall seems to imply

that segregation and discrimination in the area of housing
which deny adequate housing and suitable environment for
millions of Americans must be eliminated.
Marshall employs the problem-solution method for
developing the body of this speech.

This approach is

generally considered an appropriate design for an
indirect argument.

Accordingly, part one presents an

analysis of the problem and part two deals with determining
solution.
In terms of word distribution, the discussion con
tains approximately 1,275 words.

The following brief

outline illustrates the speaker's invention:
I.

Urban housing problems . . . are not isolated
to just a few communities; they are, in hard
and unpleasant fact, a challenging and
dangerous characteristic of urban America,
North as well as South, West as well as East.
A.

The scope and dimension of these problems
make them a matter of interest and concern
whose impact goes beyond those who per
sonally suffer the inadequacies, day in and
day out.

B.

Housing— and specifically the lack of
adequate housing— is a community problem,
an American problem.
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II.

[We must meet this problem in several ways.]
A.

Commitment of community and nation must be
developed to ensure guarantees with the
Housing Act of 1949.

B.

We must dissolve the ghetto by removal of
conditions which require certain people to
live in it involuntarily.

C.

We must establish certain pre-requisites in
terms of program and policy and their
implementation.

D.

Everyone must share the responsibility.

Most listeners were probably acquainted with
Marshall's background.

In such situations, the speaker may

need only to confirm his reputation by the materials used
and the confidence demonstrated in the presentation of his
ideas.

The forms of support Marshall used will be covered

later in this study.
Marshall builds a good case and concludes this
speech by reiterating his central idea and with a plea for
action.

Accordingly, the speaker seems to focus the

thought of his audience on his central idea and openly
appeals for belief and action.

In concluding, Marshall says:

We are left, therefore, with the massive and urgent
task of correcting the problem, of overcoming the
obstacles, of righting wrong we have permitted to
develop and grow.
As hard as the work admittedly will be, it
must be done, and in the doing we have made a last
contribution toward fulfilling the American purpose
and redeeming the American promise.
There is no higher function of citizenship
than that.
Let us determine to perform it with wisdom and
persistence, for the good of us all.70

U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3320.
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In this connection, perhaps it should be mentioned that some
authorities in the field of speech have noted:

"If you have

a good case for your proposition you have won the right to
ask your audience to share your beliefs and act upon them.
You do your case an injustice if you fail to enlist the
interests and em
Logical Appeals
Marshall's speech to persons attending the "Greater
Indianapolis Conference on Housing for All" focused on one
specific and crucial aspect of discrimination and inequality;
i.e., housing, whereas his other speeches dealt with numerous
areas of inequality and injustice experienced by Negroes.
Marshall's main ideas summarized in the preceding
section may be cast into the form of the following hypothe
tical syllogisms:
(Major Premise)

(Minor Premise)
(Conclusion)
(Major Premise)

If the scope of urban housing
problems extends beyond the imme
diate residents, it becomes a
problem of the community and of the
nation.
The scope of urban housing problems
extends beyond the immediate resi
dents .
It becomes a community problem.
If segregated and inadequate housing
is to be eliminated, community and
national commitment and program are
required.

Good Speech (2d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 89.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

(Minor Premise)
(Conclusion)

Segregated and inadequate housing
must be eliminated.
Therefore, community and national
commitment and program are
required.

The syllogistic reasoning is valid since in each
instance the minor premise affirms the antecedent and
the conclusion affirms the consequent.

Marshall's logical

proof apparently demonstrates sound reasoning and con
vincing conclusions drawn from acceptable premises.
Characteristics of the speaker's forms of support
should be discussed.

The logical proof in Marshall's

speech before the Indianapolis Housing Conference depended
largely upon the speaker's personal and professional
knowledge and experiences as the major source of evidence.
For example, the speaker supported his minor premise about
the nature and scope of urban housing problems by using
assertions :
Urban housing problems, unfortunately enough, are
not isolated to just a few communities; they are,
in hard and unpleasant fact, a challenging and
dangerous characteristic of urban America, North
as well as South, West as well as East.
And it should be plainly evident that the
scope and dimension of these problems make them
a matter of interest and concern whose impact goes
far beyond those who personally suffer the inade
quacies, day in and day out.
It is not a problem just of the poor, although
its effect on this economic group is a direct and
telling one.
It is not a problem just of the Negro
American although, once again, he is affected more
severely than most of his fellow citizens.
It is not a problem of a particular religious
or nationality group, although some of these have
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more intimate knowledge of housing inadequacies
than do others more fortunate.
Housing— and specifically the lack of adequate
housing— is a community problem., an American
problem.72
Keeping in mind that Marshall was considered an
expert authority on the subject, his assertions probably
were sufficient for audience acceptance of his conclusions.
Presumably, these assertions clarified and explained his
contention.
Apparently, Marshall was not content to rest his
conclusion solely upon assertions.

He continued with

supporting materials which consisted of statements of fact,
definition and opinion:
The Congress of the United States, in the
Housing Act of 1949, declared the national housing
policy to be "a decent home and a suitable living
environment for every American family."
As to terms, I am certain most people could
reach a common understanding as to what "decent
home" should be.
Yet ten million Americans live
in dwellings that are substandard and therefore are
denied the decency of housing which the 1949
Housing Act solemnly pledged.
But shortcomings of promise and performance—
between goal and reality— become markedly more
severe when we get to the point of "a suitable
living environment" which is also pledged for
every American family.73
Marshall's supporting materials explain and clarify
his main idea.

Further, many listeners probably shared

his belief and did not need additional evidence to arrive
at the conclusion drawn.

^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.
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In this speech Marshall employs argument by alter
nation to some extent.

The speaker devoted a great propor

tion of his speech to the demonstration of the practicality
of the solution he proposed for the elimination of discrimi
nation and segregation in the area of housing.

First, he

asserted that this "requires the eventual dissolution of
the ghetto, not necessarily its total physical destruction,
but conditions which require certain people to live in it
involuntarily."

Continuing he said to accomplish that,

"we must attain certain pre-requisites in terms of program
and policy and their implementation."

Then Marshall pro

ceeds to outline and explain these factors.

Following the

explanation of his plan, the speaker said:
We cannot delude ourselves by oversimplifying the
complexity of the work to be done or in under
estimating the difficulties we will encounter.
The alternative to facing up to that complexity
and those difficulties, however, is even more
burdensome, because it would be a program of
inaction which is fraught with terrible danger to
our economy, our society, and our national con
science.
It would be wrong— tragically, destructively
wrong.
It seems clear to me there is no alternative
in the true spirit of the word.^^
On the one hand, this illustration indicates that
Marshall did not present the alternatives comprehensively.
On the other hand, it seems likely that this audience of
people assembled to find solutions to urban housing problems

,

74U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong.,
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319-A3320.

2d Sess.
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would not need further evidence regarding- the alternatives.
Further the listeners were probably most interested in the
details of Marshall's recommendations since his life and
career had been devoted to solving problems related to dis
crimination and segregation not only in the area of housing
but in other areas as well.

Presumably^ these factors earned

respect for, if not complete acceptance of, Marshall's con
clusion.
Emotional Appeals
In Marsh a l l 's speech at the Indianapolis Housing
Conference, one finds evidence of Marshall's appeals to
patriotism.

For instance, Marshall says:

"Housing— and

specifically the lack of adequate housing— is a community
problem, an American p r o b l e m . A l s o ,

appealing to both

patriotism and social responsibility, Marshall comments :
We are left, therefore, with the massive and
urgent task of correcting the problem, of overcoming
the obstacles, of righting the wrong we have per
mitted to develop and grow.
As hard as the work admittedly will be, it must
be done, and in the doing we will have made a last
ing contribution toward fulfilling the American
purpose and redeeming the American promise.
There is no higher function of citizenship than
that.
Let us determine to perform it with wisdom and
persistence, for the good of us a l l .76
Speaking to the Indianapolis Housing Conference, Marshall

^^U.S., Congressional R e c o r d , 89th C o n g . , 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.
^^U.S., Congressional Re c o r d , 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3320.
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also appeals to the sense of social responsibility.

After

he enumerates the essential requirements to attain adequate
housing for all, Marshall said;
If we are to succeed in this effort, we face
staggering tasks and massive obligations. And I am
in no way underestimating the role or absolving the
Federal Government's responsibility when I say that
the solution to this problem of housing rests not
with Washington alone.
It is shared by State and
local governments, by business and labor, by fair
housing groups and other community action agencies,
by religious and civil rights organizations, by
those now isolated in the ghettos and, most
assuredly, by those who now enjoy the foolish luxury
of ignoring them.
But if we do that job, it will be effort and
expenditure put to constructive use and devoted to
a healthful purpose, as compared to the vast costs,
in both time and money, which are now ploughed into
the divided society and the separate worlds of
today.
That is the kind of cost we can no longer
afford, either in dollars or in depressed human
values.77
Marshall employed emotional proof to reinforce
reason.

Evidence supports the fact that many of his lis

teners shared his beliefs and attitudes.
audience with adequate motives for action.

He provided the
Many rhetoricians

maintain that audiences are moved to action by emotional
appeals and that proposals identified with emotional appeals
have been effective in securing their acceptance.

It seems

likely that Marshall's emotional appeals helped gain accept
ance of his arguments.

Hence, his use of emotional appeal

probably contributed to the overall effectiveness of
Marshall's speeches.

^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.
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Ethical Appeals
Marshall was probably invited to speak on this and
similar occasions because of the reputation he had
established as a leading advocate of civil rights and human
rights, as the constitutional lawyer whose superior strategy
and skill resulted in a large number of legal victories,
particularly in the area of civil rights, and as the NAACP
Director-Counsel who frequently addressed NAACP members and
other groups helping them to determine the nature and scope
of specific problems involving racial segregation and d is
crimination and providing practical solutions to reduce or
to eliminate the problem.

This favorable reputation was a

major advantage to the speaker in his efforts to convince or
actuate his audience.
Prior to Marshall's address before the "Greater
Indianapolis Housing Conference of Adequate Housing for All,"
his endeavors to eliminate discrimination in housing had
been publicized and generally applauded.

For example, in

one interview Marshall said:
What we must have, and will have eventually, is
total integration, of schools, housing, the power
structure, everything. . . . Not until you have
young people growing up together on an equal basis
from the start are you going to have real acceptance.
It is too late to do that for most of the present
generation of children but we can try to do it for
the next.
Take for example, the cooperative apartment
house we live in in New York.
There were whites,
Negroes, Catholics, Jews, Orientals, every group— all
living side by side and there was never an incident.
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Now those children have a pretty good chance of
growing up without p r e j u d i c e . 78
Also, as an NAACP lawyer and as Solicitor General Marshall
had sought relentlessly to ensure equality and justice for
all Americans.

Further, Marshall had been publicly acclaimed

the voice of the American Conscience.

It seems that these

factors, among others, sufficiently establish the probity
of Marshall's character and probably predisposed the
audience to give the speaker respectful attention when he
spoke.
Evidence of Marshall's use of ethical proof as a
means of persuasion can be perceived in his ability to
establish character, sagacity and good will while he spoke.
Previous discussion indicates that it was probably
not necessary for the speaker to convince the audience of
his virtue.

Obviously, most listeners admired these

qualities before the occasion of the speech.

However, the

probity of Marshall's character was strengthened during the
address since the speaker relied upon authority largely
derived from his personal experience which has been mentioned

Generally, Marshall established sagacity in dis
course since he revealed a broad familiarity with the
interests of his audience.

For example, the speaker said:

^^U.S., Congressional R e c o r d , 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No. 32, A986.
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The Congress of the United States, in the
Housing Act of 1949, declared the national housing
policy to be "a decent home and a suitable living
environment for every American family."
If that purpose were to be achieved, I am con
vinced most of us would agree that we would have met
the goal of adequate housing.
But we must be sure of our terms and creative
and perservering in developing the means and the
responsibility for establishing needed programs and
implementing them into r e a l i t y .
During this speech, Marshall also established good
will by discovering common ground between himself and his
audience.

For instance, he noted:

If we are to succeed in this effort, we face
staggering tasks and massive obligations. . . .
But if we are to do that job, it will be effort
and expenditure put to constructive use and devoted
to a healthful purpose, as compared to the vast
costs, in both time and money, which are ploughed
into the divided society. . . . That is the kind
of cost we can no longer afford, either in dollars
or in depressed human values.
We have made some progress. . . .
But we cannot delude ourselves. . . .
We are left, therefore, with the massive and
urgent task of correcting the problem, of over
coming the obstacle, or righting the wrong we have
permitted to develop and grow.
Let us determine to perform it w it h wisdom
and persistence, for the good of us a l l .80
Another example illustrates Marshall's practice of mentioning
goals and beliefs common to himself and his audience:

"We

face a crisis in housing . . . [which] constitutes one of

^^U.S., Congressional Re c o r d , 89th Cong.,
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.
89th C o n g . ,
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319-A3320.
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the most serious shortcomings of our economy and our
society.
While Marshall spoke the probity of his character,
sagacity, and good will were strengthened.

These examples

of the speaker's ethical appeal seem to conform to
rhetorical standards.

^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th C o n g . , 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.
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CHAPTER V
THURGOOD MARSHALL'S SPEECHES TO LAWYERS
AND LAW STUDENTS
This chapter analyzes three speeches delivered by
Thurgood Marshall to law students and lawyers during his
tenure as Solicitor General of the United States.

These

speeches will be appraised in terms of the following:
the occasion and the audience;

(1)

(2) the speaker's preparation,

integrity of his basic ideas, and his major premises;

(3)

the organization, identifying purpose, proposition of central
idea and structure;

(4) characteristics of the speaker's

logical appeals ; (5) forms of evidence and support;

(6) the

speaker's emotional appeals; and (7) the speaker's ethical
appeal or ethos.
The Speech of September 16, 1965

Occasion and Audience
Thurgood Marshall's address, "The Constitution and
Social Change" was delivered during the 1965 Federal Bar
Association

(FBA) Convention held at the Conrad Hilton Hotel

in Chicago Illinois September 15-18, 1965.

The FBA Conven

tion theme was "The Great Society.

^Margaret Pallansch, "Chicago Convention Preview,"
Federal Bar Ne w s , July, 1965, p. 224.
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It should be mentioned that this speech represents
Marshall's first major address as Solicitor General.
Marshall spoke "to a truly overflow crowd of 450" persons
assembled for "the September 16 lead-off luncheon"
entrusted to the YLC

[Younger Lawyers Committee], "an honor

bestowed for the third successive year."

Regarding this

occasion, the Federal Bar News reports that the "program
reaches new high" and continues:
The Sixth Anniversary of the Younger Lawyers
Committee celebrated at the FBA Annual Convention
in Chicago was a successful and appropriate con
clusion to the year of leadership by retiring YLC
Co-Chairmen. . . . Combining to make this year's
YLC Convention activities reach a new mark were
elements such as a luncheon program which had
record attendance for the first address of the
Solicitor General of the United States since coming
to his new office, . . . and a warm reception for
a leading program designed to bring the message of
the Bill of Rights into classrooms.2
Other factors about the occasion seem important.

According

to Michael Waris, Jr., Program Chairman of the 1965 FBA
Convention,

"subjects and speakers . . . will deal with all

varieties of new problems confronting the lawyer in today's
world.In

an article published in Federal Bar News prior

to the convention Varjan Staniec, Vice Chairman of
Publicity and Promotion Committee, wrote that the "Great
Society" Convention was shaping-up to be an SRO Success,

J. Thomas Rouland and Joseph Fontana, "Convention
Program Reaches New High," Federal Bar N e w s , October, 1965,
p. 338.
^Pallansch, p. 224.
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while announcing that many "headline" political, profes
sional, and government figures will have active convention
roles and naming, among others. The Honorable Abe Port a s ,
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court and
The Honorable Thurgood Marshall, Solicitor General of the
United States, as persons they would be "honored and
privileged to have with them.
Presumably, any discussion about the general nature
of the audience should include some pertinent facts about
the organization with which they were affiliated.

Accord

ingly, the FBA, established in 1920 in Washington, D.C., is
an association of members of the Federal Judiciary and of
lawyers who are or have been in the employ of the United
States Government in legal capacities.^

In 1965, the FBA

had a membership about one-tenth the size of the American
Bar Association which had 119,000 members.^

Approximately

87 chapters, four of which were in European cities, were
affiliated with the FBA.^

According to the Federal Bar

N e w s , a publication forwarded to each member, the purposes

Shaping-Up to Be an-SRO Success," Federal Bar News, August,
1965, p. 255.
September, 1965, p. 281.
^"President's Page," Federal Bar News, December,
1965, p. 388.
^Sylvester A. Puzio, "Campaign to Establish New
Chapters of the Federal Bar Association," Federal Bar N e w s ,
May, 1966, p. 156.
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of the FBA in part are as follows;
To advance the science of jurisprudence; to promote
the administration of justice; to uphold a high
standard for the Federal Judiciary, attorneys
representing the Government of the United States,
and attorneys appearing before courts, departments,
and agencies of the United States. . . .
The legal business of the Government would be
expedited wit h resultant benefits to the public were
federal lawyers and private practitioners brought
into closer relationship.
Effective means for
bringing this about is through wide membership in
the Federal Bar Association by private practitioners
who are eligible by reason of their former service
as a federal judge or as a civil or military
employee or official of the Federal or District of
Columbia Governments and by those attorneys
presently employed by these governments.8
Other characteristics of this audience can be p e r 
ceived from remarks made by other speakers.

For example,

■Phillip F. Ziedman, General Counsel of the Small Business
Administration

(SBA) and at the age of 31 the youngest

general counsel in the federal government, accepted an award
during the luncheon program and included the following com
parison of lawyers employed by the federal government and
those who are not:
We have each chosen . . . to serve the Government
of the United States.
Our abilities and our
energies, our origins and our prospects; the tools
at our command and the quality of our labors— none
necessarily differ significantly from those of our
classmates who have chosen a different path.
If we do differ from our contemporaries in law
firms and in corporations, that difference is in
large part a reflection of the different objectives,
the different concerns, and the different
responsibilities of our respective clients.^

"The Federal Bar Association," Federal Bar N e w s ,
September, 1965, p. 281.
^Rouland and Fontana, p. 339.
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Significantly, Zeidman continues by identifying the current
and future role of federal lawyers, especially "younger"
lawyers :
To many of this generation it seems clear that the
action and passion of life in the last half of the
twentieth century is increasingly to be found in
public service.
For here, it is that one can find
both action and passion.
It is in this arena that
one can play a role, large or small, in formulating
the Nation's response to the great challenges of
our time : . . . h ow to assure equality of oppor
tunity to every American . . . and how to do so
within a framework supported by laws.
These are challenges which do not yield readily
to traditional techniques . . . but the role of the
lawyer— defining the issue, resolving the conflict,
bringing order out of chaos— remains . . . central
to our society. . . .
These are the challenges which will not be
solved in our time . . . but a conference whose
theme is "Federal Law and the Great Society" mani
fests not only a recognition that we are making a
start, but also the legal profession's readiness to
make its own unique contribution to that effort.
These are challenges which are not responsive
to the empty blandishments of the brash young man
. . . but they m ay well be ripe for a fresh look
and an eager, willing hand . . . for a chance to
do better what they see their elders not doing
well . . . or not doing at all.
Perhaps "younger" lawyers may be defined as
those who are still young enough to believe that
solutions to these awesome challenges can be sought
and found by people unified in their purpose and
resolute in their determination.
And we are young
enough to deem ourselves fortunate to be participants
in that historic search.10
Similarly, Abe Fortas comments that federal lawyers have
participated in a crucial expansion of the concepts of
individual, group, and national responsibility for the

^^Rouland and Fontana, pp. 339-340.
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welfare of others— specifically reflected in the field of
social legislation and notes the beginning of a new defini
tion of the role of federal lawyers including the privilege,
through legislation and litigation, to participate in the
remarkable expansion of human rights.

Speaking before the

FBA Convention after Marshall, Fortas said:
It has been in the Federal forum that the basic
rights of the poor, the Negroes, and even those
accused of crime have been forcefully reaffirmed—
here it is that the basic legislative and judicial
affirmations have taken place, that the Constitu
tion applies to Negroes as well as to whites, to
the poor as well as the rich, and it has been
primarily in the Federal courts that the difficult
definition and redefinition of the rights of those
accused of crimes are being s h a p e d . H
Significantly, Fortas characterizes members of the Federal
Bar as follows:

"To be a Federal lawyer is . . . not merely

to specialize in matters before the Federal government and
the Federal courts.

It is . . .

a way of life, as well as

a professional s p e c i a l i t y . T h e

preceding information,

to some extent, indicates that the listeners probably had
positive attitudes toward the ideas Marshall presented.
Regarding the attitudes of this audience, consisting
of federal lawyers, toward the speaker; substantial evidence
has been presented earlier in this study that other lawyers
praised and respected Marshall as "a distinguished and an

^^"An Address by Honorable Abe Fortas," Federal Bar
News, October, 1965, pp. 315-316.
^^"An Address by Honorable Abe Fortas," p. 313.
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excellent lawyer and jurist" and a trial lawyer, federal
judge and Solicitor General with "extraordinary legal
ability.One

senator remarked:

"As a practitioner

before the Supreme Court, in his capacity as Circuit Judge,
and . . .

as Solicitor General, he has displayed a knowledge,

ability, and competence as well as

[judicial] tenqperament.

In the mid-1960s, lawyers made similar comments
about Marshall's status.

For example. Senator Hiram L. Fong

(D-Hawaii) commented that the fact that Marshall is "a Negro
who has been in the forefront of many of the most signifi
cant efforts to secure our ideas of equality and brotherhood
to all Americans" made all Americans proud.
said:

Also, Fong

"The name of Marshall is one of the most illustrious

in the annals of American constitutional law,

. . . con

tributing to the Nation's trememdous strides to make a
reality the ringing words of equality in our Declaration of
Independence."^^

Congressman William F. Ryan

(D-New York)

referred to Marshall as one of the nation's finest advocates

^^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Judiciary,
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Hearing, 90th Congress,
1st Sess., July 13, 14, 18, 19, and 24, 1967 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 16.
^'^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Judiciary,
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Hearing, 90th Congress,
1st Sess., July 13, 14, 18, 19, and 24, 1967 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 17.
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Judiciary,
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Hearing, 90th Congress,
1st Sess., July 13, 14, 18, 19, and 24, 1967 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 16-17.
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and certainly one of its most distinguished citizens and
repeated President Lyndon Johnson's appraisal of Marshall's
qualifications:

"A lawyer and judge of very high ability,

a patriot of deep convictions, and a gentleman of undisputed
integrity."

Identifying Marshall as a "great American,"

Ryan remarked:

"I personally and most Americans applaud the

contribution he has made to our jurisprudence in his 2 0
years as chief counsel of the NAACP.

Regardless of indivi

dual feelings, his skills are universally recognized.
This audience in all probability held similar
opinions toward the speaker and respected him as a foremost
authority.

As an acknowledged leader in the legal profes

sion, the audience probably expected the speaker to give
information, advice and guidance which the listeners would
most likely respect and/or accept.
Integrity of Ideas
The numerous sources of Marshall's ideas have been
discussed at length earlier in this study.

Essentially, the

speaker's ideas were derived from his extensive reading and
research, his thinking, his personal experiences and his
career as an NAACP lawyer, federal judge and Solicitor
General of the United States.

Apparently, these experiences

contributed to his interpretation of "doctrinal history; his

mittee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Thurgood Marshall to
Be Solicitor General of the United States, Hearing, 89th
Congress, 1st Sess., July 29, 1965 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1965), pp. 8-9.
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suggestion that "in recent decades the Supreme Court has
molded the Constitution into a much needed instrument of
social change, capable of initiating, accommodating and
even requiring fundamental changes in the fabric of American
society;" and his conviction that lawyers must assume greater
responsibility to ensure that the criminal process conforms
with "our highest traditions of fairness and justice" and
to advocate laws which correspond with our constitutional
ideals.
Early evidence of M a r s h a l l ’s ability to formulate
ideas regarding equality and justice appears in an article
published in 1939.

Commenting that the United States

Supreme Court had rendered favorable decisions in twelve
out of the thirteen cases handled by the NAACP, Marshall
added;
These decisions have served as guideposts in
a sustained fight for full citizenship rights for
Negroes.
They have broadened the scope of pro
tection guaranteed by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution in the
fields of right to register and vote, equal justice
before the law, Negroes on juries, segregation, and
equal educational opportunities.
These precedents
have been cited more than sixty-five times in the
highest courts in the land and have been of benefit
to all citizens, both Negro and white.
The opinions in these cases define the consti
tutional rights of the Negro as a citizen.
In
addition, they broaden the interpretation of con
stitutional rights for all citizens and extend civil
liberties for whites as well as Negroes.

(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5979 and A5981.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

212
The activity of lawyers acting for the NAACP
has added to the body of law on civil rights for all
Americans.
The association, by pressing these
cases, has brought nearer to realization the ideal
embodied in the quotation engraved over the Supreme
Court building in Washington, D.C.:
"Equal Justice
Under Law."
While it may be true that laws and constitu
tions do not act to right wrong and overturn
established folkways overnight, it is also true that
the reaffirmation of these principles of democracy
build a body of public opinion in which rights and
privileges of citizenship may be enjoyed, and in
which the more brazen as well as the more sophisti
cated attempts at deprivation may be halted.!8
Marshall noted the implications of Supreme Court
decisions.

Also, he confirmed, as many others have elsewhere,

his active participation in civil rights litigation which
promoted equality and justice for all.
In the 1957 issue of the Journal of Negro Education,
Marshall wrote a chapter— "The Rise and Collapse of the
White Democratic Primary"— tracing the white primary from
its obscure origin during Reconstruction days, according
to "Lewinson in his Race, Class, and P a r t y ," to its
"collapse" during the mid-twentieth century when Supreme
Court decisions held such primaries unconstitutional.
Explaining the nature and scope of the white primary, Marshall
wrote :
Of all the so-called "legal" devices for
checking Negro participation in Southern politics
perhaps the most effective, and on the surface the
most legal, was the white Democratic Party primary—
the most effective because it disfranchised the

Thurgood Marshall, "Equal Justice Under Law," The
Crisis, July, 1939, pp. 199 and 201.
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Negro by excluding him from participating in the
preelections which for all practical purposes were
the elections in the one-party South, and the most
"legal" because the Democratic Party, according to
contemporary legal theory, was considered as being
a voluntary association of citizens which could
discriminate on the basis of race and color or
along any other line in the conduct of its private
affairs without offending the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.
Marshall adds that the rise and collapse of the white Demo
cratic primary is an important and distinct chapter in the
story of the Negro's struggle for political equality.
Evidence of Marshall's research can be found in frequent
references to authoritative sources and the inclusion of
practically every pertinent case brought to court.
Other factors seem pertinent to this discussion.
For example, at this point in Marshall's life, he was
extolled as a man who had been dedicated to the practice and
administration of justice, playing a leading role and mani
festing always his high standard of legal ability, an
intellectual acumen, a high code of ethics, clear reasoning
and hard work through the years.

Also, many sources

acknowledged that as an attorney and as a judge Marshall
demonstrated his commitment to the highest American ideals

Thurgood Marshall, "The Rise and Collapse of the
'White Democratic Primary,'" Journal of Negro Education,
Summer, 1957, p. 249.
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary,
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Executive Report No. 13,
90th Congress, 1st Sess., August 21, 1967 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 1.
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his conunitment to the highest American ideals of constitu
tionalism and his belief that his listeners must share the
responsibility for meaningful compliance with existing laws
which protect the rights of all Americans and the advocacy
of more laws if necessary to ensure equality and justice
for all.
Many lawyers have expressed similar views regarding
the impact of the Supreme Court decisions discussed by
Marshall and the need for enforcement of current laws and
designing new laws.

For example, Archibald Cox, Mar s h a l l ’s

immediate predecessor as Solicitor General, wrote:
For a decade and a half the Supreme Court has
been broadening and deepening the constitutional
significance of our national commitment to
Equality.
The decisions implementing the equal
protection clause set new constitutional goals for
the states and the Congress, which lie substantially
beyond accepted practices and whose achievement
requires affirmative governmental action.
A newer theme is the strong declaration of
congressional power under section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment.
If Congress follows the lead
that the Court has provided, the last [1965] Term's
opinions interpreting section 5 will prove as
important in bespeaking national legislative
authority to promote human rights as the Labor Board
decisions of 1937 were in providing national
authority to regulate the economy.
They may also
relieve some of the stresses to which constitu
tional adjudication is subjected when the Court is
forced to take the lead in a legal revolution.21
When Abe Fortas, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States, addressed the FBA Convention on

^^Archibald Cox, "The Supreme Court 1965 Term,
Harvard Law Review, 80:91, 1966.
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September 18, 1965, he speaks similarly about 1) the impact
of legislation and judicial decisions and 2) the essential
obligations of the federal lawyer.

Regarding the first

point, Fortas said that while federal action and administra
tion have been and will continue to be essential because of
the magnitude of problems of this age, there are limits to
the vitality and effectiveness.

Concerning the latter,

Fortas remarked :
Perhaps the most satisfying aspect of being a lawyer
is the opportunity— perhaps the necessity— to
function— to function at maximum capacity— to
participate intensively not only in the trials and
tribulations of our fell^o^,men, but also in the
crises of our time— to help perpetuate the magnifi
cent principles and institutions of our democracy,
and . . . to help carefully and cautiously to apply
them to drastically changing conditions.
To all
lawyers, comes the summons to function in crisis—
the call to largeness of mind and s p i r i t . 22
Harvard Law School Professor and President of the Meyer
Research Institute of Law, David F. Cavers, explained the
lawyers' concerns and responsibilities:
Their concern goes to the quality of the social
order.
In many areas [decent housing, fair employ
ment, civil rights, etc.], the typical problem
confronting the lawyer is how to protect the
individual against the bureaucracy. . . .
In other
areas the typical problem is how to provide a
bureaucracy capable of protecting the individual
or how to assert the public interest effectively in
clashes with private interests that often are more
ably represented or more aggressively pressed.
These tasks may entail the enforcement of existing
law or the creation of new law.
Troubles ma y spring
from the obsolescence of legal instrumentalities

Bar N e w s , October, 1965, p. 316.
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or procedures which have persisted for want of
studies searching enough to reveal their deficien
cies.
There m ay be the need for social inventions.
There certainly will be the need for the identifi
cation of goals and the articulation of issues
where goals c o n f l i c t . 23
It appears that Marshall possessed the personal and
professional resources to recognize and to address the
pressing problems of the time.

Proof of his conviction

that the promises of equality and justice for all Americans
are not self-fulfilling can be found in historical facts.
Briefly, a review of several events preceding
Marshall's speech seems pertinent.

By the early 1960s the

civil rights movement intensified.

Southern officials used

First Amendment provisions as devices to harass outspoken
civil rights advocates.

Two civil rights groups paid for

a full-page advertisement generally critical of the vicious
treatment by Alabama officials of civil rights demon
strators.

When the advertisement was printed in The New

York Times, a libel suit was brought against the newspaper
for one-half million dollars, charing it with printing
erroneous and defamatory statements of "fact," an action
punishable under an Alabama libel statute.

The Alabama

Supreme Court affirmed the judgment; but in New York Times
V.

Sullivan

(1964), the Supreme Court reversed, and "for the

first time in American history ruled that libelous utterance.

David F. Cavers, "Legal Education in Forwardlooking Perspective," Law in a Changing America (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey:
The American Assembly, Columbia Univer
sity, 1968), p. 144.
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with certain important qualifications, was protected under
the First Amendment."

Importantly, Justice William J.

Brennan asserted that criticism of government, which neces
sarily implies indirect criticism of individuals associated
with it, "is to be encouraged, not merely in the interests
of free speech, but in the interest of checking governmental
power over people, and maintaining a democratic society.
During the Kennedy administration and part of the
Johnson administration, the Supreme Court rendered consti
tutional interpretations involving problems in other areas.
For example, it extended the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against compulsory self-incrimination to the states.

The

Court felt that the citizen had the same right in state
court as in federal.

In addition, the Court took action

which startled some constitutional lawyers as follows:
[It] called for the creation of a whole body of
extra-constitutional rights, arguing that this
action was thoroughly within the spirit of the
Ninth Amendment and the due process clause of the
Fourteenth.
With such tools, . . . the Court was
in a position to strike down all state legislation
that violates "fundamental principles of liberty and
justice" or that was contrary to the "traditions
and (collective) conscience of our people.
By the end of the 1964-65 term, the justices completed a
variety of judicial business inherited from the Eisenhower
administration.

Also, the Court had put a judicial seal of

Paul L. Murphy, The Constitution in Crisis Times
1918-1969 (New York:
Harper and How Publishers, 1972),
pp. 398-399.
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approval on numerous New Frontier programs and objectives,
including rulings dealing with reapportionment, criminal
procedure, etc.

Apparently, much remained to be done during

the Johnson administration to ensure equality and justice
for all Americans.

It should be remembered that Johnson

and Congress made giant strides to secure equal rights for
all Americans until Johnson's handling of the Dominican
Republic and South Vietnam situations evoked criticism froiri
Congress, black leaders and many other Americans.
It seems that solutions for serious domestic prob
lems were neglected considerably.

The anti-Vietnam

demonstrations and the 1965 riots in Watts, Chicago, and
Cleveland, among other activities, suggest the critical
nature of these problems.

Many Americans were being

deprived of their basic rights, including lives.
Pertinent to this discussion seems to be F ortas'
comment on the climate of the 1960s and resources of the
federal government :
In our times, whether we like it or not, the
Federal government and the Federal courts have been
at the dynamic center of the nation's affairs
. . . .
It is here— in the Federal forum— that the
law and the legal institutions that we have
inherited, and those that we newly devise— it is
here that these instruments have principally been
brought to bear upon the raw materials of our
times— in search for adequate answers.
It is here
in the Federal forum— in the Congress, the adminis
trative and executive agencies, and the Federal

^^Murphy, p. 403.
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courts— that we have primarily been compelled to
cope with the turbulent developments of this
exciting age— to mold and fashion, to direct and
contain, the strong, raw, explosive thrusts of the
revolutionary events of our time.27
A large number of these judicial decisions were
reached by the Supreme Court frequently at Marshall's
urging.

It is probable that Marshall possessed the intel

lectual resources which enabled him to formulate ideas in
accordance with rhetorical standards.

Further, the validity

of his ideas rested, largely, upon historical accuracy.
Also, it seems that the speaker demonstrated the power to
envision the consequences of the American crisis.
Significantly, the speaker's message appears to con
tain several assumptions worthy of consideration:

(1)

promises of equality and justice under law for all Ameri
cans have not been fulfilled;

(2) the significance of

recent judicial decisions which represent appropriate and
essential measures to guarantee and to protect the rights
of all Americans should be examined by the audience; and
(3) attainment of equality and justice under law for all
Americans is a realistic, although not self-fulfilling goal.
Close examination of Marshall's speech,

"Constitu

tion and Social Change," seems to reveal the following major
premises :

^^"An Address by Honorable Abe Portas," Federal Bar
News, October, 1965, p. 313.
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(1) Supreme Court decisions, in recent decades,
have reaffirmed and enlarged constitutional
guarantees protecting the right to criticize the
status quo.
(2) Through its power of invalidation, the Supreme
Court has wrought fundamental changes in the
structure of our society, attacking state laws
designed to prevent Negroes from participating
in the political process and from attaining any
sort of social or economic equality.
(3) The Supreme Court's posture of leadership in
reforming the criminal process and the law into
an effective instrument of social policy should
be shared by, not criticized by, members of the
legal profession.
The major premises are only listed here.

However, they will

be analyzed in the section of this study which deals with
logical appeals.
Organization
This section examines the organization of Marshall's
speech of September 16, 1965.

The concept of organization,

defined by Russell Wagner as "the functional selection and
use of materials for a particular p u r p o s e , s e r v e s as a
useful guide.

Accordingly, the organization is discussed in

terms of purpose, proposition or central idea and structure.
Purpose.

Typically, Marshall seems to suggest that

his purpose is to inform.

For example, the speaker says

that his address "is offered merely as one interpretation of

Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo W.
Braden, Speech Criticism (2d ed.; New York:
Ronald Press
Company, 1970), p. 471.
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recent Supreme Court decisions, with no pretense that it
is the only interpretation."^®

However, close study of

this message indicates that the speaker presented informa
tion with the ultimate purpose of convincing his audience
about the merits of these decisions and the necessity for
meaningful implementation of these and other laws.
Authorities in the field of speech generally agree
that the speaker who seeks to convince or persuade is an
a d v o c a t e . V i e w i n g Marshall's life, his career, and this
particular speech,

it is probable that Marshall's primary

purpose was advocacy.

Indeed, the speaker was not content

merely to provide his listeners with information.

Pre

sumably, he wants his listeners to adopt a specific attitude
toward the proposition and even to take action on it.
this discussion proceeds,

As

it becomes more apparent that

Marshall presents arguments and appeals in support of a
position to which he has previously demonstrated his total
commitment because he believes in it.
Central i d e a .

Stating his central idea, Marshall

appears to reiterate his specific purpose.
said:

For example, he

"My hope is to cast a new light on this doctrinal

history, to suggest that in recent decades the Supreme

^ ® U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5979.
Good Speech (2d e d . ; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 37.
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Court has molded the Constitution into a much needed instru
ment of social change, capable of initiating, accommodating
and even requiring fundamental changes in the fabric of
American s o c i e t y . T h i s

statement seems to specify

Marshall's immediate goal in speaking to this particular
audience.

This statement not only allows the speaker to

point up his central idea but also to clarify what he hoped
to accomplish.

Frequently, it is considered wise to express

purpose and central idea in this manner.

The audience is

better equipped to know what the speaker is trying to do
from the beginning.

The subject matter of the speech is

narrowed and unified.

Presumably, this audience of federal

lawyers was aware of Marshall's participation in litigation
which yielded many of these judicial decisions.

The

listeners probably found the speaker's statement candid,
acceptable, and appropriate.
In the statement of his central idea Marshall pre
views what is to come in the body of the speech and pr e 
pares the audience for understanding and appreciation of the
subject.

It certainly seems to establish the need to listen

for this particular audience.
Structure.

This aspect of Marshall's address will

be discussed in terms of its principal divisions:

intro

duction, body, and conclusion.

31,U.S., Congressional Reco r d , 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5979.
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The entire introduction consists of only 116 words
or two paragraphs.

Marshall quickly discloses his subject

as he begins the second paragraph.

Marshall probably

established good relations with his listeners and gained
their attention,

saying:

The recent history of the Supreme Court is, in
one respect, like a contemporary abstract painting.
It is not that we cannot understand the painting,
if we try, but that it has so many different inter
pretations each of which has a measure of truth
and relevancy.
None of them can be dismissed for
being impossible; none has a claim to absolute
correctness; and each reflects the interpreter's
special insights.
The subject of these remarks, "The Constitu
tion and Social Change," is such an interpretation,
suffering from these faults and seeking the appro
priate immunities.32
Previously, we noted that recent Supreme Court
decisions regarding civil rights and human rights had been
praised and criticized, especially by members of the legal
profession.
lawyers,

Also, evidence supports the fact that

in general, and federal lawyers, in particular,

recognized and respected Marshall's advocacy of equal rights
under law for all Americans.

It is very likely that

Marshall's introduction was considered relevant and imagina
tive.

A statement of the speaker's central idea followed

the aforementioned passages.
Authorities in speech tend to agree that if the
opening portion of an address is interesting, if the speaker
is interesting, if the speaker is likable and has prestige.

32 ^
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and if he begins with some aspect of the subject with
which the audience can agree, then he ma y be able to get his
listeners to change their attitudes, where necessary, toward
his p r o p o s a l . M a r s h a l l ’s introduction appears to meet
rhetorical standards.
The body of this speech consisting of almost 3,800
words is lengthy vis-à-vis other speeches treated in this
study.

Studying this speech as printed in the Congressional

Record of October 1965 and in the Federal Bar News, dated
October 1965, the following headings suggest a topical
pattern of organization:
(1) Protecting the Right to Criticize the Status Quo;
(2) The Power of Invalidation;
(3) Reform of the Criminal Process.
Possibly, the following sentence outline of the speech,
which contains main ideas and major sub-points, best
illustrates how the body of the speech fulfilled the rhe
torical requirements in terms of developing the central
idea of the message, which was specified previously :
I.

Recent Supreme Court decisions re-affirmed con
stitutional guarantees of the right to criticize
the status quo
A.

In framing the Bill of Rights a certain pri
macy was given to assuring that the
citizenry would have the fullest opportunity
to criticize the established social and
political order and to propose radical
reform.

Milton Dickens, Speech Dynamic Communication (3d
ed.; New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1974),
p. 301.
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II.

B.

Although the philosophic roots of the con
stitutional guarantees can be traced to the
very founding of this nation, only within
recent years has this promise of the First
Amendment approached fulfillment; today,
the First Amendment stands as one of the
touchstones of our civilization, not just
as a mere legal rule to be applied dis
passionately by the courts, but as a
viable principle for organizing all our
social relations.

C.

However, in 1922, the Supreme Court declared,
almost as a proposition of hornbook law,
that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor
any other provision of the Constitution of
the United States imposes upon the States
any restrictions about freedom of
speech. . . ."

D.

In 1925, the Gitlow v. New York case marked
the inception of a n ew era in the First
Amendment doctrine, safeguarding the right
to criticize from suppressive actions of
the states.

E.

In recent years, confrontations with state
suppression created the occasion for the
Court to interpret or reinterpret First
Amendment guarantees.
1.

In the New Y ork Times Case (1964), the
Supreme Court interpreted the First
Amendment to yield a measure of protec
tion never before afforded, of placing
crisp limits on state libel laws:
criticism of public officials could not
be the subject of governmental sanction.

2.

The Court expanded the First Amendment
to protect freedom of expression, recog
nizing that there are many forms of
human behavior which serve in terms of
First Amendment purposes, the same
function as speech— to express dissatis
faction; to protest; and to criticize.

In the last decade, the Supreme Court, through
its power of invalidation, assaulted discrimi
natory state regulations and laws and wrought
fundamental changes in the structure of our
society.
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A.

Brown V. Board of Education was the initial
spearhead launched by the Supreme Court;
segregation in public education was consti
tutionally condemned and thus stripped of
all moral predicates.

B.

In the first half of the twentieth century
the power of invalidation was too often used
to frustrate recently enacted legislation
designed to effect a whole sale change in
the social order; yet Brown v. Board of
Educat i o n , and its progeny, initiated and
required social change.

C.

Two conditions justify transforming the
power of invalidation into an active instru
ment of social change : (1) an established
social pattern that threatens a central
constitutional ideal and (2) default by
other societal institutions.

D.

The hope is not that the Supreme Court will
singly take up the burden of eliminating
massive injustices through requiring further
reform, but that the other social and
political institutions will make it a joint
enterprise if not their special
responsibility.

Supreme C o u r t 's involvement in reforming the
criminal process and transforming law into an
effective instrument of social policy represents
province and responsibility of courts which
should be shared and not criticized.
A.

In the 1930s, two Supreme Court decisions
heralded a new Supreme Court supervision
radically reforming the state criminal
processes and introduced a new dimension of
its involvement in the process of effecting
social change.

B.

Supreme Court's involvement in judicial
reform of the judicial process has continued
to the present with ever greater intensity,
guaranteeing the right to counsel and pr o 
tecting the personal rights of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments through the imposition
of exclusionary rules on the premise that
the Fourteenth Amendment entrusted the
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federal courts with an independent through
supplementary power to decide which actions
by state law enforcers violated our basic
concepts of justice.
C.

The Supreme Court's extraordinary posture
of leadership can in part be attributed to
a serious default by other institutions,
and the time has come when the burden must
be shared by institutions closer to the
citizenry, especially members of the bar.

D.

In recent decades, the Supreme Court has
transformed the law into an effective
instrument of social policy, and the example
par excellence is its involvement in social
change; it seems more important to recog
nize this transformation than to debate its
propriety.

Marshall's conclusion for this speech seems suit
able since it reaffirms his belief in the capability of
laws and the Constitution to ensure equality and justice
under law for all.

However, this conclusion differs from

that in other speeches treated in this study because
Marshall specifies the fact that his speech is ending and
he uses a quotation.

For example, Marshall concludes his

address as follows:
I will close . . . by quoting a revolutionary
patriot, Thomas Jefferson:
"I am not an advocate of frequent changes in
laws and constitutions, but laws and constitutions
must go hand in hand with the progress of the
human mind, as that becomes more developed and more
enlightened. . . . Institutions must advance . . .
to keep pace with the time.
We might as well
require a man to wear still the coat which fitted
him as a boy as civilized society to remain under
the regime of their barbarous ancestors."
Without attempting to trace the influence of
Jefferson on Marshall's life and beliefs, it seems
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significant that Marshall incorporated some of Jefferson's
ideas in the conclusion of this speech.

It seems reasonable

to assume that Jefferson's ideas have influenced Americans
and American life for centuries.

For example, Edwin A.

Alderman, an American educator of earlier times who fre
quently spoke about the necessity for making education,
particularly in the South but also throughout the nation,
more democratic, also eulogized great Americans.

In 1924,

speaking of Jefferson's services and influences, Alderman
characterized him as

(1) the first great philosopher and

intelligent radical in American life;
American Democrat; and

(2) the first great

(3) the greatest liberal that has

appeared in American h i s t o r y . I n

a later speech, Marshall

noted that Jefferson sought to have slavery condemned in the
Declaration of Independence although he was unsuccessful.
Of especial import is Marshall's use of
Jefferson's words which enabled the speaker to restate the
belief he desired the audience to accept.

Further, it

probably provided the audience with additional motives for
building the desired attitude.
Although evidence seems to indicate that most of
the hearers shared Marshall's belief in equality and justice
under the law for all Americans, surely there were listeners
who did not.

Perhaps, Marshall linked his belief with that

^ W i l l i a m N. Brigance, e d . , History and Criticism o f
American Public Address (New York:
Russell and Russell,
1960), pp. 545-546.
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of Jefferson to gain the desired response to his message
from the entire audience, particularly the latter group.
Restatement of the belief is considered an effective
way to conclude this type of speech.

It is likely that

Marshall's conclusion meeti rhetorical standards.
In summary, this discussion of the organization of
Marshall's speech reveals that this address contained an
introduction, a body, and a conclusion.

Materials of the

introduction probably established goodwill and gained the
attention of the listeners, indicating purpose and thesis.
The main ideas in the body of the speech, to a great extent,
follow the speaker's plan and support the central idea
expressed initially by the speaker.

Finally, the conclusion

includes materials, restatement and a quotation, which can
be considered appropriate and effective.
Logical Appeals
Having discussed Marshall's major premises and lines
of argument, the critic must examine the form.s of support
which the speaker used to gain understanding, acceptance, and
action.

According to some authorities in the field of public

address and rhetoric,

"the supporting materials for a speech

may serve any one of three purposes:

(1) to clarify,

(2) to

prove, and (3) to amplify.

Giles W. Gray and Waldo W. Braden, Public Speaking:
Principles and Practices (New York:
Harper and Row
Publishers, 1951), p. 281.
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With these purposes in mind, this section will focus
on the nature of Marshall's supporting materials, the
speaker's methods of employing them, and the general effec
tiveness of these forms of support in terms of helping the
speaker to achieve his purpose.
Marshall's evidence in his speech before the FBA
can be described under the categories of fact and opinion.
For evidence of fact the speaker referred to the Bill of
Rights, constitutions, laws, historical data, personal
observations and legal cases or precedent.
Supporting his contention that recent Supreme Court
decisions protected the right to criticize the status quo,
Marshall argued inductively, citing circumstances and legal
cases.

He added personal opinions to support his contention

that in recent decades the Supreme Court reaffirmed consti
tutional guarantees by enlarging and reinterpreting the
right to criticize the status quo.

One example illustrates

the speaker's practices.
Although the philosophic roots of constitutional
guarantees can be traced to the very founding of
this nation, only within recent years has this
promise of the first amendment approached fulfill
ment.
Now the first amendment stands as one of the
touchstones of our civilization, not just as a mere
legal rule to be applied dispassionately by the
courts, but as a viable principle for organizing all
our social relations.
This near universal acceptance
makes us lose sight of the fact that in 1922, almost
150 years after the founding of the Nation and
adoption of the first amendment, and 50 years after
the Civil War and the adoption of the 14th amendment,
the Supreme Court declared, almost as a proposition
of hornbook law, that "neither the 14th amendment
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nor any other provision of the Constitution of the
United States imposes upon the States any restric
tions about freedom of speech."
Three years later this declaration was rendered
obsolete.
(Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
in one sense marked the inception of a new era in
first amendment doctrine.
Thanks to the absorptive
powers of the Due Process Clause of the 14th amend
ment, the first amendment's protective cloak was
spread wide enough to safeguard the right to
criticize from suppressive actions of the State
. . . .
The non-Federal levels of government have
been the primary agencies formulating policy on the
issues that concern the ordinary citizen in a most
direct and immediate w ay— education; police pro
tection; sanitation; recreation; zoning; etc.
Without limiting the power to suppress criticisms
of these policies, the first amendment freedoms
would be meaningless to the ordinary citizen, who for
example, is not likely to take up the cause of
altering the form of
American Government,
can be moved to question the soundness of
the local
school board's recent decision.
Of course, most
States have had laws guaranteeing freedom of speech
. . . and have developed viable traditions of free
criticism.
Yet the extension of the Federal con
stitutional guarantee involves an independent and
impartial protection, the significance of which can
be illustrated by imagining what it would have meant
to those on the historic Selma March if they had
nothing more to rely
on than the laws and
enforcers of Alabama
to protect their right to
criticize the policies of that State.
Marshall further clarifies his interpretation of the Court's
efforts regarding right to criticize status quo.
speaker refers to the New York Times case
C o . V. Sullivan, 376 U.S.

254

Here, the

(New York Times

(1964) in which the Court

interpreted the first amendment to yield a protection never
before afforded, placing crisp limits on State libel l a w s .

(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5979-A5980.
^^U.S., Congressional R e c o r d , 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5980.
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Marshall also refers to another aspect of First Amendment
protection which he called "lateral expansion."

In other

words, the specifics mentioned in the First Amendment, such
as freedom of speech and press, have come to be referred to
as the freedom of expression.^®
Arguing deductively, Marshall contends that through
its power of invalidation, the Supreme Court has wrought
fundamental changes in the structure of cur society.

Then,

the speaker supper ■ this contention with example, profes
sional experience and opinion, testimony of authority,
restatement, and contrast:
My point can best be made through example, and
I chose the example that is closest to me — Brown v.
Board of Education. So m u c h has happened in the
decade since the decision, and people's expectations
have risen, quite justifiably, at such an
accelerated pace, that we often lose perspective.
Yet just 25 years ago most Negroes' lives were con
stricted by a whole series of state-imposed and
state-fostered laws and regulations designed to
foreclose them from attaining any sort of social or
economic equality.
In the last decade, however,
there has been a massive assault on this citadel,
and although today we find the legislature, the
executive, and the general populace joining and to
some extent directing the assault, two things cannot
be forgotten— Brown v. Board of Education was the
initial spearhead, and it was launched by the
Supreme Court.
What crumbled was not merely a network of legal
rules; it was a whole social system bent on keeping
the Negroes in a position of inferiority, a social
system inspired by the J im Crow laws.
Segregation
was constitutionally condemned and it was thus
stripped of all moral predicates. . . .
In this
struggle for racial equality the Supreme Court
served, at least in 1954, as a voice not of
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contemporary opinion but as a voice of communal
conscience, or in Chief Justice Hughes' earlier
characterization, as "teachers to the citizenry ."39
To support his second contention in this speech,
Marshall also employed contrast.

He proceeds to contrast

use of the power of invalidation in the first half of the
twentieth century with its use in recent decades:
essential difference can . . .
concept of social change.

"The

be expressed in terms of the

In the first half of the 20th

century the power of invalidation was too often used to
frustrate recently enacted legislation designed to effect a
wholesale change in the social order; yet Brown v. Board of
Education, and its progeny, initiated and required social
change.Marshall

added the following opinion:

"This

contrast reveals two conditions that justify transforming
the power of invalidation,

spawned in a more modest context,

into an active instrument of social change— an established
social pattern that threatens a central constitutional
ideal and default by other societal institutions.
Evidence is provided to support the speaker's third
contention.

Marshall cited examples of cases and decisions

and drew a conclusion regarding the Supreme Court's leader
ship in reform of the criminal process.
In Powell V . Alabama (287 U.S. 45) decided by
the Supreme Court in 1932, State convictions were

^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong.
(1965), CXI, NO. 198, A5981.
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reversed because the defendants were denied the
effective assistance of counsel in their trial; and
in B r o w L V. Mississippi (297 U.S. 278 (1936),
decided four years later. State convictions were
invalidated because they rested solely "upon confes
sions shown to have been extorted by officers of the
State by brutality and violence." These two deci
sions heralded a new Supreme Court supervision
radically reforming the State criminal processes,
and they introduced a new dimension of its involve
ment in the process of major social c h a n g e . 42
Marshall supported his conclusion with a somewhat lengthy
explanation that the Supreme Court's involvement in this
type of reform was consistent with the traditional role of
the courts.

Listing other areas which need radical reform,

Marshall asked lawyers to share the responsibility for
judicial reform and to insure that trials conform to our
highest traditions of fairness and justice.
Apparently, Marshall felt that the needs of his
listeners would not be met if he failed to acknowledge the
controversy surrounding Supreme Court decisions.

Accord

ingly, he remarked that some of the criticism stemmed from
those whose material selfishness and self-satisfaction led
them to resist any change in the status quo with fury.
Other criticism, he opined, stemmed from a more intellectual
level.

In this category he identified two groups.

First,

he adverted to those who felt that they would have rendered,
a different decision from that handed down by the Supreme
Court.

He added,

"That kind of disagreement is the life

blood of the law; the vigor of such disagreement is an

42

,
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occasion to rejoice rather than despair."

Secondly, he

referred to those whose intellectual and professional
criticism reflected a profound misunderstanding and
reflected a refusal to accept a new concept of law, to shake
free of the 19th century moorings and to view law, not as a
set of abstract and socially unrelated comiriands of the
sovereign, but as effective instruments of social policy.'*^
Brembeck and Howell describe the common arguments on
a continuum ranging from induction to deduction because, in
practice, few arguments are purely inductive or deductive
in m e t h o d . I n

this speech, Marshall argued inductively

and deductively.

In this speech, as in others, Marshall

employs argument from circumstantial detail.

Indeed, the

speaker demonstrates a preference for this cause-to-effeet
reasoning which points to a group of circumstances and
alleges results.
Most of Marshall's evidence can be considered
historical fact, legal cases which he had argued or
researched thoroughly, and opinions which he was wellqualified to express.
not be denied.

The factual materials stand and can

The listeners were probably familiar with

the legal cases and Marshall's participation.

While the

opinions may be subject to challenge there were factors

^^Ibid.
^^Winston Lamont Brembeck and William Smiley Howell,
Persuasion (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1952), pp. 194-240.
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emanating from speaker's knowledge, training and experiences
which would win respect if not acceptance.
It can be concluded that the evidence presented by
Marshall met rhetorical requirements.

Certainly they

clarified and amplified the main points.

Undoubtedly, the

speaker was able to fulfill his purpose and to meet the
needs of his hearers.
Emotional Appeals
According to some authorities in the field of public
address, emotional or pathetic proof "includes all those
materials and devices calculated to put the audience in a
frame of mind suitable for reception of the sp e a k e r 's
ideas.

Usually listeners are not content to be logical

and realistic; they often desire emotional stimulation.
With this in mind, this section examines the emotional or
pathetic proof in Marshall's speech before the Federal Bar
Association.
In this particular speech, Marshall's pathetic proof
can be characterized as follows:
fair play;

(1) appeals to justice and

(2) appeals to social responsibility;

to professional pride; and

(3) appeals

(4) appeals to patriotism.

Speaking to the Federal Bar Association, Marshall
seems to appeal to the listeners'
play many times.

sense of justice and fair

For example, at one point Marshall remarked

^^Thonssen, Baird and Braden, p. 358.
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that there have been flagrant violations of basic human
rights specifically protected by the Bill of Rights.
Speaking of the Supreme Court's efforts to expand First
Amendment guarantees, specifically in protecting the right
to criticize the status quo, he said:
Such a measure of protection seems to be an ele
mentary requirement to the healthy public debate of
public issues, the particular societal activity
that the First Amendment was designed to safeguard,
nay encourage, and the activity which is the life
blood of any progressive society.
Those who cherish
these values could only hail the d e v e l o p m e n t . 4 6
Expressing concern about the government's power to
regulate the manner of expression, Marshall seems to appeal
to the audience's sense of justice, fair play, and profes
sional responsibility.
Rigor is required . . . in its application in order
to assure that the regulation of the manner of
expression remains neutral as to content.
Achieving
this content-neutrality requires more than
eliminating uneven regulation, where the proponents
of one cause are afforded privileges and rights not
afforded to another.
For often the defenders of
the status quo are prepared to stifle all aggres
sion, since the burden of persuasion invariably falls
on reformers.
If, for example, we accepted the
principle that the manner of expression could be
regulated so that the citizenry would never be
"forced" to listen to speech they did not want to
hear— and I use "force" in the mildest sense not the
blaring sound trucks but the street corner orator
and peaceful picket line— the promise of the first
amendment, to provide an effective means of
criticizing the status quo and proposing radical
reform, might be broken.
This is an expression of
concern not of fatalism; I a m confident that if the
officials who have taken the oath to uphold the
Constitution, and this includes more than the ever

^^U.S., Congressional R ecord, 89th Cong.,
(1965), CXI, NO. 198, A5980.
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vigilant justices of the Supreme Court recognize the
delicate dynamics inherent in trying to achieve
content-neutral regulation this promise will be
fulfilled.47
Another example illustrates the speaker's appeal to
the sense of justice and fair play:
For example in Powell v. Alabama the petitioners
stood trial for their lives, in hostile and tense
atmosphere, and yet were deprived of the effective
assistance of counsel:
The trial judge would have
to do more to assure this assistance than to appoint,
in a most casual way, "all the members of the bar. "
And in Brown v. Mississippi the coercion and
brutality were alarming; as it is related in the
opinion, some of "defendants were made to strip and
they were laid over chairs and their backs were cut
to pieces with a leather strap with buckles on it"
until they confessed.48
Also Marshall invited the members of the Federal Bar Asso
ciation "to join in this task of reform.

His remarks

seem to represent further evidence of his use of appeal to
professional pride and social responsibility.

Marshall

said:
The Supreme Court's extraordinary posture of
leadership in reforming the criminal process can
in part be attributed to a serious default by other
institutions, and it seems to me that the time has
come when the burden must be shared. . . .
To be
sure, this is not only an invitation to the local
courts and local legislatures— it is also addressed
to all members of the bar. Through their profes
sional associations they can initiate and press for
this reform, and each lawyer engaged in a criminal
trial, whether as prosecutor or defense counsel,
possesses a special responsibility and power— the

^'Ibid.

‘*®Ibid.

^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong,
(1965), CXI, NO. 198, A5981.
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the power of self-control— to insure that the trial
conforms to our highest traditions of fairness and

justice.50
Also addressing the FBA Marshall probably appeals to
the listeners' patriotism and common sense "by quoting a
revolutionary patriot, Thomas Jefferson:"
"I am not an advocate of frequent changes in
laws and constitutions, but laws and institutions
must go hand in hand with the progress of the human
mind, as that becomes more developed more
enlightened. . . . Institutions must advance . . .
to keep pace with the times. We might as well
require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him
as a boy as civilized society to remain under the
regime of their barbarous ancestors."51
Ethical Appeals
Essentially, Marshall's ethical appeals before this
audience consisting of lawyers and law students emanated from
the reputation he brought to the speech situation.

However,

the speech per se serves to communicate much about the
speaker's probity, sagacity, and goodwill.
Evidence of Marshall's use of ethical proof as a
means of persuasion can be perceived in his ability to
strengthen his reputation while he spoke.

For example,

speaking on "The Constitution and Social Change," he remarked
that each interpretation of recent Supreme Court actions
"reflects the interpreter's special insights and expe
riences."

Continuing, he said that his interpretation of

recent Supreme Court decisions "is offered merely as one
interpretation . . . with no pretense that it is the only

51 Ibid.
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speaker's practice.

Observing that the Supreme Court,

through its power of invalidation, has wrought fundamental
change in the structure of our society, Marshall said:

"My

point can best be made through example, and I chose the
example that is closest to me Brown v. Board of Education
. . . .

In this struggle for racial equality the Supreme

Court served, at least in 1954, as a voice not of contempo
rary opinion but of communal conscience, or in Chief Justice
Hughes' earlier characterization, as 'teachers to the
citizenry.'

The speaker appears to link his accomplish

ments with others which are virtuous.
Earlier discussion of how Marshall handled his
materials seems to indicate that the speaker established
sagacity while he spoke.

Specifically, his use of what is

generally called common sense seems apparent in the
following example:

"Hence the first amendment's guarantee

of freedom of speech and the press, and the right of people
to assemble peaceably and to petition the Government for
redress of grievances— these safeguards, it seems to me,
are the minimal conditions needed for social change in any

^^U.S., Congressional Re c o r d , 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5979.
^^U.S., Congressional Re c o r d , 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5980.
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s o c i e t y . Discussing implications of the Court's decision
regarding First Amendment guarantees, Marshall comments on
two "developments."

The first placed "crisp limits of

State libel laws" and the second consisted of "the lateral
expansion of the first amendment protection.

. . .

Specif

ics . . . such as freedom of speech and press, have come to
be referred to as the freedom of expression."

Continuing

Marshall said:
With this lateral expansion, h o w e v e r , must come
further concession to Government regulation; or to
express the idea more graphically, the lateral
expansion is necessarily accompanied by vertical
contraction, where the peak of the vertical axis is
the ideal of immunity from all control.
Mr. Justice
Holmes' example of shouting "Fire" in a crowded
theater presented a compelling case for accepting
some Government control of speech; and one need not
be nearly as clever as the Justice to conjure up
other hypotheticals illustrating, in a compelling
way, the legitimacy of Government control if the
relevant activity is not "speech" but expression,
which can take a great variety of forms, some of
which have always been sanctioned by criminal law.
Could an individual refuse to pay taxes of commit
murder or grand larceny, then claim that his conduct
was a means of protecting and criticizing govern
mental policies, and thus seek the immunities of the
first amendment?
I think not.
Hence this lateral
expansion seems to have resulted in the general
acceptance of the proposition that Government has the
power to regulate the manner of expression, the
questions as to "how," "where," "when," though not
the content of the expression, the "what."
As a general proposition, this development is
no cause for concern.
Rigor is required, neverthe
less, in its application in order to assure that the
regulation of the manner of expression remains
neutral as to content. . . .^^

U.S., Congressional R ecord, 89th Cong.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5979.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5980.
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Apparently, Marshall's good will is revealed through
his ability to proceed with candor and straightforwardness.
For example, Marshall noted that recent Supreme Court
decisions have many different interpretations, each of which
has a measure of truth and relevancy.

He added:

"None of

them can be totally dismissed for being impossible; none has
a claim to absolute correctness; and each reflects the
interpreter's special insights and experiences.
of these remarks,

The subject

'The Constitution and Social C h a n g e ,' is

such an interpretation,

suffering from these faults and

seeking the appropriate immunities.

. . ."56

Marshall seems to establish good will by identifying
himself with the listeners and their problems.

He also

offers necessary rebukes with tact and consideration.

For

example, he said:
We often lose sight of the fact that the courts
have traditionally engaged in this type of reform.
The quality of judicial process has always been the
special province and the special responsibility of
the courts.
Even where other institutions, such as
the legislature, have participated in this reform,
it has been as a response to judicial promptings.
For example, those protesting against the imposition
of the new exclusionary rules often overlook the
hearsay rule, a massive judge-created exclusionary
rule designed to protect less worthy interests than
constitutional rights.
Of course, there is a vital
distinction.
Traditionally the judicial reform of
the judicial process has been initiated and
effectuated by the courts whose process was being
challenged; here the reform has emanated from the

°Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 459.
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Federal courts, which some would like to view as the
courts of another, though supervening, jurisdiction.
It is not difficult to explain this phenomenon,
and in many respects the explanation resembles that
offered in connection with analyses of the Supreme
Court's active use of the power of invalidation.
First, there had been flagrant violations of basic
human rights specifically protected by the Bill of
Rights. . . . Secondly, there was a realization by
the Justices that State courts defaulted.
The state
judges had state constitutional provisions to deal
with these injustices, and they had the obligation
to apply the federal constitution, but they refused
to exercise their creative power.
The Supreme
Court attempted to fill the void. . . .
There is one very unique facet to this reform.
The constitutional principle upon which these deci
sions are based, the principle that no individual
shall be deprived of his life or liberty without due
process of law, is an evolutionary principle— its
contours change with the gradual evolution of our
communal v a lues. . . . 57
Writing a rhetorical analysis of Marshall's arguments
before the Supreme Court, Jamye Coleman Williams makes the
following observation about the speaker's "ethical and
pathetic appeal:"
I believe Thurgood Marshall's professional
status as a civil rights lawyer, who had won
many cases before the high court, served him in
good stead.
His personal integrity, his dedica
tion to the cause, his own high sense of ethics
would necessarily create a kind of rapport with
the Court.
In addition, the presence of emotional
overtones, which would be inherent in any case
concerning justice and injustice, had some
weight.58

57,U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5981.
of Thurgood Marshall's Arguments Before the Supreme Court
in the Public School Segregation Controversy"
(PhD
dissertation, Ohio State University, 1959), p. 202.
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Speech of April 27, 1966
Occasion and Audience
Criticism of public address "must be soundly based
upon a full and penetrating understanding of the meaning of
the events from which it issues and of the listeners who
paused to consider what is s a i d . T h e

occasion on which

Marshall made this speech, "Human Rights— Civil Rights :
From Theory to Practice," is examined in terms of the follow
ing questions:

(1) what events gave rise to the speech;

(2) what factors determined the time and place of the speech;
(3) what elements influenced the speaker in his choice of
subject and approach to the occasion; and

(4) under what

conditions did the speaker address the listeners?®*^
Regarding the events that gave rise to Marshall's
address before the Law Day Luncheon of the University of
Miami School of Law and the local bar association, several
factors appear pertinent.

For instance, reliable sources

indicate that annually law students and lawyers celebrate
"Law Day."

Generally, these observances may be designed to

emphasize the significance of law in American life.
Specifically,

it should be noted:

"The Congress by joint

resolution . . . designated the first day of May of each
year as Law Day, USA, to remind us of the fundamental truth
that our liberty, our rights to pursue our individual
destinies, and our very lives are dependent upon our system

S^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 349.
^^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 357.
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of law and independent courts."

Further, it has been

reported that the President of the American Bar Association
(ABA) set the theme for Law Day— 1966 as follows:
Our nation will celebrate in 1966 two notable
milestones in the life of our republic.
One is the
175th anniversary of the Bill of Rights.
The
other is the 190th anniversary of the independence
of the United States.
It is appropriate that on May 1 we also will
be celebrating Law Day U SA with the theme:
"Respect the Law— It Respects You.
Significantly, President Lyndon B. Johnson's official proc
lamation of 1966 Law Day USA noted that both of the afore
mentioned occasions "are notable milestones in the life of
our republic and in man's quest for freedom and justice
under law."

Continuing, Johnson wrote:

These two events in American history serve to
remind us that the great individual rights we value
so highly carry with them corresponding obliga
tions of citizenship:
to obey the law— recognize
the rights of others— resolve grievances by lawful
means— support law enforcement agencies— encourage
law obedience by others— practice and teach
patriotism— and defend our country.
Also, Johnson noted that the Law Day theme for 1966 "will
serve to focus attention on the need for every individual to
do his part to help strengthen our national commitment to
the rule of law. "

It should be added that publications by

and for lawyers and law students printed the president's

61.U.S., Congressional R e c o r d , 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24643.
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proclamation which urged commemoration of Law Day "with
suitable programs and ceremonies."®^
To some extent, Marshall's choice of subject and
approach to the occasion could have been influenced by some
of the aforementioned matters.

For example, the speaker's

introductory remarks include reference to statement by the
president of the ABA which established the theme for Law
Day 1966.

Continuing, Marshall said:

"In discussing the

theme, I shall dwell on what I consider to be paramount:
'Human Rights— Civil Rights'
Theory to Practice'."

and more particularly

'From

Marshall's introduction contains

evidence of other factors that influenced his choice of
subject.

For example, he stated:

"Our world leadership and

struggle for peace is evaluated and re-evaluated by democracy
as it is practiced at h o m e .

"

It should be remembered that

during the mid-1960s America's involvement in Vietnam, had
produced problems including nationwide resistance to the
draft, student insurgency on college campuses, embitterment
of many black leaders who regarded Vietnam as a drain on
America's obligation to help the poor, and black disillu
sionment with the hollowness of securing further legal rights
which was producing violent responses like riots in Watts,
Chicago,
reported:

and Cleveland.

Concerning the latter,

it has been

"Federal response was not forthcoming, and

^^"Proclamation by the President of the United
States," Federal Bar N e w s , May, 1966, p. 7.
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24643.
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indeed by 1966 the government was spending more for Vietnam
than for the entire federal welfare program.
content mounted.

. . .

But

Black dis

[there was] no broad remedial

legislation for the ghettoes or for more pressing urban prob
lems such as unemployment,

slum housing, and hostile police.

It should be noted that after the riots in Detroit
and Newark, President Johnson in July 1967 established the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders to investi
gate.

The Commission's report, released in 1968, is dis

cussed in the following passage:
While submitting detailed recommendations for a
comprehensive program to insure equality, social
justice and peace, and warning against resort to
blind repression or capitulation to lawlessness,
it also placed m a jor responsibility for the
nation's racial disorders on white racism and warned
that "our nation is moving toward two societies,
one black, one w h i t e — separate and unequal. . . .
To continue our present course will involve the
continuing polarization of the American community,
and will involve ultimately the destruction of
basic democratic v a l u e s .65
On the other hand, the Supreme Court during its 1965-66
session handed down a series of rulings in the civil rights
area.

Among other things,

in these rulings the Supreme

Court continued its protection of civil rights demonstrators
from unwarranted harrassment,

struck further at southern

schemes for noncompliance with school desegregation, opened
public park facilities to equal access, and struck at
divergent of white and Negro patrons of Louisiana public
librairies.

However,

such federal action often evoked

64,Murphy, p. 415.
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Southern hostility to the civil rights movement.

For

example. Governor Wallace indicated that he was unable to
protect the marchers in Selma, Alabama, and southern courts
refused to bring in indictments against whites who assaulted
and murdered civil rights workers, even when federal offi
cials provided them evidence of form and nature.
Unfortunately, at this point in time, the extent of federal
intervention in such cases was limited by the Constitution.
In late March, 1966, the Supreme Court issued opinions
deploring the inability of the federal government to move
against private citizens who deprived other Americans of
their basic rights— including their lives.
Significantly, Marshall's speech of April 27, 1866,

Save for Viet Na m and the drive for peace
throughout the world, public opinion— professional
and lay— is focused on the so-called Negro revo
lution in the United States and the War on Poverty.
Indeed, all three are part of the same cloth.
Our
world leadership and the struggle for peace is
evaluated and re-evaluated by the democracy as it
is practiced at home. We can never explain away
our mistreatment of minorities, whether because of
race or lack of financial affluence.
Recent demonstrations ranging from the peaceful
Selma march to the violent riots in Los Angeles,
California, are dramatic enough to cause all to
pause and seek out inevitable solutions. Then, too,
our present judicial process including the present
method of jury trials in the South— indeed our
entire judicial system needs more careful study.
Whichever way you look at it, we must seek the
removal of all barriers in American life which are
based on minority status whether racial or
financial, or both.

^^Murphy, pp. 412-413.
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Additionally, Marshall remarked that understanding present
problems,

first, required a look at our basic statutory

structure which initially gave legal support to slavery.
He added:

"In fact, two worlds were being set up with the

same democracy.
With the preceding discussion in mind, it appears
that the speaker made a suitable choice of subject and
approach to the occasion.
Previously, it was mentioned that the Congress
designated May 1 of each year as "Law Day."
May 1, 1966, was a Sunday.

However,

According to the Miami N e w s ,

Marshall's speech was delivered "before the Law Day
Luncheon" on April 27, 1966, at the Everglades Hotel during
Law W e e k . I t

seems safe to assume that the time and place

for the speech were appropriate and convenient for
Solicitor General Marshall as well as the persons sponsoring
the event.
Further, it is likely that the sponsors selected
a satisfactory setting for their commemoration of Law Day
1966.

There does not seem to be any evidence to indicate

that the conditions under which Marshall gave this speech
were anything but favorable.

^^U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24643.
^^"Thurgood Marshall Raps King's War View," Miami
Ne w s , April 27, 1966.
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The forces which shaped the occasion also influenced
the audience to some degree.

This section deals with other

pertinent factors about the listeners by considering the
following questions:
audience;
(3)

(1) what was the composition of the

(2) in what ways were the listeners homogeneous ;

what did the listeners know about the speaker ; (4) what

did the listeners know about the speaker's subject;

(5) how

did the listeners stand on the speaker's proposition;

(6)

did a significant portion of the listeners hold attitudes
favorable to the speaker's point of view; and (7) what atti
tudes stood in the way of the speaker's achieving his
objectives?^^
The audience was composed of University of Miami
Law School students and faculty members along with members
of the local bar association.

According to the University

of Miami School of Law's catalogue,

it was established in

1928; it is neither controlled nor supported by state,
municipality, or church;

it is a co-educational and

desegregated; and applicants for admission are accepted or

^^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 358.
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary,
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Hearing, 90th Congress,
1st Sess., July 13, 14, 18, 19, and 24, 1967 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 11.
^^Bulletin— University of Miami School of Law
1966-1967 (Coral Gables, Florida:
Publication of University of Miami, 1966), p. 16.
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same source stipulates the following objectives:
The purpose of the School to fit the student
for the practice of law and, in a larger sense, for
his responsibilities in our social, political, and
economic affairs, is being achieved by a comprehen
sive curriculum covering a wide range of topics
using varied teaching techniques.
Starting with
training in basic legal techniques, particularly
in case and statutory analysis and synthesis,
students are guided into problem analysis and
finally into individual research, writing, planning
and drafting, always directed toward the ideals of
justice, of good government and free, progressive
society.72
These factors in principle appear to indicate to some extent
the general nature of the law students and faculty in this
particular audience.

The validity of this assertion rests

upon the assumption that faculty and students pursued the
aforementioned objectives.

Also, it is presumed that people

are shaped by their environment.
In terms of the homogeneity of the listeners, it
seems significant that lawyers and law students assembled
to commemorate Law Day in 1966.

These individuals shared

or anticipated sharing the same profession.

Their presence

on this occasion suggests other similarities including their
respect for the occasion, the theme, and the speaker.
It seems that the speaker was well-known and
respected as an outstanding trial lawyer, judge, and Solicitor
General.

For example, during Senate Hearings on his nomina

tion, one senator remarked:

"He has been a towering figure

in the landmark cases striking down discriminatory

^^Bulletin— University of Miami School of Law
1966-1967, p. 17.
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practices, in litigation and the decisions which lie at the
very heart of American life and have brought us closer in
our everyday life to those principles for which we stand*
Further, many lawyers agreed that the character and the
career of Thurgood Marshall embody the best in American life
and the best in American law.

Lawyers have asserted that

Marshall's "imprint on justice and jurisprudence, once . . .
on the Court, will without a doubt be as constructive and
distinctive as that of his previous years of service to his
fellow m a n . " ^
These factors,

in part, established Marshall's

status as a respected member of the legal profession and
as an eminently qualified authority on the subject for this
occasion.

It is conceivable that in 1966 most lawyers and

law students were acquainted with the speaker's acclaimed
and widely publicized "exemplary career in the law and in
the public service.
Obviously, the lawyers and law students who listened
to Marshall's speech of April 27, 1966, were knowledgeable
about the subject.

During the mid-sixties in America, the

Civil Rights movement and related matters received attention

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary,
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Hearing, 90th Congress,
1st Sess., July 13, 14, 18, 19, and 24, 1967 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 15.
74u.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary,
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Hearing, 90th Congress,
1st Sess., July 13, 14, 18, 19, and 24, 1967 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 16.

^^Ibid.
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from most Americans.

For more than a decade prior to this

address, the Supreme Court had played a powerful role in
eliminating barriers to equality and justice for all.

The

Court's leadership in constitutional change and social
reform had generated controversy, particularly in legal
circles.

Significantly, it has been reported that these

judicial actions became the focus for scholarly concern.
The results had a major impact in various fields of American
education.

It should not surprise anyone that evidence

supports "its impact upon the traditional teaching of
public law in colleges and universities.
The knowledge of some members of the audience was
probably enhanced by innovative law school programs which
many lawyers felt were essential to meet the needs of the
times.

For example, David Cavers, Professor of Law at the

Harvard Law School and member of the Executive Committee
of the Association of American Law Schools noted:
Pressures generated by the social discontent and
governmental malfunctioning in our cities will not
relent and . . . will lead to major measures and
programs . . . designed to attack, and hopefully
cure, the evils we are now belatedly recognizing.
I shall assume that these measures will include some
services to those who now go without and others
designed to socialize and civilize the remnant of
medievalism in our communities, the treatment of
lawbreakers.77
Further evidence that these listeners were familiar
with the speaker's subject can be offered.

For instance.

Professor Herbert Wechsler, delivering the Oliver Wendell
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Holmes Lecture at the Harvard Law School in 1959, remarked:
On three occasions in the last few years
Harvard has been hospitable to the discussion of
that most abiding problem of our public law: the
role of courts in general and the Supreme Court
in particular in our constitutional tradition;
their special function in the maintenance, inter
pretation and development of the organic charter
that provides the framework of our government, the
charter that declares itself the "supreme l a w . " 7 8
Wechsler added that previous lectures comprise only a frag
ment of the serious, continuous attention that the subject is
receiving at Harvard as well as elsewhere in the nation.
Pertinent faccors seem to indicate how the listeners
stood on Marshall's proposition:

Recent and dramatic con

ditions in American society give us cause to pause and seek
out the causes and inevitable s o l u t i o n . F o r instance,
in the mid-sixties law students joined the dissident chorus
on campuses across the nation, voicing feelings of unease
and discontent.

Outstanding law professors identified

these stirrings as expressive of a generalized dissatisfac
tion with the course and quality of life in America and/or
defects in legal e d u c a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y , it has been
noted that by the mid-sixties a substantial number of able

Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law," Harvard Law Review, 73:1, November,
1959.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24643.
®°Abraham S. Goldstein, "The Unfulfilled Promise of
Legal Education," Law in a Changing America (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey:
The American Assembly, Columbia
University, 1968), p. 157.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

255
law students did not see a big-firm partnership as a career
goal but sought opportunities for public service, especially
to the disadvantaged, through the legal profession.®^
Increasingly, prominent members of the legal profession
[bench and bar] pursued Continuing Legal Education

(OLE)

which was offered in approximately thirty-one states.

The

two-fold purpose of CLE has been explained as follows;
To improve the professional competency of lawyers,
and to bring about greater professional respon
sibility.
By "professional competency" is meant the
ability of the lawyer to perform services for his
clients in a technically proficient and sophisti
cated way as counsellor, planner and advocate.
"Professional responsibility" . . . refers to other
duties and obligations the lawyer assumes, reforming
of both procedural and substantive law; providing
representation for all persons including the poor
and unpopular; serving in civic and public affairs;
participating in the work of the organized b a r . 82
In the mid-sixties,

the ABA and the American Assembly of

Columbia University jointly sponsored a CLE program— "The
American Assembly on Law and the Changing Society"— and
considered goals for the legal profession in the years ahead
in light of the social changes of the present and past.

Legal Education," Law in a Changing America (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey:
The American Assembly, Columbia Uni
versity, 1968), p. 167.
^^Clifford C. Nelson, "Preface," Law and a Changing
America (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: American Assembly,
Columbia University, 1968), p. v.
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Additionally, legal scholars admitted that legal education
seems to be in a process of fission in the bar and law
schools, a process that reflects changes taking place in our
society.

Fission in the bar would discontinue the practice

of permitting access to the machinery of justice to remain
a prequisite of business, organized labor, and the well-todo and relegating the legally indigent to the overloaded
legal aid services and depending upon the least reputable
for the administration of criminal justice.

Fission in the

law school would enable each to adapt their programs and
employ their resources to realize more fully their differing
alities.
It seems that in the mid-sixties the number of
lawyers and law students who held attitudes favorable to
Marshall's position was increasing.

Legal scholars observe

that by this period law school programs became more relevant
"to the deepening crises in the law which reflected the
conflicts in the country's political, economic and social
relationships."

Similarly, the spectrum of lawyer roles was

broadened somewhat by law schools in the design of their
curricula to meet contemporary needs.

By the late sixties

"a new wave of young lawyers" came out well-tuned not to
serve power but to shape, distribute, curb, or displace power
in accordance with their professional allegiance to a just
legal system.

84

Traditionally such initiatives were not

Cavers, pp. 140 and 143.
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considered their responsibility as lawyers.

Obviously, the

traditional school of thought was giving way to the broader,
system-directed focus of the public interest law y e r .
Interestingly, such a group expressed their views in the
book. With Justice for Some

(1970).

Writing the introduction

for this book, Ralph Nader remarked:
Most of the topics treated in this volume are
continuing front page even t s . They have been
treated in congressional hearings, court testimony,
administrative hearings, and other investigations.
What these young authors are saying is that this
is the law's moment of truth, that it can no longer
hide behind the public's ignorance of its failures
or the complicity of the organized bar's tokenism
when massive re-developments of legal manpower are
necessary. And contributors are living their con
cerns in public interest careers that require a
stamina of commitment quite beyond perception or
observation.
Unlike past reformist legal schools
of thought, these young lawyers and increasingly
more like them are "staying with it."
They are
determined to make the law a force in reducing the
institutional injustices and in shaping an
initiatory democratic system of active and skilled
citizens.
Available evidence indicates that audience attitudes
probably did not prevent the speaker's achievement of his
objectives.

Actually, evidence presented earlier implies

largely favorable attitudes.

Additionally, it should be

noted that by this period, time had demonstrated several
pertinent factors.

For instance, New Deal assumptions that

solutions to many pressing problems would come as an
automatic spinoff from the achievement of economic security

Ralph N a de r , "Introduction," With Justice for
S o m e , eds. Bruce Wasserstein and Mark J. Green iBoston:
Beacon Press, 1970), pp. x-xi.
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had proved overly optimistic.

Further, it became clear that

if the individual's social and political rights were to be
raised to the same level as his economic rights, positive
governmental action in this connection was essential.

Some

constitutional scholars contend that the accomplishment of
such action seemed a particularly relevant task for the
courts.

Additionally, the achievement of such rights

necessitated the clearing out of a legal thicket of archaic
interpretations, which the legislative and executive
branches were either ill-fitted or slightly motivated to
undertake.®®
On the other hand, evidence to some extent reveals
that for decades law schools neglected or refused to ask
hard questions,

seek hard data, and provide opportunities

for the students to comprehend and prepare to deal with
the injustices challenging the pretensions and canons of
the profession.

In fact, law schools did not see the need

to investigate the politico-economic power that deployed
the legal system to its special advantage.

During the

fifties, law schools reportedly paid little attention to the
questions dealing with minorities and indigents which the
Supreme Court confronted in the sixties.
practices note:

Critics of such

"Aristocratic pedagogy flitted before the

students one uncritical image of another of society's
alignments— big business, big bureaucracies, racial
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oppression, control of information and technology, and
hypocritical electoral and legislative processes.
Further, it should be remembered that while eliminat
ing barriers to equality and justice for all Supreme Court
leadership generated a variety of reactions from lawyers
as well as the general public.

Of particular importance was

the Court's involvement in constitutional change and social
reform which drew mixed responses from legal scholars.

For

example, it has been reported that conservative and tradi
tional legal scholars were somewhat apprehensive about what
they considered revolutionary departures by the Supreme
Court.

Accordingly, they were inclined to challenge the

methods used by the Court to attain its ends.

Some members

of the legal profession described judicial decisions of the
fifties and early sixties as insensitive and heavy-handed.®®
Professor Herbert Wechsler in the Harvard Law School
Lecture,

"Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,"

argued that courts have the power to decide all constitu
tional cases in which the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements are met.

He concluded that in these cases

decisions must rest on reasoning and analysis which trans
cend the immediate result and discussed instances in which
he believes the Supreme Court has not been faithful to this
principle.®®

Constitutional lawyers like Charles L.

®^Nader, p. x.

®®Kurphy, p. 469.

®^Wechsler, p. 1.
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Black, Jr., of the Yale Law School, acknowledged that the
significance of the Warren Court particularly was in the
values it set out to achieve and extend through the courts
as instruments.

By sublimating legal process to moral ends

and to the goals of meaningful justice, while managing not
to overlook the latest election returns, constitutional
lawyers felt that the Court had achieved a new level of
90
statesmanship.^
Integrity of Ideas
Additional information about the integrity of
Marshall's ideas was revealed during a press conference held
June 30, 1954.

It should be remembered that in May of 1954

the Supreme Court had rendered a favorable decision in the
Brown V . Board of Education case.

In other words, separate

but equal public education had been declared unconstitu
tional.

As NAACP Director-Counsel, he discussed the practice

of holding lawyers' conferences "for the purpose of getting
together with lawyers working on the local level and
schooling them on how to handle civil rights cases."
Marshall added:
This year the conference concentrated on legal
techniques to bring about implementation of the
Supreme Court decisions in each community. . . .
A meeting was also held on Tuesday afternoon with
state conference presidents as the state level is
the level of implementation of national policy.
A priority schedule was set up . . . . In each
state branches will be represented at each hearing

^^Murphy, p. 469.
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accompanied by a lawyer or other expert in working
out the details of desegregation.
Conferences will
be aimed at getting schools desegregated on a
voluntary basis. We will urge that it be done as
soon as possible. We will negotiate as long as the
school board will negotiate in good faith.91
Marshall's address,

"Human Rights— Civil Rights;

From Theory to Practice," was delivered during a period in
American history in which some progress had been made toward
guaranteeing equality and justice for all Americans.
However, some conditions which denied constitutional rights
of minorities for centuries persisted.
particularly blacks,

Many Americans,

seemed to be growing impatient with the

delay of equality and justice under the law.
In recent decades Thurgood Marshall and other law
yers successfully argued an unprecedented number of civil
rights cases before the Supreme Court of the United States
that helped eliminate many barriers to equal rights for
all.

However, other lawyers opposed their views.

Historians tend to agree that the conflicting views on
civil rights can be found throughout American history.
In the mid-twentieth century the Supreme Court,
especially the Warren Court, handed down many decisions in
the area of civil rights and human rights.
legal scholars have observed:

Significantly,

"In selecting landmarks in

human rights law, one quickly focuses on the Warren Court

June 30, 1954," NAACP Press Release, Dallas, Texas, June 30,
1954, p. 1.
(Mimeographed.)
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era as the first, and only, era to date in which the United
States Supreme Court has considered a significant number of
cases in this field.
To find answers to the human rights issues posed in
cases coming before them during this period, it is generally
agreed that the Court turn to constitutional documents.
Further, it has been explained:
The justices are concerned with three elements
of human rights— freedom, justice, and equality.
The legal phrases describing these rights are
"civil liberties," "due process," and "civil
rights, " and they are protected in a series of
constitutional amendments :
(1) Protections of freedom and civil liberties
from interference b y the government are found
mainly in the First Amendment;
(2) Provisions for fair trial and due process
of law in the courts and before administrative
agencies are found mainly in the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments;
(3) Guarantees of civil rights and equal p r o 
tection of laws for all Americans— regardless of
race, creed, color, nationality, religion, or
sex— are found mainly in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth A m e n d m e n t s .®3
The justices of the Warren Court looked out their
windows at the clamor in the streets, at the rising black
militance, at the figure A m e rica was playing on the world
stage and reached new, but not easy, decisions.

The diffi

culty experienced by the Court became apparent, in part,
when difficult cases like Brown v. Board of Education

(1954)

Ann Fagan Ginger, The Law, the Supreme Court, and
the People's Rights (Woodbury, New York:
Barron's Educa
tional Series, Inc., 1973), p. xi.
^^Ginger, p. xxix.
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had to be argued and re-argued by Thurgood Marshall as Chief
NAACP Counsel.

Also, sources agree that the Court demon

strated uncertainty on how to carry out their decisions,
especially those that sharply changed existing law by
returning to the intentions of the framers of the Recon
struction amendments and statutes.
Pertinent to this discussion seems to be the fact
that the Court based its famous Brown desegregation decision
on psychological grounds as well as legal precedents.
Reportedly,

"this approach opened the wa y for endless attacks

on the Brown decision, on desegregation, on the Court
itself."

Apparently, this was not the only basis for the

attack on the Court.

If so, the attack would have ceased

when the Court outlawed discrimination in housing, basing
its decision solely on legal grounds.

In fact, the Court

cited a clearly worded statute prohibiting housing discrimi
nation that had been passed in 1866 and never repealed.
However, the attack did not end then nor when the Court
ordered southern registrars to obey old voting rights
statutes that left no room for interpretation.

Therefore,

"many commentators have . . . concluded that the attack was
based on racism and would have occurred regardless of the
basis for the school desegregation d e c i s i o n . I n

each of

these speeches, Marshall acknowledged that the Cou r t 's
involvement in the process of social change, through

^^Ginger, p. 408.

^^Ginger, pp. 408-409.
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protecting the right to criticize the status quo, invalidat
ing laws and institutions, such as segregation, which fall
short of central constitutional ideals, and reforming the
criminal process, provides part of the explanation why the
Court has found itself in the center of an intense contro-

In each of these speeches, Marshall urged listeners,
particularly courts and lawyers, to join the Court in
efforts to initiate reform which guarantees equal rights
and justice and to ensure meaningful enforcement of
existing laws.

Consistently, Marshall identifies resources

available to lower courts and lawyers which could not only
implement existing laws but could also create new laws to
guarantee equality and justice for all.

Interestingly,

other authoritative sources have expressed similar views:
"The Warren Court did much to reconstruct the Reconstruc
tion, but left much to be done by the lower courts.

The

justices seemed anxious to require lower court judges to
re-read old Reconstruction history and statutes, to rethink
their attitudes on race and racism and on the meaning of
the Reconstruction amendments
We should remember that the Congressmen of the
1960s, unlike the Radical Republicans of the 1800s, were
not pressing for a new wave of equalitarian legislation.
In fact. Congress failed to follow up on the Court's 1954

^^Ginger, p. 409.
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civil rights decisions until 1957, passing the first Civil
Rights Act since Reconstruction.

As previously mentioned,

even the presidents moved cautiously in the area of civil
rights, issuing executive orders on housing and employment
discrimination mainly during election campaigns or when
popular pressure reached a peak.
Numerous constitutional scholars seem to confirm
Marshall's argument that for traditional reasons the Court
was qualified as the agent to reinterpret the meaning of
the constitutional guarantees of the Bill of Rights and
apply them to states and cities in such a way as to produce
uniform national standards of criminal justice in federal
and state courts.

Accordingly, it has been explained:

What appellants sought who brought cases in these
fields was application of a variety of traditional
principles and values associated with the American
tradition of democratic government to contemporary
problems. The Court's historic role had been to
construe established statutes and legal language in
the context of both initial meaning and intent and
current societal demands.
The judicial transition
directed itself naturally not merely to discovering
the precise locus of the productive language of
constitutional provisions and statutes, but to
ascertaining their thrust and deep and enduring
implications as well as their overall philosophical
justification for a republican state.
Unhampered
by the same need for compromise and concern for
constituency expedient for the other two branches,
the judiciary was able to move quickly and directly
toward the assuring of abstract public values, such
as justice, fairness, natural rights, and morality
in individual and public relationships, in a far
less qualified way.
It was thus in a unique posi
tion to act, as one commentator put it, as the
"conscience of the nation.

'ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

266
In this speech, the main premises from which Marshall
argued emanated from his personal and professional expe
riences as well as his attitude toward the complex problems
of this period in American life.

Briefly, this speech

reveals the following major premises :
(1) For centuries our constitutional democracy has
denied minorities, especially Negroes, equality
and justice under law.
(2) Recent Supreme Court leadership in the struggle
for racial equality stems from two profound
insights:
first, the status quo had fallen
short of a central constitutional ideal, the
egalitarian ideal, and secondly, all other
societal institutions, especially the more
representative institutions, refused to assume
a major responsibility in working toward the
realization of this ideal.
(3) Lower courts and members of the bar should
share, not criticize, the responsibilities of
bridging the gap between equality and justice
in theory and in practice.
Organization
This section examines the speaker's address in terms
of rhetorical craftsmanship, considering the speech from
the point of view of its basic construction and the total
plan of organization with reference to the peculiar audience
conditions to which it was presumably accommodated.
Specifically, the purpose, the proposition and the structure
of this speech will be considered.
Purpose.

If we remember the turbulent conditions of

this period and if we remember that as Solicitor General
Marshall resumed involvement in the affairs of this country
as an advocate, it should not be surprising that Marshall's
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purpose seems to be to convince or persuade.

Frequently,

the speaker who seeks to convince or persuade is an
advocate, according to some authorities in the field of
s p e e c h . S t u d y of this speech reveals that Marshall
recognized the pressing problems of his time and assessed
pertinent needs.

Hence, the speaker not only provided his

audience with information but apparently sought belief in
and action on his proposition.
Proposition.
following proposition:

Examination of this speech reveals the
We must seek causes of and

inevitable solutions for barriers in American life which are
based on minority status whether because of race or financial
or both.
speech.

This statement appears to clarify the plan of the
Further,

it seems to indicate the subject matter

that will be treated.

Even if the speaker's proposition

challenged the beliefs and conduct of some members of this
audience, it very likely enabled the audience to listen
intelligently.
Structure.
major divisions.

Typically, this speech consists of three

One can easily perceive an introduction,

a body, and a conclusion.
In this speech, Marshall's introduction
of 265 words)

(consisting

seems to be appropriate for three reasons:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

268
(1)

it arouses favorable attention;

common ground; and

(2) it establishes

(3) it issues a challenge.

For

instance, Marshall's reference to the occasion, the theme,
and the issue he considered paramount probably served
to stimulate the attention of the audience and to prepare
the listeners for the discussion to follow.

Marshall's

comments about the appropriateness that "we" celebrate
Law Day USA, his use of words by ABA's president, and his
reference to "our" judicial system appear to establish
identification and relationship with the audience.
Rhetoricians maintain that people naturally listen more
readily to a speaker they believe is like them, shares
their feelings and knows their problems.
The body of this speech contains three contentions
which appear to support the speaker's proposition.
Marshall's main ideas in this speech are somewhat similar
to those presented in previous speeches.

However,

difference in arrangement and emphasis seems evident.
The main ideas may be summarized as follows :
I.

II.

Since the oldest and most consistent example of
mistreatment of minorities in America has
focused upon Negroes, a fair understanding of
our present system requires a glimpse into the
past.
In the last decade, the Supreme Court, through
its power of invalidation and its involvement
in reforming the criminal processes, has
assumed leadership in removing barriers in
American life based on minority status.
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III.

The time has come for local courts, local
legislatures, and all members of the bar to
share the task of reform which removes barriers
in American life based on minority status;
thereby, bridging the gap between theory and
practice in the area of human rights and civil
rights.

The body of this speech is one of the longest of those
covered in this study.

It consists of more than 3,000 words.

Essentially, the outline reflects several aspects of
the problem-solving pattern:

(1) review of the problem— its

origin, its growth to urgency, and its present dangers;

(2)

enumeration and analysis of possible solutions ; (3) recom
mendation of the best solution with support that it will
solve the problem without creating worse difficulties ; and
(4)

appeal to audience to act upon the recommendation.^^^
Rhetoricians often contend that logical patterns,

particularly the problem-solving pattern, are the most
useful; for questions that commonly occasion the use of
rhetoric are likely to be problems in need of solution, and
the dialectic essential to the discovery of solutions may
furnish the most effective structures for communication.^®^
It is not surprising that Marshall employed significant
aspects of the problem-solving pattern in his speech of
April 27, 1966.

Bower Aly and Lucile Folse Aly, A Rhetoric of
Public Speaking (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973),
p. 180.

^°^Ibid.
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Further, the pattern of this speech can be con
sidered appropriate if it increased the impact of the
speaker's ideas, enabling the listeners to understand the
speaker and to share the ideas, whether they agree or dis
agree.

Also, the pattern seems suitable to the speaker's

purpose and central idea.
Marshall's conclusion is typically brief, consisting
of about 102 words or one paragraph.

The speaker said:

The gap between theory and practice is being
shortened but there is much to do. Much for all of
us to do.
Once a year we stop to evaluate our legal
framework on Law Day.
Too often we consider that
sufficient to hold us for another year. We return
to the old rut of "business as usual." Regardless
of how much our government does or will do in the
future, we will not close the gap until each of us
makes Law Day for every day in the year and each
takes this as his individual personal
responsibility.^02
Marshall uses standard rhetorical devices in this
conclusion.

For example, it seems that he summarizes his

main points, makes a call for action to enlist support for
his proposition, and presents a prediction of the future.
This conclusion appears to be designed to fulfill the
speaker's purpose and to gain the desired response from most
listeners.

^°^U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24644.
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Logical Appeals
The validity of Marshall's reasoning in his "Law
Day" speech can be determined by constructing syllogisms
from his main points and testing them according to the
rul^

of logic.

Three hypothetical syllogisms can be

framed as follows:
(Major Premise)

(Minor Premise)
(Conclusion)
(Major Premise)

(Minor Premise)
(Conclusion)

(Major Premise)

(Minor Premise)

If laws and practices in America
for centuries largely protected
rights of the majority, rights
of minorities, especially Negroes,
were not protected.
Laws and practices in America for
centuries largely protected the
rights of the majority.
Rights of minorities, especially
Negroes, were not protected.
If Supreme Court actions of the
last decade have protected some
rights of minorities, some
barriers in American life based
on minority status have been
removed.
Supreme Court actions of the last
decade have protected some rights
of minorities.
Some barriers in American life
based on minority status have been
removed.
If ne w laws, practices, and judi
cial reform fulfill constitutional
guarantees of equality and justice
for all Americans, all barriers in
American life based on minority
status can be removed.
New laws, practices, and judicial
reform fulfill constitutional
guarantees of equality and
justice.
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Conclusion)

All barriers in American life
based on minority status can be
removed.

Close examination of this speech reveals that
Marshall often implied rather than expressed some of his
premises.

However^ the syllogistic reasoning can be con

sidered valid since in each case the minor premise affirms
the antecedent and the conclusion affirms the consequent.
Apparently, the speaker's reasoning is sound.
Having examined the speaker's reasoning, w e now
turn to his use of evidenoe.

The critic must determine the

forms of support used by the speaker to gain understanding,
acceptance, and action.
Marshall seems to support his oonclusion that for
centuries the rights of minorities, especially Negroes,
were not protected by laws and practices.

Accordingly,

he cited specific instances that historically mistreatment
of minorities has focused upon Negroes.

Typically, the

speaker argues from circumstantial detail:
Since the oldest and most consistent example
of mistreatment of minorities has focused upon
Negroes, a fair understanding of our present
problem requires a glimpse into the past.
Being
a constitutional democracy we first look to our
basic statutory structure.
Beginning w i t h the
Declaration of Independence we remember that
Jefferson sought to have slavery condemned in the
Declaration of Independence.
He was u n successfulSecondly, the constitution of our government
expressly recognized slavery and gave legal
support to it. . . .
During the early part of the 19th century,
despite the great drive of abolitionists and
others, there was always the recognition of the
so-called inferiority of the Negro— even the free
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Negro.
There were instances of refusal of admission
of Negroes to abolitionist meetings. . . .
After the Civil War, Congress made its first
efforts toward removing state imposed racial dis
crimination by passing the proposed Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments and Civil Rights Acts. . . .
The supreme effort of the Civil War, the rough
struggle to get the bills through Congress and the
urgency of expanding our country to the West Coast,
exhausted the liberals and the struggle for protec
tion of the Negroes was abandoned after the
Reconstruction Era.
The executive branch of government never had any
intention of moving in. Finally, Supreme Court
decisions in the Civil Rights cases (1883) and
Plessy V . Ferguson (1896) were interpreted as final
abandonment of efforts of the federal government to
protect the civil rights of Negroes.
The states
resumed much of the pre-war practices of deliberate
racial discrimination.104
Obviously, the speaker's evidence clarified and
amplified the contention.

In all probability, the audience

was able to understand and possibly to share the speaker's
conclusion.
The speaker argued deductively using assertions,
examples, and explanations as supporting materials.

For

example, Marshall remarked that decades into the twentieth
century "neither the executive nor legislative branches of
the federal government could be persuaded to m o v e ."
"the federal courts found a way to fill the vacuum."
asserted,

But
He

"Through its power of invalidation the Supreme

Court has wrought fundamental changes in the structure of
our society."

Continuing, Marshall chose Brown v. Board of

^^^U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24643-24644.
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Education as an example which he explained in terms of its
impact.

In part, he said that segregation was constitu

tionally condemned and stripped of all moral predicates.
Marshall asserted that Supreme Court's involvement
in reforming our criminal processes which began in the
1900s has intensified recently, removing anachronisms which
have no place in our society.

Then Marshall said,

"Guaranteeing the right to counsel and protecting the per
sonal rights of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments through the
exclusionary rules have been among the most significant
changes."

Commenting that it is not necessary to add other

instances rather there exists the need to analyze these
developments "on a more institutional level," the speaker
proceeds to explain the traditional and unique aspects of
judicial reform.
Marshall admits that progress has been made in
reforming the judicial process but asserts that "gross imper
fections remain."

To illustrate the former, he said,

"as a

national proposition we have come a long way from those
initial outrages perceived in Brown v. Mississippi and
Powell V. Alabama."

Regarding the latter, he said:

"Pre

arraignment procedures in the station house; bail; pre-trial
discovery; the admission of evidence dealing with the

^°^U.S., Congressional Record, 90th C o n g . , 1st Sess.
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24644.

lO^Ibid.
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accused's prior criminal record; the right to counsel in
specialized proceedings, such as collateral attacks, commit
ment proceedings, and revocation-of-parole proceedings.
These are just some of the areas in which radial reform will
take place."

Marshall adds that this is not a prediction but

an invitation to all to join in this task of reform.
Finally, Marshall asserts that the time has come when
the burden of reforming the criminal process must be shared.
Then he opined:
Sharing the burden will add to the resources that
can be used in this enterprise; it will tend to gain
a more popular backing for the reform when the
reform is initiated by institutions closer to the
citizenry. . . . Members of the bar . . . through
their professional associations can initiate and
press for this reform, and each lawyer engaged in a
criminal trial, whether prosecutor or defense
counsel, possesses a special responsibility and
power . . . to ensure that the trial conforms to our
highest traditions of fairness and j u s t i c e . 108
At this point in his speech before the Miami Law Day
Luncheon, Marshall acknowledges the controversy surrounding
Supreme Court decisions in the same words that he used in
the speech before the Federal Bar Association.

However, he

does not conclude his speech immediately.
The preceding discussion seems to indicate that the
speech provided a variety of evidence to support his con
tentions.

Also, it can be assumed that his evidence helped

the listeners understand and respect his ideas.

Assuming

the audience largely agreed with the noble proposition, the

^°"^Ibid.

^°®Ibid.
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reasoning and evidence presented by the speaker probably
earned acceptance of the speaker's ideas and proposal for
action.
Emotional Appeals
Having examined the speaker's logical appeals, we now
turn to an examination of his emotional appeals.

Brembeck

and Howell have defined persuasion as "the conscious attempt
to modify thought and the action by manipulating motives of
men toward predetermined ends."^®^

With this in m i n d , this

section focuses on Marshall's use of emotional appeals.
Generally speaking, Marshall seems to repeat
pathetic proof in these speeches to lawyers and law students.
Specifically, his emotional appeals consist of those to
justice and fair play and those to social responsibility and
professional pride.
Speaking in Miami, Marshall seems to appeal to the
listeners' sense of fair play and justice.

Asserting that

history reveals that from the very beginning our system of
government crystalized the status of Negro Americans,
Marshall adds:

"In fact, two worlds were being set up within

the same democracy."

Continuing, Marshall says:

During the early part of the 19th century
despite the great drive of abolitionists and others,
there was always the recognition of the so-called
inferiority of the Neg r o — even the free Negro.
There were instances of refusal of admission of
Negroes to abolitionist meetings.

^Brembeck and Howell, p. 24.
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All of this was brought about by the propa
ganda of many southern professors.
These men, for
the sole purpose of continuing s l a v e y , managed to
convince others that scientific studies actually
proved the inferiority of Negroes, and it had its
effect.110
In this speech, Marshall seems to repeat the following appeal
to justice and fair play.
Yet on the constitutional horizon there looms the
problem.s of the large metropolitan ghettos, both
a product and a cause of fears and prejudices of
our generation, and the massive injustices
inflicted on the poor; the "other America," is
still with us.
The hope is not that the Supreme
Court will singly take up the burden of eliminating
these injustices through requiring further reform,
but that the other social and political institutions
will make it a joint enterprise, if not their
special responsibility.m
Addressing the Miami law students and lawyers,
Marshall appeals to the audience's sense of professional
pride and social responsibility.
The gap between theory and practice is being
shortened but there is much to do. Much for all of
us to do.
Once a year we stop to evaluate our
legal framework on Law Day.
Too often we consider
that sufficient to hold us for another year. We
return to the old rut of "business as usual."
Regardless of how muc h our government does or will
do in the future, we will not close the gap until
each of us makes La w Day for every day in the year
and each takes this as his individual personal
responsibility.112

., Congressional R e c o r d ,
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24643.
lllu.S,., Congressional R e c o r d ,
(1967) , CXIII, No. 140, 24644.
., Congressional Recordj
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24645.
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In these speeches, Marshall consistently implies or states
the following:

"Law cannot only respond to social change but

can initiate it, and lawyers, through their every day work in
the courts, may become social reformers.
As a successful trial lawyer for more than three
decades, Marshall obviously realized the significance of
stimulating the emotions of listeners.

Undoubtedly, he

recognized that the skillful and judicious use of pathetic
proof can move judges and juries to act in accordance with
the speaker's recommendation.

On this occasion, Marshall

included pathetic proof which reinforced reason and met
rhetorical requirements.
Speech of March 8, 1967
Occasion and Audience
Generally, some of the factors which shaped the
occasion when Marshall delivered his speech on April 27, 1966,
influenced the speaker's choice of subject, "The Law and the
Quest for Equality."

Equality and justice under law for all

Americans continued to be more assumption than fact.
Particularly, it should be kept in mind that condi
tions which denied equality and justice for minorities in
America had not changed significantly during the mid-sixties.
The executive and legislative branches of government, in the

llSThurgood Marshall, "Law and the Quest for
Equality," Washington University Quarterly, Winter, 1967,
p. 7.
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opinion of many, did little to remedy problems in the area
of civil rights.

For example. President Johnson felt

military priorities came first and Congress was reluctant
to act on civil rights matters.

However, in 1967 the

Supreme Court continued its controversial involvement in
protecting the rights of many Americans.

For example,

"in

a series of cases involving the omission of Negroes from
juries and grand juries, the Court struck consistently at
discriminatory local practices" and exercised judicial power
in cases involving equal rights to h o u s i n g . B u t much
remained to be done in the area of civil rights.

Accordingly,

peaceful protests continued under the leadership of Dr.
Martin Luther King and others.

The "Black Power" movement

escalated under leaders like Stokely Carmichael.
On this occasion. Solicitor General of the United
States Thurgood Marshall delivered the nineteenth annual
Tyrrell Williams Memorial

(TWM) lecture sponsored by

Washington University Law School
St. Louis, Missouri.

(established in 1899)

in

The TWM Lectureship "was established

in the School of Law of Washington University by alumni of
the school in 1949, to honor the memory of a well-loved
alumnus and faculty member whose connection with and service
to the school extended over the period 1898-1947. .,115

^^"^Murphy, pp. 417-418.
^^^Thurgood Marshall,
Equality," p. 1.

"Law and the Quest for
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Apparently, the TWM Lectureship brought to the Law School a
distinguished lecturer each year.

Previous speakers had

been well-recognized members of the bar, legal scholars and
jurists; including Supreme Court Justices Felix Frankfurter,
William 0. Douglas, and William J. Brennan.
The Washington University Law School employed the
"case method" of i n s t r u c t i o n . W i t h this in mind,
Marshall's speech which utilizes this method to some extent
appears suitable.
Perhaps, some indication of the general nature of
the audience that Marshall addressed on March 8, 1967, is
suggested in the following passages from the school
catalogue:
The program of the School of Law is designed
to help students develop an understanding of law,
the processes by which it operates, and the social,
economic, and political context in which it func
tions.
Without . . . ignoring technical legal
knowledge, the School of Law recognizes that legal
education must be broadly based for its recipients
to contribute effectively to shaping society's
goals and developing the means of achieving these
The law is not, and cannot be, static, and the
man who is "learned in the law" is the man who has
developed the ability to find sound solutions to
new problems by adapting and using, rather than
merely echoing, the teachings of the p a s t . H ^

Bulletin of Washington University 1969-197 0 :
The School of Law (St. Louis, Missouri:
Publication of
Washington University, 1968), p. 29.
^^^Bulletin of Washington University 1967-1968:
The School of L a w , p. 6.
^^^Bulletin of Washington University 1967-1968:
The School of L a w , p. 9.
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This audience was composed of approximately two hundred
thirty law students, numerous faculty members, and some
local attorneys.

It seems likely that the selection of

Marshall as speaker for this special occasion was to a large
extent based on his illustrious familiarity with current
problems, on knowledge of his prominence in the legal pro
fession in general and on his unparalleled success as a
constitutional lawyer.

Evidence presented earlier disclosed

that many lawyers respected Marshall as an advocate, a trial
lawyer, a federal judge and as the first black Solicitor
General of the United States.

In 1967, Marshall was des

cribed as a Supreme Court nominee whose qualifications were
"dramatically and compellingly e s t a b l i s h e d . F o r
several decades, Marshall's career seems to have paralleled
the Supreme Court's new interpretation of constitutional
amendments.

When Marshall spoke to this audience rumors of

his nomination for Supreme Court Justice were persistent.
Indeed, a few months later he was nominated for this post
by President Johnson who emphasized Marshall's exceptional
qualifications by saying that Marshall had "already earned
his place in h i s t o r y . T h e

members of the audience like

most Americans, especially lawyers and the people he

119"The Supreme Court:
The First Negro Justice,"
T ime, September 8, 1967, p. 16.
^Randall W. Bland, Private Pressure on Public
Law— The Legal Career of Justice Thurgood Marshall (Port
Washington, New York:
Kennikat Press, 1973), p. 151.
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represented, undoubtedly were well-acquainted with the
speaker and his subject.
Specific information about how they stood on the
speaker's proposition and attitude of audience toward the
speaker's point of view is not available.

However, the

school's catalogue revealed some data which can be con
sidered:

(1) the law students serve as interns with govern

mental agencies in St. Louis, Missouri;

(2) the faculty

(seventeen full-time and twelve part-time teachers) received
legal training in "better known law schools of the country"
and had wide experience in teaching, practice, governmental
service and research; and

(3) the library was one of the

few in the country "designated for United States Supreme
Court B r i e f s . S o m e

other interesting facts about the

students in attendance include the following:

(1) they cam.e

from thirty different states and three foreign countries;
(2)

they had been admitted to the law school on the basis

of their exceptional academic achievement; and

(3) while

attending Washington University Law School the students
worked for the Legal Aid Society which provided services to
persons unable to afford an attorney, under the supervision
of local attorneys.

Students who have demonstrated ability

in the second- and third-year classes are given the fullest
responsibility consistent with their experience and ability.

^^^Bulletin of Washington University 1967- 1 9 6 8 :
The School of Law, p. 7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

283
Further, students in their second and third years who have
completed the course in Criminal Law participated in the
Voluntary Defender Program (VDP).

Participants in VDP

assisted attorneys appointed to defend persons charged with
a crime who are unable to afford legal representation.
Further, the catalogue reveals:

"Participation in this pro

gram not only gives the student invaluable experience, but
also gives the attorney additional assistance to ensure that
every defendant in a criminal proceeding gets a fair trial
and is adequately represented by vounsel."^^^
Other factors imply that Marshall's point of view
was acceptable to his listeners.

For example, it has been

noted that by the mid-sixties young lawyers and law
students were inspired by legal heroes like Justice William
O. Douglas.

Justice Douglas, prior TWM Lecturer, has been

characterized as a distinguished lawyer who "long kindled
the hope that our legal system can evolve to be sensitive
to the needs of all c i t i z e n s . A d d i t i o n a l l y ,

these

lawyers and law students were taking more active measures,
by the late sixties to reform the p r o f e s s i o n . A c c o r d i n g

Bulletin of
The School of L a w , pp.

Washington
10 and 38.

University

1967-1968:

^^^Eric E. Van Loon, "The Law School Response:
How
to Sharpen Students' Minds by Making Them Narrow," With
Justice for So m e , eds. Bruce Wassestein and Mark Green
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 342.
^^"^Van Loon, p. 343.
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to some lawyers, Marshall had an activist legal out
look.
Presumably, the TWM Lectures were planned to provide
the greatest possible benefits for the audience.

The speaker

for this occasion would be one whose proposition and point
of view those assembled respected very highly.

Also, it

is probable that few, if any, attitudes of hearers would
interfere with the speaker's achievement of his objectives.
Integrity of Ideas
As explained earlier in this study, Marshall's life
and career had been dedicated to the pursuit of equality
and justice under law for all A m e ricans.

Marshall's

preparation, training and experiences apparently equipped
him to deal effectively with ideas pertinent to this
subject,

"Law and the Quest for Equality."
In this connection several factors seem important.

This man had "captained the long-drawn legal battle for
equal rights during his 23 years as counsel for the NAACP."^^^
This man argued and won an unprecedented number of cases
before the Supreme Court and whose famous victory in Brown
V.

Board of Education was the Court's ruling that segre

gated schools are in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This man was appointed federal judge by President Kennedy and
the first black Solicitor General by President Johnson.

125"The Supreme Court:
September 23, 1967.

Negro Justice," T i m e ,
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This man, a few months after this speech, would be nominated
the first black Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court.
Marshall wrote an article,

"Mr. Justice Murphy and

Civil Rights," published in the Michigan Law Review of
1950.

This article focuses on Justice M u r p h y 's genuine

devotion to equalitarian principles of our fundamental law,
particularly in the field of civil rights.

His description

of Murphy resembles characterizations of Marshall by some
of his associates:

"In the field of civil rights, Mr.

Justice Murphy was a zealot.

To him, primacy of civil

rights and human equality in our law and their entitlement
to every possible protection in each case, regardless of
competing considerations, was a fighting faith.
Marshall discusses the major cases of the 1940s involving
fundamental issues affecting civil rights of unpopular
minorities which "clearly demonstrate Justice Murphy's con
tribution to the basic law of the l a n d . O f

some

importance is that this article afforded Marshall an earlier
opportunity to express beliefs that he repeated in speeches
as Solicitor General.
Studying Marshall's speeches and his career, one is
convinced that the speaker believed strongly in the causes

Rights," Michigan Law R e v i e w , 48:745, 1950.
Marshall,
l ^ ^Thurgood
Thurg
Rights," p. 746.

" M r . Justice Murphy and Civil
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for which he spoke.

Members of the legal profession, as

well as the general public, have attested to his exceptional
knowledge and his ability to articulate his ideas skill
fully whether in the courtroom or on the lecture platform.
In particular, Marshall was renown as an outstanding
authority on constitutional law and a courageous champion
in the struggle to achieve equality and justice under law
for all Americans.
Significantly, the speaker reiterated ideas which he
had presented in earlier speeches.

However, it should be

noted that the emphasis shifted, from speech to speech, and
the supporting material varied.

These matters are examined

more closely later in this study.
In this speech, Marshall discusses the Supreme
Court's involvement in legal reform which eliminated many
inequalities and injustices in American life.

As the Court

moved actively to extend constitutional protection to
minorities,

scholars of this period turned close attention

to the impact of Supreme Court decisions.
Further, constitutional historians generally
agree that the average American of the 1960s was conscious
of the changing role of the Supreme Court in American life.
Whether they approved or appreciated the Court's new
position of prominence, many Americans observed its
actions closely.

To some, the Court seemed to be pushing

ahead of public opinion, assuming the lead in setting forth
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new standards of social control and public behavior and
becoming the most innovative of the three branches of the
American government.
The evolution of the C o u r t ’s new role and its
ramifications have been explained as follows:
Its attainment of its new position seemed in
retrospect the inevitable result of the public law
revolution of the 1930s and its impact on American
life and institutions.
The overwhelming popular
endorsement, at the ballot box, of the New Deal
had constituted a clear public acceptance of big
government.
It was the government's task, from here
on, a majority agreed, to take actions in the
public interest that in a complex and enormous
industrial state an individual could not meaning
fully take for himself.
Thus the condition of the
average individual, his protection, against massive
impersonal forces such as poverty, unemployment,
the business cycle, and his general lack of economic
security, which the depression had demonstrated a
laissez-faire system could not insure, were now to
be turned over to government, whose responsibility
it was to afford remedies and solutions. New Deal
leaders argued persuasively that only if such
elemental economic guarantees were achieved could
man be free to cope with the great range of social
and political problems chronically confronting him.
By the 1950s, the permanence of such an approach to
public policy became clear.
Eight years of
Eisenhower Republicanism demonstrated that even the
na t i o n 's more conservative party was prepared to
preserve and extend rather than reverse or alter
the basic New Deal p r o g r a m s . ^28
Also, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court's involve
ment in the area of civil rights and human rights was
praised and criticized.

The extent of the controversy sur

rounding Supreme Court decisions during the decades
following the 1930s seems evident in the following passage

^Murphy, pp. 458-459.
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from a magazine article— "What 36 State Chief Justices Said
About the Supreme Court"— of October 3, 1958:
The chief justices of 36 States recently
adopted a report critical of the Supreme Court of
the United States, declaring that the Court "has
tended to adopt the role of policy maker without
proper judicial restraint."
This report, approved by the chief justices
of three fourths of the n a t i o n ’s States, found that
the present Supreme Court has abused the power
given to it by the Constitution.
The Court is
pictured as invading fields of Government reserved
by the Constitution to the S t a t e s . ^29
It seems particularly significant that this entire article
was included as an appendix to Senator Sam Ervin's

(D-North

Carolina) views in the 1967 Report Together with Minority
Views of Hearings on Nomination of Thurgood Marshall to be
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States.

It should be remembered that Ervin had opposed

Marshall’s nomination saying "Judge Marshall will align
himself with the judicial activists now serving on the
Supreme Court.
As the Supreme Court's decisions drew sharp and mixed
responses, the Court responded that this was its purpose.
Specifically, the response of the Warren Court has been
explained as follows:

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judi
ciary, Nomination of Thurgood M a r s h a l l , Executive Report
No. 13, 90th Congress, 1st S e s s . , August 21, 1967
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 18.
^ ^ % . S . , Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judi
ciary, Nomination of Thurgood M a r s h a l l , Executive Report
No. 13, 90th Congress, 1st S e s s . , August 21, 1967
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 16.
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There was no reason, its majority felt, why his
torically professed American ideals and their
practice could not be harmonized and why the
hypocrisy and immorality that had pervaded the
behavior of earlier generations of Americans—
Americans who while professing deep belief in
liberty and equality found innumerable ways to
qualify and destroy each— could not be eliminated.
Thus, while the Court was conscious of playing a
new power role, and acting as a balance wheel in
protecting the rights of the individual against
the power of business, big labor, and big govern
ment, it was also conscious of its obligation to
make American traditions and values operative in
the context of a modern industrial society even in
face of the reluctance or obstruction of the two
br anches.131
The m erit of Marshall's ideas, in part, can be
measured by the fact that other successful lawyers and
distinguished legal scholars expressed similar views.
Although some of these persons and their views have been
mentioned earlier in this study, perhaps others should be
added here.

For example, in the late 1960s, Justice Tom C.

Clark wrote:
Although the Bill of Rights was included in
the Constitution by ratification as early as 1791,
some Amendments . . . are not enjoyed by all
citizens today. . . . Although the Fourteenth
Amendment is now in its 101st year, many of the
fruits of its clauses are not enjoyed by millions
of our citizens.
Indeed, the news media report
every day of the many anguished cries for equal

justice.^32

In 1967, Chief Justice Earl Warren said:

pp. 461-462.
Radical Reform
pp. xiii-xiv.

_ _ ______ American Law:
The Case for
(Toronto: The MacMillan Company, 1969),
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In a century which has been characterized by
growth and modernization in science, technology and
economics, the legal fraternity is still living in
the past.
We have allowed the mainstream of
progress to pass us by. . . . Our failure to act
becomes alarming when a competent district judge
must admit in testimony before a Senate committee
that unless something new and effective is done
promptly in the area of judicial research,
coordination, and management, the rule of law in
this nation cannot endure. VThen justice is denied
to any of our citizens because of faulty adminis
tration, our failure to act becomes i n e x c u s a b l e . 3
Writing American Law:

The Case for Radical Reform

(1969),

John P. Frank, described by Justice Clark as a distinguished
scholar and author, an effective advocate, and a most
successful lawyer and well qualified to speak on the short
comings of our judicial system and to suggest methods for

If we are to have a new agenda . . . in the balance
of this century, we must develop far more radical
ideas than we have been exploring of late.
We
need to reconsider our legal system from the ground
up. We need to develop plans
1. To reconstruct the institutions of the law.
2. To reconstruct the job we expect the law
to do.
3. To reconstruct the way we do that job.
In this speech, Marshall seems to repeat m ajor
premises mentioned

earlier in this

study.

The extent to which

the speaker shifts emphasis and varies support should become
apparent as this discussion proceeds.

^^^Frank, pp. 2-3.
134
Frank, p . x i x .
^^^Frank, pp. 32-33.
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Organization
The disposition of this particular speech will be
explored in terms of the speaker's purpose, his central idea
and structure.
Purp o s e .

Previewing the main points to be covered

in the body of his lecture at Washington University Law
School, Marshall implies that his purpose is to inform.
However, upon close examination one is inclined to assume
that once more the speaker used information to persuade his
listeners to act in accordance with his recommendation which
he makes at the end of this address.

Assuming that the

speaker's purpose met the needs of the audience and the
occasion, it can be considered acceptable.
Central id e a .
idea of this speech,
he said:

Perhaps, Marshall implies the central
"Law and the Quest for Equality," when

"Actually the subject involves several themes:

the synergy of law and social patterns; the promotion of
reform through and by means of existing legal means and
doctrine; and the changing role of a lawyer in society.
Study of this speech reveals that these were the general
topics that Marshall developed in the body of this address.
This information in all probability enabled the audience
to listen intelligently to his message.

Equality," p. 1.
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On the other hand, he makes statements in the con
clusion of this speech which appear to represent his
central idea.

In part, he remarked:

I am sure you will agree that the force of law— its
capacity to initiate and mold change— is a major
force in society, a force which lawyers are most
called upon to shape. From the early days in this
country's history, it has been the traditional
task of lawyers to mediate between principle and
practice, between man's heritage and his h o p e s . 137
But these remarks seem to recapitulate the main points.
Maybe, the speaker decided not to state the central idea ini
tially.
For purpose of this study, it seems that Marshall's
central idea or proposition might be stated as follows:
Historically, and traditionally, lav/s and lawyers have pro
duced far-reaching social changes which coincided with and
created a climate conducive to new legal and social
relationships; the possibilities of social change and legal
reform today are even greater; but we must dedicate our
selves to the task of ensuring equality and justice for all
Americans.

With this in mind, perhaps Marshall decided not

to include a central idea that would be so lengthy.
Structure.

Generally speaking, this speech contains

an introduction, a body, and a conclusion.
Specifically, Marshall's introductory remarks seem
to promote friendliness and respect, to lead into the

Equality," p. 7.
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subject quickly, and to reveal the direction the speech is
going to take.

Of particular importance is the fact that

in this relatively brief introduction, containing about 135
words, Marshall employs common devices for beginning a
speech.

For instance, Marshall refers to a previous speaker

and to the occasion.

Also, the speaker extends an honest

compliment to the audience and establishes common ground
coupled with a personal reference.

For example, Marshall

said:
Dear Lesar, ladies and gentlemen.
I was happy to accept Dean Lesar's invitation
to deliver the nineteenth Tyrrell William Memorial
Lecture.
Unlike your lecturer of last year, I did
not have the pleasure of knowing Professor
Williams; however, from my own experience with
inspiring teachers, I can understand the feeling
which prompted you to establish a lectureship in
the professor's memory, and I hope that I can meet
the standards of those who have occupied this
podium previously.138
Continuing, Marshall identifies the subject of his address
and previews his main points:

"I have defined my subject

as 'Law and the Quest for Equality.'
involves several themes:

Actually the subject

the synergy of law and social

patterns; the promotion of reform through, and by means of,
existing legal means and doctrine; and the changing role of
a lawyer in society.

for Equality," Tyrrell Williams Lecture by Honorable
Thurgood Marshall, Solicitor General of the United States,
St. Louis, Missouri, March 8, 1967, p. 1.
(Mimeographed.)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

294
In terms of word distribution, the body of this
speech consisted of about 3,000 words.

In the body of this

speech, Marshall apparently develops the topics that he
mentioned in the introduction.

However, it seems that this

part of the speech, largely, follows a chronological
pattern.

The following sentence outline reveals how the

main ideas in the body of this speech supported the pre
viously mentioned central idea:
I.

Pertinent cases and legislation during the nine
teenth century disclose legal recognition of
equality for legitimization of inequality.
A.

In the Dred Scott case (1857), the Supreme
Court decided that Scott could not be a
"citizen" of a state within Article III of
the federal Constitution, and that, in any
event, he was not free by his having lived
in free territory because Congress had no
power to deprive slaveowners of "property"
rights by prohibiting slavery in certain
territory.

B.

After much travail and a costly war, the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend
ments were adopted; each of which contained
an innovative provision, giving Congress the
power to enforce the amendments "by appro
priate legislation" . . . which the Recon
struction Congresses exercised in various
civil rights legislation but the Supreme
Court struck down some of those provisions
in the Civil Rights cases in 1883.

C.

In Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the Supreme
Court upheld a state statute prescribing the
racial separation of railroad passengers
within the state; it reasoned that estab
lishing "separate but equal" facilities did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment; the
Court legitimized and gave impetus to the
myriad laws and customs, described as "a p er
vasive, official system of segregation which
carries from cradle to grave. . . ."
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D.

Some indication of hope for the quest for
equality through the courts was evident in
decisions rendered in the Strauder case
(1880), which in effect held unconstitu
tional as state statute prescribing that
white males only could serve on a jury, and
Yick Wo V. Hopkins (1887), which condemned
administrative discrimination against
Chinese as a class.

During the twentieth century equality and
social reform have been promoted largely by
litigation in the courts.
A.

The NAACP's participation in the struggle
for equality and justice was evident in
Quinn V. United States (1915), in w h ich the
grandfather restrictions on voting were
struck down; Buchanan v. Warley (1917), in
which racially restrictive zoning ordinances
were declared unconstitutional; Nixon v.
Herndon (1927), which held state laws
barring Negroes from primary elections to be
a violation of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment; and Moore v.
D empsey, the mob-dominated trial of a Negro
in which the Supreme Court decided that a
new trial must be held.

B.

In the 1930s, NAACP lawyers argued cases for
the elimination of inequality and dis
crimination not without occasional setbacks;
but the Supreme Court continued to rule
against discrimination in the selection of
grand and petit jurors and, in various
ways, to insure the fairness of criminal
proceedings against Negroes ; it struck
down abhorrent police practices, such as the
beating of Negroes suspected of a crime in
order to obtain confessions in Brown v.
Mississippi (1936); in the Scottsboro cases
(1932 and 1935), the Court first ruled that
the trials were unfair because the defend
ants did not have effective assistance of
counsel and later that the trials were
unfair because of discrimination against
Negroes in the selection of juries.

C.

During the next decades. Supreme Court
rulings eliminated discriminatory practices
in numerous aspects of life, including d is
franchisement of Negroes through the
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ingenious white primary (Smith v.
Allri g h t ; 1944), gerrymandering
(Gomillron v. L i g h tfcot; 1960), and other
such schemes; nullifying "sophisticated as
well as simple-minded modes of discrimina
tion" (Lane v. W i l s o n ; 1939) , striking down
peonage laws (Taylor v. Georgia; 1942) ,
maintenance of separate dining cars under
the Interstate Commerce Act (Henderson v.
United States ; 1950), declared enforcement
of racially restrictive covenants to be
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment
(Shelley v. K r a e m e r ; 1948 and Barrows v.
Jackson; 1953), discrimination in higher
education (McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents (1950) .
D.

During the early 1950s, many states had
undertaken to eliminate racial discrimina
tion, and . . . the executive branch of the
federal government had not only supported
the petitioners in several cases but had
affirmatively sought to eliminate d i s 
crimination in the services, in govern
mental employment, and in the insurability
of homes in mixed neighborhoods through FHA,
indicating that the impetus for change
stimulated by . . . things other than the
Court decisions . . . mentioned.

E.

Finally, in the School Segregation Cases
of 1954 and 1955, the Supreme Court held
segregated public education unconstitutional,
eliminating one of the two pillars of the
caste system (the other being disenfranchise
ment) but the decision was not an easy one
to enforce.

F.

The story of the quest for equality does not
end with the School Segregation cases; it
branches out in several directions, most
notably to legislation:
the Civil Rights
Acts of 1957, I960, and 1964, and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.

The role of lawyers in society is changing to
include responsibility for social reform and the
quality of legal services for the poor, which
ensures equality in access to justice.
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A.

Lawyers have a duty in addition to that of
representing their clients; they have a duty
to represent the public, to be social
reformers.

B.

Lawyers can provide the quality of legal
services for the poor, which ensures equality
in access to justice.

Marshall begins this discussion with an historical
background of pertinent cases, social patterns and
legislation which have contributed to the racial discrimina
tion and inequality in America for several centuries.

Next

Marshall discusses endeavors of the NAACP and the three
branches of the government, particularly the judicial
branch, to eliminate discrimination and to promote social
reform from 1915-1967.

Marshall's third main idea asserts

the need for lawyers to become social reformers to ensure
equality in access to justice.

This discussion presumably

strengthens beliefs of the listeners at times and at
other times it seems to attempt to get any undecided
hearers to make up their minds.

The speaker appears to

seek belief and ultimately overt behavior.
Marshall's conclusion seems to meet rhetorical
requirements.

The speaker summarizes the main ideas and

presents a final admonition.

He said:

Some of you may undoubtedly disagree with some
of the recent changes in social patterns and in
the law. Well-considered dissent is, of course,
an intimate part of the process of society.
But I
am sure you will agree that the force of law— its
capacity to initiate change and its flexibility to
accept and mold change— is a major force in
society, a force which lawyers are most often called
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upon to shape.
From the early days in this country's
history, it has been the traditional task of lawyers
to mediate between principle and practice, between
man's heritage and his hopes— that is the message
of Law and the Quest for Equality— and that task and
message we must never f o r g e t . ^^0
It appears that Marshall organized this message with
his purpose in mind.

Further, the speaker arranged his

arguments in a manner that probably contributed significantly
to the listener's ability to understand the message.

It can

be concluded that Marshall's organization fulfilled tradi
tional requirements of rhetoric.
In summary, it is evident that Marshall organized
these speeches in patterns which combine both inductive and
deductive processes.

Further, his lines of argument can be

easily converted into syllogisms.

He demonstrates a prefer

ence for such deductive tools as explanation and restatement.
He also utilized comparison and causal inference.

Among

the conclusions which can be drawm from close examination of
Marshall's support,

Lbe first is that he was determined to

convince his listeners that equality and justice under law
for all Americans is a realistic goal; the second is that
lawyers must assume the largest responsibility for
guaranteeing equality and justice for all.
Logical Appeals
This section will examine M arshall's reasoning and
evidence in his lecture before law students and lawyers in

^^^U.S. Department of Justice,
for Equality," p. 7.

"Law and the Quest
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St. Louis, Missouri.

To analyze his reasoning, three

hypothetical syllogisms can be constructed:
(Major Premise)

(Minor Premise)
(Conclusion)

(Major Premise)

(Minor Premise)

(Conclusion)
(Major Premise)

(Minor Premise)
(Conclusion)

If Supreme Court decisions for
decades largely legitimized
inequality, some Americans, partic
ularly Negroes, did not enjoy
equality and justice under law.
Supreme Court decisions for decades
largely legitimized inequality.
Some Americans, particularly Negroes,
did not enjoy equality and justice
under law.
If litigation and Supreme Court deci
sions during recent decades changed
some racially discriminatory laws
and practices, segregation and dis
crimination in some areas have been
diminished. .
Litigation and Supreme Court deci
sions during recent decades changed
some racially discriminatory laws
and practices.
Segregation and discrimination in
some areas have been diminished.
If equality and justice under law
must be achieved, lawyers must
assume responsibility for social
reform and the quality of legal
services for the poor, which
ensures equality in access to
justice.
Equality and justice under law must
be achieved.
Lawyers must assume responsibility
for social reform and the quality of
legal services for the poor, which
ensures equality in access to
justice.

In each of the above hypothetical syllogisms, the
minor premise affirms the antecedent and the conclusion
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affirms the consequent.

Accordingly, the syllogistic

reasoning can be considered valid.
Now, we analyze the forms of support.

This section

will deal with the nature of the evidence Marshall pre
sented and the effectiveness of that evidence.
Typically, when addressing lawyers and law students,
Marshall cites legal cases and explains circumstances to
support his contentions.

This practice is apparent in the

speaker's address at Washington University.

For example,

offering proof that for decades Supreme Court decisions
largely legitimized inequality, Marshall refers to three
specific cases.

He remarks that in the Bred Scott case

(1857) the Supreme Court ruled that Scott could not be a
"citizen" of a state within Article III of the Constitu
tion and that he was not free by having lived in free
territory because Congress did not have power to deprive
slaveowners of "property" rights by prohibiting slavery in
certain territory.

He added in the Civil Rights Cases

(1883), the Supreme Court struck down some provisions of
the Civil War Amendments which "tolled the death-knell"
for civil rights legislation but by this time "the act had
already fallen into desuetude."

In Plessy v. Ferguson

(1896) the Supreme Court upheld a state statute prescribing
the racial segregation of railroad passengers within the
state, reasoning that establishing "separate but equal"
facilities did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.

The

speaker documents thoroughly the impact of Plessy quoting
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from L. Poliak's The Constitution and the Supreme Court,
C.

Vann Woodward's The Strange Career of Jim C r o w , brief

for the United States as Amicus Curiae . . . Griffin v.
Maryland

(1963) and Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy,

and finally asserts:

"But Plessy marks the nadir of con

stitutional protection for minorities.
To support his second contention about the quest
for equality through the courts, Marshall refers to the
Strauder case

(1880) which in effect held unconstitutional

a state statute prescribing that only white males could
serve on juries and Yick Wo v. Hopkins

(1886) which con

demned administrative discrimination against Chinese as a
class.

To prove that in the twentieth century the quest

for equality has proceeded largely through the courts with
some victories and some defeats, Marshall cites practically
every legal case and court decision.
legislative acts and executive orders.

He also mentions
Arguing inductively,

perhaps, the speaker assumed that if he built a pre
ponderance of instances his conclusions would be inevitable.
This method of argument is familiar to lawyers and law
students.

The speaker's success as a trial lawyer

certainly verifies his skill with this and other methods
of argument.

His evidence probably led his listeners to

share his conclusion.

^^^Thurgood Marshall, "Law and the Quest for
Equality," Washingto.i University Law Quarterly, 1:1-3,
1967.
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Having offered proof that the Negro who was once
enslaved by law and emancipated by law is achieving equality
through it, he adds that "law is often in response to social
change; but Brown v. Board of Education demonstrates law
also can change social patterns.

Provided it is adequately

enforced, law can change things for the better.

. . ."^42

To prove his final contention again Marshall argues
from circumstantial detail, he employs rhetorical questions
and he adds his authoritative opinion.

The following

passage illustrates his method of argument.
The lawyer has often been seen by minorities,
including the poor, as part of the oppressors in
society.
Landlords, loan sharks, businessmen
specializing in shady installment credit schemes—
all are represented by counsel on a fairly permanent
basis.
But who represents and speaks for tenants,
borrowers, and consumers? Many special interest
groups have permanent associations with retained
counsel who seek and sponsor advantageous legisla
tion.
But who represents and speaks for the sub
stantial segment of the populace that such
legislation might disadvantage? Outside of the
political processes, I think the answer is clear.
Lawyers have a duty in addition to that of repre
senting their clients; they have a duty to be social
reformers in however small a way.
The cases I have mentioned show what can be done
by private lawyers through the courts. And the
possibilities of social change and reform today are
even greater.
The lawyer's image as solely the pro
tector of vested interests is changing.
For years the bar responded to the need for
legal services for the poor through legal aid, but
even the most ardent supporters of the legal aid
movement never claimed that the needs of the poor
were fully met.
Now we have at hand the tools with

^^^Thurgood Marshall,
Equality," p. 8.

"Law and the Quest for
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which to provide those services in an organized and
more complete way. . . . Like any reform
scheme . . . the success . . . is directly related
to the quality of people, especially the lawyers,
who become active in it. . . . It involves the
quest for equality, no longer racial, but rather
equality in access to justice.143
The specific instances were probably considered
sufficient, typical, and reliable.
data and testimony were identified.

The sources of historical
The testimony came

from authority that was experienced in the field, known to
the audience, and well qualified to discuss it.

In all

probability, the evidence proved the points and won the
audience's acceptance.
Emotional Appeals
In this lecture some emotional appeals are evident
also.

It should be remembered that without distorting or

vitiating the integrity of his ideas, practical wisdom
often decrees that speakers expound their views with fore
thought of the emotional makeup of the audience.
Specifically, Marshall made emotional appeals to 1) consti
tutional and egalitarian ideals; 2) professional pride and
social responsibility; and 3) justice and fair play.
Marshall's appeal to constitutional and egalitarian
ideals can be illustrated.

Having presented an historical

narrative of practically all noteworthy cases involving the
quest for equality through the courts, Marshall said:

Equality," pp. 8-9.
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Moreover, these cases do not appear in
Shepard *s Citations with an asterisk to limit their
precedential value to race relations.
They concern
us as lawyers, lay professors, citizens, and
government officials because the principles they
announce quite transcend the immediate controversy
which occasioned them.
Thus, Powell v. A l a b a m a , the
first Scottsboro case, gave rise to an important
principle in the administration of justice announced
finally in Gideon v. Wainwrighty the due process
right to a fair trial includes representation by
counsel and the appointment thereof for the
defendant who cannot afford to retain counsel.
The
same is true, of course, of the early coerced con
fession cases; they too have spawned many offspring.
In short, these decisions go far to prove the truth
of Dean Pound 's statement that what he called
"justice according to law" . . . insures that the
more valuable interests, social and individual, will
not be sacrificed to immediate interests w hich are
more obvious and pressing but of less real
weight.144
Another example illustrates the speaker's practice ; it also
seems to appeal to the sense of justice and fair play;
Gratified by the ad hoc victories but dissatisfied
in its quest for equality, the organization
[NAACP] decided that it would press on every pos
sible front for the elimination of inequality and
discrimination.
The means selected was through use
of the courts, partially because other avenues of
redress appeared to be closed, and partially
because of the deep and abiding faith the planners
had in the rule of law, and the efficacy and
feasibility of instigating social reform through
reliance upon the Constitution— which after all was
designed to insure the protection of the basic
values of our society.145
Marshall's speeches also included appeals to social
responsibility.

For example, he says that the quest for

^^'^Thurgood Marshall,
Equality," p. 8.

"Law and the Quest for

^'^^Thurg
Equality," pp. 3-4.
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equality is an ongoing search, "as our ideas and hopes are
transmitted into reality.”
President Lyndon Johnson:

He added remarks made by
"For the work that lies ahead is

demanding, and involves far too many lives in urgent need of
help, to be parceled out by race.

Tomorrow's problems . . .

will not be divided into "Negro problems" and "white prob
lems ."

There will be only human problems and more than

enough to go around.
Of particular importance is the fact that in
Marshall's addresses to law students and members of the legal
profession he repeated the following appeal to the
listeners' professional pride and social responsibility.

In

this connection, Marshall said:
I am sure all agree that the force of law— its
capacity to initiate change and its flexibility
to accept and mold change— is a major force in
society, a force which lawyers are most often
called upon to shape.
From the early days in this
country's history, it has been the traditional task
of lawyers to mediate between principle and prac
tice, between man's heritage and his hopes— that
is the message of the Law and the Quest for Equality—
and that task and message we must never forget.
Orators frequently furnish their listeners with
pathetic proof.

Pathetic proof employed as adjuncts to,

not substitutes for, reason can be considered appropriate.

Equality," p. 5.
^"^^Thurgood
Marshall,
^^^Thurg
Equality," p. 7.

"Law and the Quest for
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Indeed pathetic proof is often essential to induce
belief and to produce action.

It is suitable to assume

that the preceding examples of Marshall's pathetic proof
meet these requirements.
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CHAPTER VI
STYLE AND DELIVERY
Analysis of oratory must give some attention to the
speaker's style and delivery.

This chapter examines

Marshall's style and delivery with particular emphasis on
the five speech situations treated in this study.
Style
Classical rhetoricians refer to style as elocutio.
As a part of rhetoric, elocutio refers largely to the way
in which the speaker clothed his ideas with language.^
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden establish the essential components
of style as follows;

"An effective style— that is, one

capable of preparing and opening the minds of the listeners
for a particular subject— depends upon a speaker's having
(1) an idea worth presenting,
conception of the idea,

(2) an unmistakably clear

(3) a desire to communicate it,

(4)

a willingness to adapt it to a particular set of circum
stances, and

(5) a mastery of language adequate to express

Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo W.
Braden, Speech Criticism (2d e d . ; New York:
Ronald Press
Company, 1970), p. 489.
^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 515.
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public address and rhetoric summarize the chief means of
enhancing style as communication:

"There are two sets of

materials which are more likely to open the listeners* minds
to the ideas of the speaker:
clearness, and

(1) elements that make for

(2) elements that make for impressiveness in

discourse.
This section deals with the elements of clarity,
correctness, vividness, and appropriateness which reveal
significant features of the speaker's style.
Marshall probably enhanced the clarify of his
speeches when he employed specific historical facts and
figures.

This stylistic endeavor was impressive when he

traced the history of the struggle for equality in America
from the seventeenth century to the mid-twentieth century.
Marshall's thorough knowledge or familiarity with
the content of his messages apparently promoted the clarity
of his speeches.

The first black Solicitor General of the

United States, who was chief NAACP lawyer for more than
twenty years and a federal judge for four years, spoke about
matters related to his personal and professional expe
riences.
Of particular importance is Marshall's perceptive
word selection and types of examples.

His words before

Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech
Criticism:
The Development of Standards for Rhetorical
Appraisal (New York:
Ronald Press Company, 1948) , p. 430.
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general audiences were distinctively different from words
selected for audiences made up of lawyers and law students.
Addressing the latter, Marshall's vocabulary reflected his
exceptional legal mind.

For example, in these speeches he

discusses the Court's posture interpreting, or reinterpret
ing, that guarantee of the First Amendment protecting the
right to criticize the status quo.

Also, Marshall asserts:

"Through its power of invalidation, the Supreme Court has
wrought fundamental change in the structure of our
society.Further,

Marshall explains the contrast between

this use of the power of invalidation and that which con
fronted the early welfare and New Deal legislation.
Marshall also contends that "Powell v. Alabama
. . . and Brown v. Mississippi

(297 U.S. 278

(287 U.S. 45)

(1936)— these

two decisions heralded a new Supreme Court supervision
radically reforming the State criminal processes.

..."

Explaining that courts had traditionally initiated and
effectuated judicial reform of the judicial process,
Marshall remarks : "For example, those protesting against the
imposition of the new exclusionary rules often overlook the
hearsay rule, a massive judge-created exclusionary rule
designed to protect less worthy interest than constitutional
rights."^

Commenting on the unique facet of this reform

(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5980.
^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5981.
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and the constitutional principle upon which these decisions
are based, Marshall refers to the "doctrine of stare
decisis" and the "Due Process Clause."

Marshall's selec

tion of words and use of examples can be illustrated in the
following passage:
Even though, as a national proposition, we have
moved a long way from those initial outrages p e r 
ceived in Brown v. Mississippi and Powell v.
A l a b a m a , gross imperfections still remain, if the
standard of judgment is contemporary communal
values.
Pre-arraignment procedures in the station
house; bail; pretrial publicity; the right to a
speedy trial; pretrial discovery; the admission of
evidence dealing with the accused's prior criminal
record; the right to counsel in specialized
proceedings, such as collateral attacks, commitment
proceedings, and revocation-of-parole proceedings.
These are just some of the areas that will come
under particular scrutiny in the years to come,
and the areas in which radical reform will take
place.6
Perhaps it should be added that Marshall used phrases such
as follows:

"as a national p r o p o s i t i o n , " a s a general

p r o p o s i t i o n , a n d "as a logical p r o p o s i t i o n . F o r
example, speaking of the necessity to reform the criminal
process, Marshall remarks :
While, hopefully, only a minority of the population
would come in contact with law enforcers, this
enterprise could hardly be considered specialized:
as a logical proposition all citizenry was

^ U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), CXIII, No. 140, 24644.
^Ibid.
®U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5980.
^ U . S ., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24644.
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susceptible to the abuses, for it was impossible
to insure against being included in the minority,
and the enforcement of criminal laws is one of the
most direct or immediate confrontations between
the individual and the state.10
Mar s h a l l 's speeches to general audiences contained
little legal terminology which is replete in his speeches
to lawyers and law students.

On the other hand, it appears

that Marshall used words that are familiar when addressing
general audiences.

His words seemed to convey their

intended meaning as accurately as possible.
It has been mentioned that Marshall frequently used
long sentences.

According to Jamye Williams, "He uses a

large number of long,

loose sentences.

His transitions,

nevertheless, are especially clear and well defined.
On the other hand,

it should be added that the speaker's

transitions contribute to the coherence of the message.
Often, Marshall's assertions are cumulative.

For example,

at the Indianapolis Housing Conference he said:

"There are

some people, and we should never forget or ignore it, who
would say 'Yes, that can be suitable living environment. '
And then there are some who really haven't thought about it
because, they believe,

it doesn't affect them.

Finally,

there are those who know, without doubt or reservation, that

Jamye Coleman Williams, "A Rhetorical Analysis of
Thurgood Marshall's Arguments Before the Supreme Court in
the Public School Segregation Controversy" (PhD disserta
tion, Ohio State University, 1959), p. 199.
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such an environment is suitable neither for the individual
nor for the coinmunity."

In the same speech we find further

evidence of Marshall's transitions:
Surely then, this . . . separation of one
group, one race, from another [must be]
repaired. . . .
To do that requires. . . .
And to do that, we must. . . .
First of these. . . .
And with these factors established. . . .
If we are to succeed in this effort. . . .
Discussing Marshall's sentence structure in Brown v.
Board of Education, Jamye C. Williams notes :
His sentences which, when transcribed, appear long
and involved obviously were effective when
delivered. . . .
An examination of Marshall's
sentences revealed that some of them are extremely
short, being merely answers to the interrogations
of the judges; others are inordinately long,
following the pattern of conversation.
That the
sentences, short and long, satisfy the criterion
of clearness is evidenced by the Justices' indica
tion that they comprehend his argument. Mr.
Marshall's answers to the interrogations, with his
now simple, now diffuse style, show the meeting
and the understanding of legal m i n d s .13
Making an "overall evaluation" of Marshall's style, Williams
concludes:

"It is, according to Aristotelian standards,

both clear and appropriate.

Clearness was secured through

diction, the collocation of words, and the embellishment.
Marshall's suiting of his language— its proportion and
emotion— to the occasion also contributed to his effective-

89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No.

101, A3319.

^^Williams, pp. 179-180

^^Williams, p. 183.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Marshall frequently used specific instances to
support general statements.

For example, he said:

It was the Northern states that did much to deny
free Negroes their rights after the Civil War. . . .
A mob drove eight Negroes out of Portsmouth,
Ohio. . . . Bands of whites in Cincinnati took the
law in their own hands and ran out of the city
those Negroes who did not have the bonds required
by law.
In New York state, there were riots in
Utica, Palmyra, and New York City. . . .
In 1834,
a mob of whites marched down into the Negro section
of Philadelphia and committed numerous acts of
violence.
They wrecked the African Presbyterian
Church, burned homes, and . . . beat up several
Negroes.
Often Marshall tried to clarify abstract concepts
by including parenthetical expressions:

"The force of

law— its capacity to initiate change and its flexibility
to accept and mold change— is a major force in society.
Parenthetical remarks frequently provided the audience
additional information as follows:

"Two years later— again

at the urging of the Solicitor General, who took issue with
I.C.C.— the Supreme Court outlawed segregation in railroad
dining cars.

"Address of Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall,
Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To Fulfill
These Rights" (Washington:
Government Printing Office,
1966), p. 43.
^^Thurgood Marshall, "Law and the Quest for
Equality," Washington University Law Quarterly, 1:9,
Winter, 1967.
"Address of Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall,
Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To Fulfill
These Rights," p. 51.
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Marshall's speeches contained accurate grammar and
acceptable sentence structure with only a few exceptions.
Each speech included a suitable mixture of simple, compound,
complex, and compound-complex sentences which added variety.
Lengthy sentences were followed by short sentences.

The

shortest sentence contained only three words, while the
longest sentence contained eighty-eight words.

Each speech

revealed a predominance of complex sentences, illustrated
in the following paragraph:
If we are to fulfill these rights, if we are
promptly and effectively to bridge the gap between
theory and practice, we must first realize fully
the depth of the problem of racial prejudice and
discrimination in this country.
There are today
two groups of Americans sincerely interested in
the problems.
One group believes we have made
tremendous progress in the last two decades and
thinks little more is needed— that, given time,
the problem will solve itself.
The other group
recognizes the progress that has been made, yet
views the present achievement as no more than a
firm base from which to launch the final attack on
the causes of racial and religious prejudice.
Both
groups need to pause for a consideration of the
background history of this p r o b l e m . 18
The speaker incorporated figurative language which
enhanced the vividness and the forcefulness of his ideas.
For example, he said:

"Perhaps there were some who

philosophized that since things could not get w o r s e , they
would get better.

But they were wrong.

This was a dark

"Address of Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall,
Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To Fulfill
These Rights," p. 39.
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hour indeed; yet a blacker night would come, and the sun
would not come out for a very long time.
Marshall frequently employed questions that prob
ably helped direct the listeners' attention to a specific
phase of his subject.

In each case the question was

followed by a clear and concise answer.

This stylistic

device contributed to the overall vividness of each speech.
Within a single paragraph, he posed three questions:
what relevance is all of this to my second theme :
of lawyers in society?

. . .

"Of

the role

Landlords, loan sharks,

businessmen specializing in shady installment schemes— all
are represented by counsel.

. . .

But who represents and

speaks for tenants, borrowers, and consumers?

. . .

But

who represents and speaks for the substantial segment of
the populace that such legislation might disadvantage?
I think the answer is clear.

Lawyers have a duty.

. . .

. . .

They have a duty to represent the public, to be social
reformers.

. .

Other examples of figurative language characterized
Marshall's speeches.

He often employed terms such as:

"struck do w n ;" "the darkest days;" "outlawed;" "dead
letter;" and "kindled a flame."

Vivid expressions were

"Address of Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall,
Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To Fulfill
These Rights," p. 47.
^^Marshall, "Law and the Quest for Equality,"
Washington University Law Quarterly, pp. 8-9.
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included:

"These decisions were a long time bearing

fruit;" "disfranchising laws . . . separating races from
cradle to grave;" "massive resistance;" "The

New Deal

[did not] bring dramatic relief;" "The Negro

could

not .. .

appreciate . . . being dealt a new h a n d ;" "Again, he seemed
. . . left out of the d e a l ; " T h e
at least
and

in 1954,

Supreme Court served,

. . . as a voice of communal conscience;

"two worlds were being set up within the same

democracy."23
Another significant aspect of M a rshall’s style
was his appropriate use of a quotation to stress an
important point.

To emphasize the importance of the Brown

decision, the speaker remarked to general audiences that one
author called the day of that decision "That

Great

Up Morning.

this

Marshall quoted excerpt from

Gettin’

spiritual:
There's a better day a ’ cornin'
Fare thee well, fare thee well.
In that great gettin' up morning
Fare thee well, fare thee w e l l . 25

"Address by Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall,"
Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To Fulfill
These Rights," pp. 44-51.
^^Thurgood Marshall, "The Constitution and Social
Change," Federal Bar N e w s , September, 1965, p. 287.
^^U.S., Congressional Rec o r d , 90th Cong.,
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24632.

1st Sess.

^^Marshall, "Law and the Quest for Equality,"
Washington University Law Quarterly, p. 6.

^^Ibid.
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Addressing audience of lawyers and law students, Marshall
occasionally quoted Supreme Court Justices.

He quoted

President Lyndon Johnson in his speech to the Federal Bar
Association.

Marshall concluded by quoting Thomas

Jefferson.
In his Chicago speech, Marshall also employs per
sonification.

Commenting on Supreme Court decisions which

marked a new era in First Amendment doctrine, Marshall
observes:

"The first amendment's protective cloak was

spread wide enough to safeguard the right to criticize from
suppressive actions of the s t a t e s . I n

this speech, one

finds additional examples of Marshall's capacity to employ
imagery and vivid language.

For instance, Marshall

described the effect of recent Supreme Court decisions:
"What crumbled was not merely a network of legal rules; it
was a whole social system bent on keeping the Negroes in a
position of inferiority, a social system which relied on
and was inspired by the Jim Crow laws.

Segregation was con

stitutionally condemned, and it was thus stripped of all
moral p r e d i c a t e s . F u r t h e r ,

addressing the Federal Bar

Association, Marshall contends :

"One of the most dis

tinguished features of American society is that it began
with a bang, not a whimper— with a revolution packed with

^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5980.

^^Ibid.
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economic, social, and political significance."^®

Dis

cussing practices of deliberate racial discrimination in
America prior to the 1930s, Marshall says:

"Whether by

action of the states or inaction by the federal government,
they both recognized two classes of citizens divided by
color— two worlds within o n e . M a r s h a l l ' s

first speech as

Solicitor General of the United States before the Annual
Convention of the Federal Bar Association contains an
illustration of the speaker's ability to utilize the simile.
For example, Marshall begins his address on "The Constitu
tion and Social Change" as follows:

"The recent history of

the Supreme Court is, in one respect, like a contemporary
abstract p a i n t i n g . I n

this same speech, Marshall remarks

that the Supreme Court's efforts to ensure equality and
justice, specifically in terms of reforming criminal pro
cesses, have been evident for about thirty years but most
recent decisions indicate that the Court's involvement has
greater intensity.

Figuratively, Marshall adds:

"The

brush strokes have been getting broader and broader, and the
result has been, in my opinion, to prove anachronisms which
have no place in our society. «31

2®Ibid., A5979.
^^U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24644.

30]U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5979.
^^U.S., Congressional Record,
(1965), CXI, No. 198, A5978).

89th Cong., 1st Sess.
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Marshall seems to have a penchant for parallelism.
Evidence of this particular aspect of his style can be
found in speeches to lay and legal audiences.

For example,

speaking to the Indianapolis Housing Conference, Marshall
observes the scope of inadequate housing:
problem just of the poor.
the Negro.

. . .

. . .

"It is not a

It is not a problem just of

It is not a problem of a particular

religious or nationality group.

..."

Commenting on the

"varying and divergent assessments about housing— its
adequacy, its ready accessibility by all, its character and
quality," Marshall repeats "there are those. . . . "

Each

speech contained evidence of interrogation which seems to
be a favorite construction.
said:

In his Indianapolis address he

"Let us assume that all housing in our urban areas

met the standard of decency
of 1949]."

Then he queried:

[guaranteed in the Housing Act
"Would we then have satisfied

our goals, even though some— a very sizeable some— would be
restricted to certain areas by deliberate design, confined
to a section not by choice but by influence beyond their
own desire and will, prohibited, as if by law of apartheid,
from, the exercise of freedom, of mobility, which is a right
enjoyed and utilized by others with varying degrees of
flexibility?"^^

Presumably, these devices helped him to

maintain interest and to promote clarity.

Probably, the most

^^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.
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impressive effect of this device was its appropriateness to
the speaker, the audience, the subject, and the occasion.
In his speeches to legal audiences, some of the
cases cited included:

"Dred Scott case;" "Civil Rights

Cases" of 1883; "Plessy v. Ferguson;" Strauder case;"
Yick V. Hopkins;" "Guinn v. United States;" "School Segrega
tion Cases ;" "Brown v. M ississippi;" "Scottsboro cases;"
"Powell V . Alabama;" and "Gideon v. Wainwright.

On the

other hand, M a r shall’s speeches to general audiences did
not include these citations.

Addressing general audiences

or listeners who are law students and/or members of the
legal profession, Marshall seems to impart knowledge,
judgment, or counsel for the benefit of his hearers and to
present material within their comprehension, phrased inlanguage they could understand.
Each speech appears stylistically similar in that
specific features of clarity, correctness, vividness, and
appropriateness were evident.

Marshall's oral style seems

to have been well-suited to the speaker, his purpose, his
message, his audience, and the occasion.

He used language

that was consistent wit h his education, status, profession,
and the listeners' expectations.

One might conclude that

^^Marshall, "Law and the Quest for Equality,"
Washington University L aw Quarterly, pp. 2-8.
^^Bower Aly and Lucile Folse Aly, A Rhetoric of
Public Speaking (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1973), p. 110.
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these elements of style m e t the requirements of effective
oral style and contributed significantly to the liste n er s '
understanding and overall impact of each message.
Delivery
This section examines significant aspects of
Marshall's delivery that enhanced his communicativeness.
His method of presentation, appearance, bodily action, and
vocal characteristics are considered.
Newspaper articles abo u t the five speeches of this
study contained no specific references to Marshall's
delivery.

However, information about his activities as legal

defense counsel for the NAACP, comments by persons who
observed him in other speech situations during the fifties
and sixties, and the texts of five selected speeches p r o 
vide important information.
A colleague remarked that Marshall's cases and
speeches were prepared wit h habitual thoroughness.^^

Sub

stantial evidence supports the fact that Marshall believed
in being well-prepared when he argued a case or delivered a
speech.

These factors p r obably enhanced his effectiveness.
As legal counsel for the NAACP, Marshall frequently

addressed local chapters and other groups around the
country.

Most of his speeches dealt with the struggle for

Alexandria, Louisiana, September 21, 1978.
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equality and justice.

Marshall was acclaimed as a brilliant

and successful lawyer who devoted most of his career to the
legal struggle for civil r i g h t s . T h o r o u g h l y familiar with
his subject, Marshall did not need to rely heavily upon
notes or manuscript.
Reliable sources provide additional evidence that
Marshall delivered his speeches without a manuscript.
Columnists testified at confirmation hearings when Marshall
was nominated to be Solicitor General of the United States
that Marshall did not use a manuscript.

While addressing

local chapters of the NAACP in several states, Marshall's
secretary reports that he usually spoke from notes.
The texts of Marshall's speeches provide clues about
his delivery.

The White House Conference text suggests

that he probably utilized a manuscript for part of his
historical review "of the struggle for racial equality in
this country,"

which covered three centuries.

Marshall

acknowledged his indebtedness to the well-known historian
John Hope r-anklin for materials "up to 1900"^^ as mentioned

Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Thurgood Marshall
to Be Solicitor General of the United S t ates, Hearing, 89th
Congress, 1st Sess., July 29, 1965 (Washington:
Government
Printing Office, 1965), pp. 8-9.
Telephone conversation
Secretary to Thurgood Marshall, NAACP Director-Counsel,
November 5, 1977.
"Address by Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall,"
Major Addresses at the White House Conference "To Fulfill
These Rights," p. 39.

^^Ibid.
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earlier in this study.

The speaker's message to each

audience, lay or professional, contained ideas and issues he
addressed often.

It seems safe to assume that Marshall's

experiences and knowledge prepared him to deliver most of
each speech extemporaneously.
Several aspects of Marshall's appearance were sig
nificant.

His distinguished and commanding presence

impressed audiences.

In June of 1967, a Washington reporter

described Marshall as "an immensely attractive fellow and
c h a r m i n g . P h o t o g r a p h s of Marshall taken during the
sixties reveal that he was tall, well-groomed, and handsome.
Sidney Zion, New York Times columnist, noted:

"The six-

foot-two jurist insists that his weight has remained steady
daring the past five years— between two hundred and two
hundred ten.
thick.

While not exactly fat, Marshall is comfortably

The National Review noted that "he is affable,

outgoing, an highly attractive human being.

One senator

remarked that Marshall had an "almost occult power over the

'^°U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judi
ciary, Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, Executive Report
No. 13, 90th Congress, 1st Sess., August 21, 1967
(Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1967) , p. 45.
^^Sidney E. Zion, "Thurgood Marshall Takes a New
'Tush-Tush' Job," The New York Times Magazine, August 22,
1965, p. 69.
^^James T. Kilpatrick, "Term's End," National
Review, July 25, 1967, p. 804.
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Supreme C o u r t . M a r s h a l l ' s

appearance and personality

probably contributed to the overall effectiveness of his
delivery.

Rhetoricians agree that these factors often

"figure prominently in the judgments of men.
Marshall's legal training and his public speaking
experiences seem to have equipped him to use appropriate
bodily action to reinforce his message.

Eric sevareid,

observing Marshall on several occasions in 1960, reported
that Marshall's greatness was manifested "in every expres
sion and g e s t u r e . M e m b e r s of Louisiana audiences
remarked that he maintained good eye contact and used a
variety of gestures to emphasize his ideas.

They noted that

he moved from one side of the lectern to the other side as
he talked.

Occasionally, he clasped his hands behind his

back as he walked.

Sometimes,

introducing a quotation or

a list of facts, he removed note cards from his pocket.
This device is commonly used by speakers to heighten the
importance and the accuracy of the material cited.

Lerone

Bennett, Jr., Johnson Publishing Company editor, observed
Marshall numerous times when Marshall addressed NAACP

^ R a n d a l l Bland, Private Pressure on Public Law
(Port Washington, New York:
Kennikat Press, 1973),
p. 116.
^"^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 525.

Louisiana, October

25, 1977.
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chapters around the country.

Bennett noted:

"He dramatized

litigation, made it understandable and gave Negroes a new
vision of battle.

Because of him, the Fourteenth Amendment

became as real and meaningful to Lennox Avenue as the cop
on the beat.

. . .

The man . . . made the Supreme Court

comprehensible to Lennox Avenue, and Lennox Avenue com
prehensible to the Supreme C o u r t . " '

Similarly, Jamye C.

Williams, who was a member of the audiences when Marshall
delivered a speech at Central State College and a speech
in Miami, Florida, in 1956^® wrote the following comment on
the speaker's bodily activity:
As to his bodily action, one observes, first of all,
his excellent eye contact.
He is both physically
and mentally direct.
While he does not gesticulate
unduly, he makes one aware of his expressive hand
movements.
The manner in which Marshall walks to
the platform . . . shows that he is poised, selfconfident, and in control of his physical
machinery.
His facial expressions connote clearly
the mood and the emotion of his words.
On the
whole . . . Thurgood Marshall's delivery is
characterized by coordinated use of the voice and
the body.49
Numerous news articles acknowledge Marshall's
exceptional vocal skills.

The National Review noted that

in court he was a r t i c u l a t e . E r i c

Sevareid observed that

History of the Negro in America 1619-1966 (Chicago:
Johnson Publishing Company, 1966), p. 310.
^^Williams, p. 208.
^^Williams, p. 186.
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Marshall was impressive "in everything he s a i d . Time
Magazine disclosed that he argued law "in meticulously
scholarly tones" and that he was "equally comfortable drawl
ing Negro d i a l e c t . S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,

his St. Louis lecture

included one quotation w i t h Negro dialect.

In many speech

situations, listeners observed that Marshall varied his
pitch, rate, volume, and quality to suit the message, the
audience, the speaker, and the occasion.

Marshall's clear

and distinct articulation probably fulfilled the audience's
expectations.

His education and professional experiences

very likely contributed to his correct pronunciation.
Listeners report that he used distinct articulation and
correct pronunciation when he addressed Texas college
students and Louisiana e d u c a t o r s . A m o n g others. United
States Congressman Andrew Jacobs describes Marshall's
speech in Indianapolis as "eloquent.
Having observed Marshall's delivery of speeches at
Central State College, April 14, 1956, and at the A.M.E.
General Conference, Miami, Florida, May, 1956, Jamye C.

^^Bland, p. 117.
^^"The Supreme C o u r t :
June 23, 1967, p. 18.

Negro Justice," T i m e ,

Interview w ith Dr. J. K. Haynes, former Executive
Secretary of the Louisiana Education Association, October,
1976.
^^U.S., Congressional R e c o r d , 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No. 101, A3319.
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Williams makes the following comment about the speaker's
vocal skills:
His voice is deep and resonant, there being no
irritating qualities to distract the listeners.
The resonance of t'Ir. Marshall's voice results in
appropriate volume for the occasion, the room, and
the speech itself. Not only is the volume ade
quate, but also is his speech distinct.
One
notices too that Marshall's voice possesses emo
tional color which reveals him as now earnest and
impassioned, now ironic and indignant.
His genuine
feelings seem to permeate his voice to such an
extent that a responsive chord is struck with the
audience.
The tempo of his speech is usually slow
and deliberate.
One may note particularly the
restrained way in which he is able to handle emo
tionally loaded material. Mr. Marshall's use of
variations in force aids him in effectively com
municating his ideas.55
Marshall apparently possessed the knowledge and the
ability to use a variety of vocal techniques appropriately.
His vocal skills probably enhanced his effectiveness in
the speech situation.
Substantial evidence supports the fact that
delivering addresses to general audiences and to audiences
consisting of lawyers and law students Marshall fulfilled
the traditional standards of rhetorical effectiveness.
In each speech situation, Marshall probably gained and
maintained the attention of his audience.

Marshall's theme

was clearly established and his main points were valid
and supported with an abundance of evidence.

As pointed out

earlier, his method of delivery was chiefly extemporaneous
and his vocal skills were varied and appropriate.

The

55,’williams, pp. 185-186.
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structure of each speech m et the technical requirements of
rhetoric as noted earlier in this study.
Although it is impossible to estimate the exact
number of listeners persuaded by Marshall's message, it is
safe to assume that Marshall communicated his ideas
effectively.

It has been reported that before the Federal

Bar Association Marshall "delivered a stimulating interpre
tation of recent Supreme Court d e c i s i o n s , A s a speaker,
Marshall apparently demonstrated that he possessed vision
and the capacity to understand the meaning of current
happenings.

Also, he possessed integrity and revealed the

social utility of his message in each speech situation.
In part, a speaker's greatness is measured in terms of his
ability to foresee the effects of a contemporary action
upon the destinies of men.

Marshall's speeches demon

strated his perception, his competence, and his overall
effectiveness as an orator.

In fact, it has been noted

that few living individuals have had greater effect than
Marshall on the social fabric of America.

Program Reaches New High," Federal Bar N e w s , October, 1965,
p. 339.
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CHAPTER vll
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study has been to examine,
analyze, and evaluate five speeches delivered by Thurgood
Marshall during his tenure as Solicitor General of the
United States 1965-1967.
In appraising Marshall's advocacy of equality and
justice for all, it seems desirable to consider two broad
but poignant questions:

(1) What kind of man was he? and

(2) What is the overall effectiveness of his speakir._,?
Thurgood Marshall's career as Solicitor General was
highlighted by his unparalleled number of legal victories
before the Supreme Court, earning him the title, "The
Court's Tenth Member."^

Perhaps of greatest significance

is the fact that Marshall's speeches outside the courtroom
afforded him impetus as a speaker of national prominence.
Throughout most of Thurgood Marshall's career,
Americans had little difficulty perceiving his role in the
American Negro's struggle to secure equality and justice.
His name was synonymous with civil rights.

His speeches and

press statements reflect his philosophy and commitment to
equal justice for all.

^U.S., Congressional Re c o r d , 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No- 32, A985.
329
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By the time Marshall became Solicitor General he
had won acclaim and respect for his skill as a trial
lawyer possessing a "brilliant and forceful mind w i t h few
peers in the legal profession,"^ and his knowledge of and
contributions to constitutional law.

Marshall w a s "a man

whose work symbolized and spearheaded the struggle of
millions of Americans for equality before the l a w . F o r
example, as Director-Counsel of the NAACP he became
synonymous with their legal attacks on inequality and
injustice in America.

Perhaps, it should be added that

Marshall attributes "his passion for argument and his ability
at it to his father. "

It has been frequently reported that

Marshall was born into "a naturally argumentative family,
in fact, and one used to fighting for its ri ghts .

As a

law student at Howard University, he accepted the challenge
to become a "social engineer."

These experiences

apparently shaped his overall conduct and philosophy.
Obviously, his attitudes and convictions must be considered
as determinants in structuring his pattern of life.

For

instance, his concern for the human element seems to take

ciary. Nomination of Thurgood Marshall to Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearing, 90th
Congress, 1st Sess., July 13, 14, 18, 19, and 24, 1967
(Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1967) , p. 2.
(1966), CXII, No. 32, A985.
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precedence over statistics, reason outweighs formality, and
intelligence supersedes blind technicality.

Further, he

believed "that human rights mu s t be satisfied through the
orderly process of law.
An analysis of his effectiveness is appropriate and
essential to complete the concept of the man.

Six measures

of effectiveness have been recommended by Thonssen, Baird
and Braden and are applied to the speeches examined in this
study.

Generally, the standards of effectiveness may be

summarized as follows:

(1) the test of readability;

the technical perfection;

(2)

(3) the honesty and integrity of

the orator and the social utility of his message;
character of the immediate response;

(4) the

(5) the orator's

wisdom to judge trends of the future ; and

(6) substantial

responses producing the desired changes in belief or atti
tude, which may come hours, days or weeks after the delivery
of the speech and the long-range effects of oratory upon
society.®
According to some authorities in the field of
speech readability of speech is sometimes perceived as a
negative indication of effectiveness on the assumption that
a speech must have been unsatisfactory to the listeners
if it reads well in print.

Since numerous exceptions to

With Mr. Marshall on the Supreme Court," U.S.
News and World Report, June 26, 1967, p. 12.
Braden, Speech Criticism (2d e d . ; New York:
Company, 1970), pp. 540-545.

Ronald Press
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this criterion have emerged, the validity of this position
seems doubtful.

Applying this criterion to copies of

Marshall's speeches, one can detect what some have described
as Marshall's "appeal to common sense and logic rather than
to legal technicalities."^

Marshall's speeches are notable

for the quality of their prose and in this writer's
opinion read well.

It could be concluded that this aspect

verifies the fact that Marshall's style almost equaled his
ideas in determining his overall effectiveness as a
speaker.
The technical or artistic excellence of a speech
is accepted as a measure of merit.

Marshall's addresses

to legal scholars and laymen are praiseworthy in terms of
inventive conception, structure and stylistic composition.
Marshall's speech organization consistently conformed to
the classical divisions of introduction, body and conclu
sion.

The structural aspects of his speeches were adapted

in content and length to the knowledge and interests of the
audiences.

In terms of style, Marshall's speeches were

lucid, stimulating, impressive, and appropriate.

He

utilized familiar terms, figures of speech and thought
which suited the particular audience.

Marshall tends to

prefer the logical pattern of organization whether address
ing a general audience or law students and lawyers.

The

^U.S., Congressional Rec o r d , 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), CXII, No. 32, A985.
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speeches treated in this study indicate that he often
utilizes the problem-solution pattern effectively.

Of

some importance is the fact that Marshall varies his
types of examples to suit the needs of each type of
audience.

Marshall's contentions were supported by sound

reasoning.
Marshall's legal training contributed to his
effective inventive skill.

His ability to think clearly

and to reason cogently was demonstrated on each speech
occasion.

This capacity combined with his exceptional

talent for choosing effective and appropriate arguments
and supporting them logically strengthened his oratory.
Marshall demonstrates the ability to establish the accept
ability of a conclusion with the aim of securing belief
or action.
Marshall's arguments usually centered on social
and moral forces.

These arguments required proofs demon

strating the existence of universal tendencies.

Marshall

fulfilled this requirement by presenting a body of data,
incidents, and statements correlated and synthesized so
that his conclusions about their importance seem unques
tionable.

Further, Marshall sought to arouse listeners and

to urge the correction of immediate and pressing wrongs.
Marshall's address at the White House Conference
represents a typical example of his preference for
narration of historical and contemporary events as a method
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of development.

His proposition rested chiefly upon

historical narratives and examples.

In this address,

Marshall devoted most of the speech to narration and develop
ment of historical and contemporary incidents, analogies,
and examples which inform the audience about the persistent
denial of equality and justice to American Negroes.

Members

of the audience obviously found listening easier and ideas
understandable because of the speaker's mode of development.
Among others, Genung has described the rhetorical advantages
of this method of presentation:
When we inquire what ordinary men . . . are
interested in and talk about, we find it is almost
to be some manifestation of action. . . . Such
things can be observed without learning and
without painful thought; moreover, the very
progress of them is a stimulus to sustained atten
tion.
The spirited account of such things,
accordingly, is the kind of literature that appeals
most easily to all classes of men.8
Marshall's audiences, for the most part, were
favorably disposed toward his premises.

Addressing general

audiences, in particular, Marshall needed to amplify and
vitalize his principles of judgment and conduct.

To some

extent, he was able to impel his hearers to act upon these
principles with vigor and without delay by the proofs which
he included to support his urgings, as well as by the
manner in which he applied those supports.

Evidence of the

Marie Kathryn Hochmuth, e d . , A History and Criti
cism of American Public Address (New York:
Russell and
Russell, 1955), pp. 159-160.
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latter can be found in the published report following the
White House Conference.

Following Marshall's speech in

Indianapolis, newspaper accounts of statements by
public officials and a list of recommendations by the
conferees represent, in part, the extent to which Marshall
achieved his goal.
It is not surprising that addressing audiences of
lawyers and law students Marshall uses mode of develop
ment which demonstrates his briefmaking skills.

For

example, the brief is divided into three parts— introduc
tion, discussion, and conclusion.

The introduction

includes the background material needed for understanding
the discussion to follow; the main points of the discus
sion correspond to the points of partition in the
introduction; the outline is logical, with points supported
by reasoning and evidence; refutation is clearly pre
sented; and the conclusion summarizes the main points and
affirms the proposition.
Evaluating Marshall's overall effectiveness, the
critic also considers his honesty and integrity and the
social utility of his message.
critic may query:
intent?

In this connection, the

Does the speech reflect high moral

Does it express ideas and feelings that are ethi

cally praiseworthy?

In short, is a good man using his art

to do good things?
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As an orator, Marshall did not rely upon his engag
ing presence and prominent position.

His addresses con

sistently appear to epitomize an active intelligence
energetically at work.
During and following the period that Thurgood
Marshall served as Solicitor General of the United States
and made the five speeches treated in this study, we find
substantial evidence that Marshall meets the following
requirements:

"One who speaks . . . suasive discourse may

thus be making— or at least declaring— policy.

He propounds

a course of action to be taken, often in troubled c ircum
stances, where even the wise and the prudent may hold
differing opinions.

The rhetorician is concerned typically

with concerting and advocating a judgment, with reaching and
defending a decision in areas that may be controversial."^
Marshall’s oratory which essentially focused on
themes dealing with equal rights and justice or generally
speaking civil rights ma y be characterized or classified as
rhetoric of reform; i.e., he urges his listeners 1) to
utilize legal and creative means,

2) to share responsibility

for eliminating inequality and injustice, and 3) to mobilize
all available resources which promote social reform in
keeping with constitutional guarantees.

^Bower Aly and Lucile Tolse Aly, A Rhetoric of
Public Speaking (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973),
p. 2.
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Part of Marshall's heritage from his father was his
propensity for argumentation and debate which led to his
pursuit of a career as a lawyer.

As a law student at

Howard University we discover that Marshall not only acquired
academic skills which enabled him to become a trial lawyer
with few peers but helped to mold his faith in the law as
the instrument of social change and his concept of members
of the legal profession as social engineers.
Marshall joined his former mentor Charles L.
Johnson as an NAACP lawyer.

Marshall, along with other NAACP

lawyers, argued and usually won cases which not only defined
the constitutional rights of the Negro as a citizen but
broadened the interpretation of constitutional rights for
all citizens and extended civil liberties for white citizens
as well.

These activities and their goals were reported in

newspapers throughout this nation.

Of the hundreds of

comments, the following remarks published in The Crisis may
be viewed as among the best:
While it may be true that laws and constitu
tions do not right a wrong and overturn established
folkways overnight, it is also true that the
reaffirmation of these principles of democracy
build a body of public opinion in which rights and
privileges of citizenship may be enjoyed, and in
which the more brazen as well as the more
sophisticated attempts at deprivation may be
h alted.10

lOrhurgood Marshall, "Equal Justice Under the Law,"
The Crisis, July, 1939, p. 201.
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During the late 1950s and early 1960s numerous
studies reveal that a minority of American Negroes had
entered a growing affluent black middle class more than in
prior decades.

On the other hand, many reports substantiate

the fact that the condition of the majority of American
blacks had not improved significantly.

Millions of blacks

continued to live in the grinding poverty and the
deepening despair of the urban ghettos.

There is evidence

that the lot of these neglected and alienated people had
not been altered.

In fact, evidence supports the fact that

the gap between the haves and the have-nots was widening.
When signs of an activist civil rights movement
emerged, the government took steps to improve the lot of
American Negroes.

In the first five years of the 1960s,

executive orders and legislation passed by Congress
represented some attempts.

During the Kennedy and Johnson

administrations the War on Poverty was accompanied by an
economic boom.

However, riots in Watts, Detroit, Harlem

and other northern cities erupted during the summers of
1965-1967.

It seems the civil rights laws had not eradi

cated the de facto economic and social segregation in the
North.

The War on Poverty had not fulfilled the goals and

the economic prosperity of the 1960s had not reached those
in the lower economic strata.

For instance, reports show
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that the average Negro family's income had decreased during
this period in comparison to the average white family's
income.
This was a period in America when there existed the
need to determine anew.

At the same time there emerged

demands for political and economic self-determination, the
call for "Black Power" and what has been called the Black
Revolution.

In short, it seems that America was confronted

with the most serious and potentially dangerous domestic
situation since the Civil War.
Evidence presented earlier substantiates the fact
that Thurgood Marshall's honesty and integrity were widely
acclaimed time and time again by supporters and opponents as
well.

Further, these speeches provide additional evidence

that Marshall was in close contact with problems related
to inequality and injustice, was qualified to speak of the
need for social reform and the capacity of the Supreme
Court and all other Americans to make equality before the
law a reality, and was an authority on constitutional law
capable of recommending specific actions to be taken by the
audience to accomplish desired goals.
Regarding the immediate response given to a speech,
it has been noted that this is sometimes superficial but
often it is considered an accurate indicator of merit.

-^Joseph Parker Witherspoon, Administrative
Implementation of Civil Rights (Austin!
University of
Texas Press, 1968), pp. 5-32.
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Articles in law journals and eye witness accounts provide
evidence that the audience reaction to Marshall's speaking
was almost universally favorable.

Applause and cheers were

among the overt signs of approval which substantiate the
fact that as a speaker Marshall gained and maintained the
attention of his audiences.
there were no exceptions.

As far as one can determine
For example, the Federal Bar News

of October, 1965, contained the following comment:

"The

Honorable Thurgood Marshall, Solicitor General of the United
States . . . delivered a stimulating interpretation of
recent Supreme Court decisions in an .address,
tion and Social C h a n g e M e m b e r s

'The Constitu

of the audience when

Marshall spoke in Indianapolis comment that his remarks
were eloquent and that they consider his ideas as great as
his reputation.

Significantly, newspaper accounts of his

addresses tended to report more about his ideas than about
his delivery.

Typical examples of such accounts appeared

in the Indianapolis Star and the Chicago Daily N e w s .
Michael B. Scanlon of the Indianapolis Star wrote:
Marshall also warned against the total
physical destruction of the ghetto.
"Remove the
conditions which require certain people to live
in it involuntarily," he said.
"This society of two worlds must be merged,
this widening gulf between affluence and poverty
bridged, this separation of one group, one race

Thomas Rowland and Joseph Fontana, "Conven
tion Program Reaches New High," Federal Bar N e w s , October,
1965, p. 339.
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from another repaired and healed once and for
all," he s a i d . 13
Edmnnd J. Rooney of Chicago Daily News wrote:
Thurgood Marshall, Solicitor General of the
United States, said Thursday that the United States
Supreme Court should not end its involvement with
social change.
Marshall said he hopes the Supreme Court
will not singly try to eliminate these injustices
but that other social and political institutions
will make it a joint e n t e r p r i s e . 14
Substantial evidence provided earlier in this study supports
the theme that Marshall's popularity as a speaker on
college campuses and before conferences and conventions
reached its zenith during this period.

His popularity

generated increasing demand for his services particularly by
law schools and legal associations.

Finally, according to

rhetorical standards, Marshall can be considered an effective
speaker.
His speeches were reprinted in their entirety with
complimentary comments in law journals, professional
magazines, and the Congressional R e c o r d .

Leading news

papers contained these speeches in part.

The audiences were

large and responsive.

According to his secretary, he

received more requests than he could possibly fill.

^^Michael B. Scanlon, "Don't Bulldoze Slum; Fix It
Up, Conference Told," Indianapolis S t a r , June 16, 1966.
Edmund J. Rooney, "Negro Asks Court to Stay
Involved," Chicago Daily N e w s , September 16, 1965.
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In mid-1967 Marshall's nomination as Supreme Court
Associate Justice occasioned many comments and appraisals.
His professional career as an NAACP lawyer and as an advo
cate of equal rights and justice for all, victories before
the Supreme Court, his knowledge of and reverence for the
Constitution, his personal traits of character and
temperament were analyzed and reviewed.
Appraisal of Marshall's wisdom in anticipating
future trends essentially tests his vision, his capacity
to understand the meaning of current happenings, and his
foresight in appreciating their probable effect upon the
course of history.

Thonssen, Baird, and Braden note:

"With such a test, we link the concepts of statesmanship
and oratory; we measure a man's greatness as a speaker in
terms of his competence in gauging the effects of a con
temporary action upon the destinies of m e n . "
Accordingly, Marshall's abilities have been lauded time
and time again.

The following excerpt from a letter dated

July 14, 1967, endorsing Marshall's nomination
summarizes :

"Both in private practice and in public

office he has demonstrated those qualities which we admire
in memh>ers of our highest judicial tribunal; i.e.,
moderation, reasonableness, a judicial temperament, and

^^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 542.
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a balanced approach to controversial and complicated
national problems.
Many scholars and orators agree that it is a
travesty upon the American creed that Negroes have had to
fight for their rights at all.

Presumably, the meaning of

civil rights implies that they are guaranteed to all
without regard to race, color, creed, or class.

Signifi

cantly, many Americans, Negro Americans in particular, feel
that achievement of rights through the courts is expensive
and slow but few will disagree with the fact that in the
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, there has been "a
tide moving slowly but inexorably in the direction of the
achievement of first-class citizenship by N e g r o e s . I n
other words, while the processes of the courts are slow,
cumbersome and costly, generally the victories w^on this way
have tended to be solid and enduring.

It is not sur

prising that Marshall's victories before the Supreme Court,
arguing cases dealing with civil rights, provided the
foundation for his position that the Supreme Court should
stay involved in the struggle for equal rights and
justice.

Put another way, the Supreme Court should continue

^S.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on the
Judiciary, Nomination of Thurgood Marshall to Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearing,
p. 198.
^^Donald B. King and Charles W. Quick, Legal
Aspects of the Civil Rights Movement (Detroit; Wayne State
University Press, 1965), p. 2.
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social reform designed to eliminate inequality and injustice.
Marshall's belief in the Constitution as a "living
d o c u m e n t " a n d in the capabilities of members of the
legal profession and other branches of the federal govern
ment gave rise to his argument that these groups, in
particular, should share the responsibility for securing
equality and justice for all.

Marshall contends that the

Supreme Court should remain active "in the process of social
change of requiring that our social living conform to our
social ideals.

He maintains that the elimination of

inequality and massive injustices require that other
branches of the federal government, other social and
political institutions, and lawyers in particular make
solving the related problems a joint enterprise.
Authorities in the field of speech criticism advise
the critic to measure an orator's effectiveness by sub
stantial responses associated with possible changes in
belief, attitude, or action which come hours, days, or
months after the delivery of the speech.
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden remark:
test will be:

For example,

"But the fundamental

Did these speeches have an effect upon the

Judiciary, Nomination of Thurgood Marshall to Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearing,
p. 49.
19
U.S., Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967), CXIII, No. 140, 24644.
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subsequent disposition of the question?
the delayed response?

Did they produce

Did they create a readiness in the

listeners to act in a certain way when the right stimulus
came along?

(This is a legitimate end of persuasive dis

course.)" In this connection, these authorities also
comment:

"By extension, this criterion or measure tries to

assay the long-range effects of oratory upon society.

Over

a period of years, did the speech or a series of speeches
exercise a discernible influence upon the course of
events?"
Thurgood Marsh a l l 's speech to the Greater
Indianapolis Housing Conference June 15, 1966, focused on
the need to resolve the problem of inadequate housing and
discrimination in housing or unfair housing practices.

On

the same day, the Indianapolis News reported the following
statements from Marshall's conclusion:

"The massive and

urgent task of correcting the problems must be done and in
the doing we will have made a lasting contribution toward
fulfilling the American purpose and redeeming the American
promise.

There is no higher function of citizenship than

that," he

[Marshall]

said.

Of some interest is the fact that earlier in this
speech Marshall had remarked that the provisions of the
Housing Act of 1949, particularly the one guaranteeing a

^^Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, pp. 542-543.
"Marshall Cites Flaming Distrust," Indianapolis
News, June 15, 1966.
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decent home for every American, had not been realized.
Marshall's address contained specific prerequisites to
ensure adequate

[decent]

and fair housing for all.

The

Indianapolis Star of June 16, 1966, the day after
Marshall's address before the Greater Indianapolis Housing
Conference, reported that the conferees had drafted fif
teen recommendations that would be presented to city and
state officials.

According to this article,

"Paying

replacement value for some owner-occupied homes in the
path of interstate highways was one
tions]."

[of the recommenda

The article continues by listing five other

recommendations :
1.

Add at least five representatives to advisory
councils in areas slated for urban renewal
to the housing committee of the Greater
Indianapolis Progress Committee.
The
committee provides the "citizens participa
tion" required by the 1949 Housing Act to
qualify the community for public housing.

2.

Enlarge staffs and budgets of both the
Indiana Civil Rights Commission and the
Indianapolis Housing Rights Commission to
enforce fair housing l a w s .

3.

Amend the Indiana Civil Rights Law to permit
licenses of real estate brokers and salesmen
to be revoked if they violate fair housing

4.

Co-ordinate neighborhood associations by
formation of a council to exert maximum
political pressure on city and state officials.

5.

Organize an Indiana Department of Housing
through which the state might build housing

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

in Indianapolis to repay city taxpayers for
loss of taxable land to be used for highways.
Also significant is the fact that in June, 1966,
Congressman Andrew Jacobs, Jr.

(D-Indiana) who heard

Marshall's address introduced a bill in the House of
Representatives "to assure homeowners of getting replace
ment value and not just fair market price for their homes
when forced to sell for federally supported public works
projects.It

should be added that Congress passed the

Civil Rights Act of 1968.

According to the United States

Department of Housing and Urban Development;

"Title VIII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Fair Housing Title,
declares a national policy to provide for fair housing
throughout the United States."

The "Fair Housing Law"

protects Americans from such acts as refusal to deal,
discrimination in the terms or conditions of sale or rental
of a dwelling, and discriminatory advertising, where such
acts are based on discrimination on account of race, color,
religion, or national origin.
Edgar F. Kaiser, Chairman of the President's
Committee on Urban Housing, in a letter to the president

^^Scanlon, June 16, 1966.

Federal Housing Administration, Fair Housing 1968— An
Interpretation of Title VIII (Faxr Housing) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 (Washington:
Government Printing
Office, Ï969).
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dated December 11, 1968, which accompanied the Committee's
report wrote;
We have learned that no single new development in
technology or in social and economic organization
will solve at a stroke this pressing problem. We
have learned, also, that although the responsi
bility of the Federal government is great.
Federal action alone cannot build the needed
housing.
Instead, there mus t be creative new
action by many institutions and agencies, by
government at the state and local level as well as
in Washington, and especially by private enter
prise. We have proposed m a n y specific improve
ments in Federal housing programs which are
intended to encourage greater business participation
in the field of low income housing.
We have also
proposed a specific new instrument— the National
Housing Partnership— to provide another route for
business entry into the production of housing.
We are pleased that this Partnership has now
become a reality. 25
Among others the following recommendation was made by this
Committee:

"A 10-year goal of 26 million more new and

rehabilitated housing units, including at least six million
for lower-income families.

Attainment of this goal should

eliminate the blight of substandard housing from the face
of the nation's cities and should provide every American
family with an affordable, decent home."

This report

included two specific reasons why the committee strongly
believed that the goal is necessary and justified:

(i)

"Decent housing is essential in helping lower income
families help themselves achieve self-fulfillment in a free

^^ h e Report of the President's Committee on Urban
Housing:
A Decent Home (Washington:
Government Printing
Office, 1969), p. ii.
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and democratic society;" and

(2)"Public expenditures for

decent housing for the nation's poor, like public expendi
tures for education and job training, are not so much
expenditures as they are essential investments in the
future of American society.
The United States Commission on Civil Rights wrote
a letter of transmittal dated February, 1978, and
addressed to the President of the United States, the
President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.

This letter preceded the second in a

series of Annual Commission Reports described as follows:
"Each report reviews executive, legislative, and judicial
actions, and other developments, favorable and unfavorable,
that the Commission considers critical to the national
goals of eliminating discrimination and enhancing equal
opportunity for all Americans in fundamental aspects of our
national life."

Of particular significance, the report

presents the status of housing, political participation, and
the need for continued commitment in the area of civil
rights.
In housing, the rising costs of housing and
various subtle patterns of discrimination continued
to limit fair housing opportunities in 1977.
Federal programs continued to fall far short of
providing additional housing needed by low- and
moderate-income groups and thus contributed to
the lack of any measurable progress toward
achieving the national goal of decent housing for
all Americans.

^ The Report of the President's Committee on Urban
Housing: A Decent Home (Washington:
Government Printing
Office, 1969), p. 3.
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In political participation, the administration
promised the appointments of significant numbers
of minorities and women to important positions in
the Federal Government.
Although movement toward
this goal has been slower than expected, various
top-level posts have in fact been filled by
representatives of these groups.
Voting rights
of minorities were also strengthened by several
Supreme Court decisions.
Full participation in
the Nation's political process remains a distant
goal, however, and vigilance must still be
exercised to ensure voting rights of minorities.
Following firm Presidential commitments,
steps were taken in 1977 to reorganize the Federal
civil rights enforcement effort.
It is antici
pated that these efforts will result in more
effective enforcement efforts in 1978.
While important beginnings were registered
during this past year, it is hoped that 1978 will
be marked by a determined commitment, fully
shared by executive and legislative branches of
government, to follow through on the encouraging
first steps noted in this report and to undertake
new and greater efforts to eliminate obstacles
to the full protection of civil rights and equal
opportunity for all.
We urge your consideration of the facts
presented in this report and ask for your further
leadership to guarantee equal opportunity for all
the citizens of this country.27
Assuming the audience complies with Marshall's
pleas for action, in the distant future it will
undoubtedly appear strange to look back upon these days
and observe that a segment of this nation's population
had to fight so long simply for equal treatment.
Although Thurgood Marshall's exact place among
mid-twentieth century orators may be debatable,

few will

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, The State of
Civil Rights;
1977— A Report of the United States Com
mission on Civil Rights (Washington:
Government Printing
Office, 1978), pp. i-ii.
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argue the fact that Marshall, like other great orators,
came forward to meet recurring crises in American society
and uttered words which helped to gain support for social
reform and to secure constitutional guarantees for
millions of Americans.

Marshall certainly expressed the

aspirations of many Americans to realize first-class American
citizenship in dignified, honest speech.

Each of

Marshall's speeches represents "a venture in the communica
tion of ideas and feelings to a specific audience."

In

fact, substantial evidence corroborates the effectiveness
of Marshall's addresses in terms of bringing out the moral
and intellectual character of the speaker, eliciting some
sort of immediate response, bearing the stamp of artistic
craftsmanship within the limitations set by the speech
situation, contributing to the common good, and to some
degree exercising influence upon subsequent events since
they certainly indicate concern for man and his manifest
destiny.
In terms of the extensiveness of his speaking, in
the power of his ideas and communication of them, in the
success he achieved gaining support for the causes he
represented,

in the degree to which he used the courtroom

and the public platform to assert humanitarian and
equalitarian principles to motivate others to share his
beliefs and to act accordingly thereby bringing about

28,Thonssen, Baird and Braden, p. 545.
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social and political reforms; one is convinced that
Thurgood Marshall must be included as one of America's
mid-twentieth century orators.
For centuries other orators in America have
addressed the problems related to the inequality and
injustice as Marshall did in the five speeches of this
study.

Certainly, the problems to which Marshall dedi

cated his life, his professional career and his personal
concern have not at this point in time been settled.
Presumably, Marshall's efforts must be evaluated in terms
of the effectiveness with which he asserted his sincerest
convictions.
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